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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the undersigned 
counsel for Defendant-Appellee Facebook, Inc. states that Facebook, Inc. is a 
publicly traded corporation, that it has no parent corporation, and that no publicly 
traded corporation holds 10% or more of its stock.  
/s/ Theodore J. Boutrous Jr.   
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr.  
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
Facebook, Inc. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the undersigned 
counsel for Defendant-Appellee Google LLC states that Google LLC is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company; no publicly traded company holds 10% 
or more of Alphabet Inc.’s stock. 
/s/ Brian M. Willen   
Brian M. Willen  
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
Google LLC 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the undersigned 
counsel for Defendant-Appellee Twitter, Inc. states that Twitter, Inc. is a publicly 
traded corporation and that no publicly traded entity owns 10% or more of its stock. 
/s/ Seth P. Waxman   
Seth P. Waxman 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
Twitter, Inc. 
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RULE 35(B)(1) STATEMENT 
This case raises an exceptionally important question: whether, under the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), social media companies and other 
businesses may be held liable for aiding and abetting a terrorist attack based on 
allegations that they:  
(1) provided standardized services to numerous users—billions or 
hundreds of millions worldwide, in the case of each Defendant here—
some of whom allegedly were supporters or members of a terrorist 
organization;  
(2) had only generalized awareness that their vast customer base included 
such supporters, regularly enforced policies expressly prohibiting such 
use, and are not alleged to have failed to remove any particular terrorist-
related account or content that came to their attention; and   
(3) played no role in the specific “act of international terrorism” that 
injured the plaintiffs.   
The panel’s holding that such allegations state a viable aiding-and-abetting claim 
conflicts with the ATA’s text and structure, and departs from decisions of other 
circuits.  Indeed, it is the first time that any court has subjected any business to 
potential liability for aiding and abetting a terrorist attack simply because it allegedly 
failed to enforce with sufficient vigor its rules against terrorists using its services.  
This unprecedented ruling warrants rehearing.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) created a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting ATA violations.  U.S. nationals injured by an “act of 
international terrorism” that was “committed, planned, or authorized” by a 
designated foreign terrorist organization may sue “any person who aids and abets, 
by knowingly providing substantial assistance, … the person who committed such 
an act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).   
Until now, no court has allowed an ATA claim to proceed where the defendant 
provided only standardized services, common to billions of users, that supporters of 
a terrorist organization allegedly used to benefit that organization—much less where 
the defendant affirmatively sought to prevent such use.  In over a dozen cases, courts 
have rejected similar ATA claims against social media companies.  
This all changed with the panel’s decision.  By extending aiding-and-abetting 
liability to Twitter, Google, and Facebook, the panel departed from the ATA’s text 
and the traditional aiding-and-abetting principles it codifies.  Although the statute 
requires knowingly and substantially assisting the principal violation at issue, the 
panel deemed it sufficient that (1) Defendants were generally aware that their 
billions of users included supporters of a terrorist organization, despite regularly 
enforced policies against such use, and (2) this use allegedly benefited the 
organization generally, without any connection to the specific terrorist attack that 
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injured Plaintiffs.  That unprecedented approach not only contravenes the ATA’s 
plain text and traditional aiding-and-abetting principles, but also breaks from 
decisions of other circuits.  And as a practical matter, the legal uncertainty it creates 
threatens ordinary business activities across numerous economic sectors.  Rehearing 
is needed to ensure consistency and predictability under this critical federal statute. 
BACKGROUND 
In January 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov killed 39 people at the Reina 
nightclub in Istanbul.  Plaintiffs are relatives of Nawras Alassaf, who was killed in 
the attack.  They allege that Masharipov acted at ISIS’s direction and under the 
guidance of Abu Shuhada, the alleged head of ISIS’s Turkey operations.   
Plaintiffs seek to hold Twitter, Google, and Facebook liable for Alassaf’s 
death because they offer global Internet platforms to billions of users worldwide, 
some of whom were ISIS adherents who allegedly used those platforms to recruit 
terrorists, raise funds, and disseminate propaganda.  But as the panel acknowledged, 
Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants had “any intent to further or aid ISIS’s 
terrorist activities,” or “shared any of ISIS’s objectives.”  Op. 72 (Addendum).  
Indeed, Plaintiffs admit that Defendants prohibit use of their services to promote 
terrorism and “regularly removed ISIS content and ISIS-affiliated accounts” when 
discovered.  Id.  Plaintiffs do not identify a single specific account or post that any 
Defendant knew was promoting terrorist activities yet did not remove.  As for the 
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Reina attack, neither Masharipov nor Shuhada is alleged ever to have used Twitter, 
Google, or Facebook, much less in connection with the attack, and no Defendant is 
alleged to have known about, assisted, or had any involvement whatsoever in the 
attack.  The district court thus held that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.  
The panel reversed.  In its view, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Defendants 
“knowingly” assisted ISIS because third parties reported that ISIS supporters were 
somewhere among the billions of users on Defendants’ platforms and Defendants’ 
efforts to prevent such use allegedly could have been more “meaningful.”  Op. 70.  
According to the panel, the “principal violation” here was “ISIS’s terrorism 
campaign” or “enterprise,” not the Reina attack—even though Plaintiffs 
“unambiguously conceded the act of international terrorism they allege is the Reina 
attack itself.”  Op. 60-61, 70-72. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant rehearing for three reasons. 
First, ATA aiding-and-abetting liability requires that the defendant aid and 
abet by knowingly providing substantial assistance.  The panel held that Plaintiffs 
stated a viable claim even though it is undisputed that no Defendant intended or 
sought to assist ISIS—and that all of them maintained and regularly enforced 
policies against terrorists and terrorist content.  The panel deemed it sufficient that 
Defendants allegedly were generally aware that, somewhere among their billions of 
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users were some ISIS supporters circumventing Defendants’ policies, and that 
Defendants could have more “aggressive[ly]” tried to prevent that use.  Op. 69.  In 
the many aiding-and-abetting cases under the ATA (or similar statutes), no prior 
court found the mens rea requirement satisfied through such a “failure to do more” 
theory.  Rather, applying traditional aiding-and-abetting principles, courts frequently 
apply a heightened scienter requirement to cases premised on providing routine 
services and purported inaction in the face of third-party wrongful conduct.  The 
panel here did the opposite.     
Second, the panel’s holding that an ATA aiding-and-abetting claim can 
proceed with no allegation that Defendants provided any (much less “substantial”) 
assistance to the underlying terrorist attack that injured the plaintiff—here, the Reina 
attack—contravenes the statutory text and the traditional aiding-and-abetting test it 
codifies.  It also departs from decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and a prior 
ruling of this Court, all of which focus on the defendants’ alleged assistance to the 
specific “act of international terrorism” at issue.  The tension between the panel’s 
decision and recent ATA aiding-and-abetting decisions warrants rehearing.   
While each of these holdings warrants review, the combination of the two 
make the panel’s ruling a striking outlier.  In a very recent decision holding 
(incorrectly, in Defendants’ view) that the ATA does not require a bank’s assistance 
to the “injury-causing act,” the Second Circuit required knowledge that particular 
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customers were affiliated with a terrorist group.  Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL, __ 
F.4th __, 2021 WL 3197188, at *9-10 (2d Cir. July 29, 2021).  The panel here 
required neither.  It held that Defendants were subject to aiding-and-abetting liability 
based merely on allegations of highly general knowledge that their platforms were 
used by ISIS supporters—without ever identifying any particular ISIS-affiliated 
account or content that Defendants knew about and did not promptly disable or 
remove, and without any connection between Defendants’ platforms and the attack 
that injured Plaintiffs.  That approach stretches aiding-and-abetting liability beyond 
anything permitted in any prior case. 
Third, the panel’s decision threatens harmful consequences for ordinary 
businesses that provide generally available services or engage in arms-length 
transactions with large numbers of consumers.  Recent ATA cases have targeted a 
range of companies under loose aiding-and-abetting theories like those asserted here.  
By holding that liability attaches to any terrorist attack committed anywhere in the 
world, just because a defendant allegedly knew generally that adherents of a terrorist 
group used its standardized product or service (and despite regularly acting to 
prevent that use), the panel’s ruling would allow expansive aiding-and-abetting 
theories rejected by other courts.  Indeed, plaintiffs in other ATA cases have already 
cited the ruling as holding that “merely allowing terrorists onto a general commercial 
platform” may support aiding-and-abetting liability even where a defendant “shared 
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none of ‘ISIS’s objectives’” and “took affirmative ‘steps to remove ISIS-affiliated 
accounts and videos.’”  E.g., Letter, Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., No. 20-7077 
(D.C. Cir. June 24, 2021).   
Rehearing is urgently needed to ensure that the ATA is applied consistently 
and fairly to target terrorists and their actual supporters—not social media 
companies and other general-use businesses that actively endeavor to prevent 
terrorists from using their services.1 
I. THE PANEL’S DECISION DEPARTS FROM THE ATA’S TEXT AND 
STRUCTURE AND DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS 
In allowing Plaintiffs’ claim to proceed, the panel made two particularly 
egregious errors.  First, Defendants’ alleged failure to “take meaningful steps” to 
ensure that ISIS adherents do not use their platforms (Op. 70) does not establish that 
Defendants “knowingly” assisted ISIS.  Second, Defendants’ alleged assistance to 
users who support ISIS generally cannot support ATA aiding-and-abetting liability 
 
1 Although Defendants argued that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
bars Plaintiffs’ claim, the panel declined to “reach this question in the first instance” 
because the district court did not.  Op. 23 n.6.  But in Gonzalez v. Google, No. 18-
16700 (9th Cir.), with which Taamneh was consolidated for oral argument, the panel 
held that Section 230 immunizes Google (the only defendant there) from ATA 
aiding-and-abetting claims indistinguishable from those presented here.  Op. 22-49.  
Defendants understand that the plaintiffs in Gonzalez will file a petition for rehearing 
en banc contemporaneously with this petition.  Defendants respectfully submit that 
rehearing in Gonzalez should be denied but that if the Court does rehear Gonzalez, 
it should rehear this case along with it.   
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without any connection to the specific “act of international terrorism” from which 
the suit arose (here, the Reina attack).  These erroneous rulings are inconsistent with 
this Court’s decision in Brill v. Chevron Corp., 804 F. App’x 630 (9th Cir. 2020), 
and depart from how other circuits apply the ATA.  Had the panel reached the correct 
result on either ground, it would have affirmed the district court’s dismissal.  
A. Allegations That Defendants Provided Routine Commercial 
Services That Were Used By Terrorists Despite Efforts To 
Prevent Such Use Cannot Establish “Knowing” Assistance  
Under Section 2333(d), a defendant must “knowingly” provide substantial 
assistance to the principal wrong.  Although the panel recited this requirement, see 
Op. 59-60 & n.17, 70, its interpretation thereof eliminated any meaningful 
knowledge requirement.  The panel’s entire assessment of this element rests on a 
single observation: “The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that each defendant 
has been aware of ISIS’s use of their respective social media platforms for many 
years—through media reports, statements from U.S. government officials, and 
threatened lawsuits—but have refused to take meaningful steps to prevent that use.”  
Op. 70; see Op. 69.2 
 
2 In the same paragraph, the panel also referred to allegations that ISIS depended on 
Defendant’s platforms to advance its agenda (Op. 70), but these allegations say 
nothing about Defendants’ knowledge, much less knowing assistance of ISIS.  The 
panel also pointed to allegations about Google’s alleged revenue sharing with ISIS—
allegations that the panel had rejected (in Gonzalez) as insufficient to establish that 
Google knowingly provided substantial assistance to ISIS (Op. 65-66) and that, in 
any event, are irrelevant as to Facebook and Twitter.    
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On this view, general awareness that supporters of a terrorist group are 
somewhere among the numerous users posting content on Defendants’ social media 
platforms—or more generally, using a business’s routine services—in violation of 
the business’s express rules, coupled with an alleged failure to take more 
“meaningful” steps to prevent that misuse, can establish knowing assistance under 
the ATA.  Remarkably, the panel so held while expressly acknowledging that:  
(1) Defendants did not share ISIS’s goals or have any “intent to further or 
aid ISIS’s terrorist activities”;  
(2) Defendants had, “at most, an arms-length transactional relationship 
with ISIS” and did not provide any specialized assistance, tailored to 
terrorists;  
(3) Defendants’ “policies prohibit posting content that promotes terrorist 
activity”; and  
(4) Defendants “regularly removed ISIS content and ISIS-affiliated 
accounts.”   
Op. 72. 
No prior ATA case—and no analogous case of any kind of which Defendants 
are aware—has found aiding and abetting under these circumstances.  And for good 
reason:  a business that provides a standardized service and adopts and enforces rules 
barring its use by bad actors cannot be a knowing “aider and abettor” simply because 
it allegedly could have done more “to prevent that use.”  Op. 70 (emphasis added).   
The panel’s analysis cannot be squared with the ATA’s express requirement 
of knowing assistance or with decades of cases applying a strict mens rea standard 
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for civil aiding-and-abetting liability.  As this Court has explained, the ATA requires 
“actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her 
role in furthering it.”  Brill, 804 F. App’x at 632 (quoting Harmsen v. Smith, 693 
F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982)).  Allegations of negligence or even “recklessness”—
that defendants “should have known that they were contributing to terrorism and 
chose to ignore the possible consequences”—are insufficient.  Freeman v. HSBC 
Holdings PLC, 465 F. Supp. 3d 220, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). 
Moreover, a defendant’s knowledge must be specific to the aid provided.  In 
Brill, this Court rejected an aiding-and-abetting claim applying the same mens rea 
standard under an analogous statute because there were no allegations that the 
defendant “knew [its] funds were then provided to a terrorist organization and that 
those same funds were specifically used to finance the terrorist activity in Israel that 
resulted in the injuries to Appellants and their family members.”  804 F. App’x at 
632-633.  Allegations that a defendant providing services to the general public knew 
terrorist sympathizers were using those services, without more, are “insufficient to 
satisfy JASTA’s scienter requirement.”  Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 379 
F. Supp. 3d 148, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, 842 F. App’x 701 (2d Cir. 
2021).   
That approach tracks how courts traditionally have applied the knowledge 
requirement under analogous statutes and at common law.  For aiding-and-abetting 
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liability, “the knowledge element is critical.”  Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 
(8th Cir. 1991).  Without it, “aiding and abetting would be indistinguishable from 
simply aiding” and “would cast too wide a net, bringing under it parties involved in 
nothing more than routine business transactions.”  Id.  Aiding and abetting requires 
“knowledge of a wrongful purpose,” and a defendant “whose actions are routine and 
part of normal everyday business practices” is not liable as an aider and abettor 
absent a higher degree of knowledge.  Id.; accord Woodward v. Metro Bank of 
Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (“If the evidence shows no more than 
transactions constituting the daily grist of the mill, we would be loathe to find … 
liability without clear proof of intent.”); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Ft. Lauderdale, 
765 F.2d 1004, 1009-1010 (11th Cir. 1985) (“stronger evidence of complicity would 
be required for the alleged aider and abettor who conducts what appears to be a 
transaction in the ordinary course of his business”).  Courts also have held that 
“[w]here the secondary defendant’s conduct is nothing more than inaction,” a 
plaintiff must demonstrate “that the aider-abettor consciously intended to assist in 
the perpetration of a wrongful act.”  Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 
F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978).   
While recent ATA cases have adopted varying standards for aiding-and-
abetting claims, not one has suggested that businesses can be found liable without 
allegations that they shared the terrorists’ goals, provided services tailored to 
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terrorist objectives, or affirmatively assisted a person or entity they knew was a 
terrorist “at the time that it provided … services to” that individual.  Honickman, 
2021 WL 3197188, at *10-11 (rejecting ATA claim where plaintiffs failed to allege 
that defendant bank knew that specific customers were members of or affiliated with 
Hamas); see also, e.g., Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 999 F.3d 842, 865-866 
(2d Cir. 2021).  And certainly none has held that a social media platform knowingly 
assisted a terrorist organization merely because terrorist sympathizers posted 
harmful content on the platform despite the platform’s policies prohibiting such 
activities.   
Nothing in the ATA’s text supports the panel’s approach or suggests that 
Congress, in using the word “knowingly,” meant to depart from how courts have 
long understood the term.  And Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)—cited in the preamble to JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2, 130 Stat. 852 
(2016) (Op. 55)—only confirms that the panel erred.  There, the D.C. Circuit, after 
setting out the “knowingly” requirement and citing Woodward and similar cases, 
705 F.2d at 477-478, affirmed the defendant’s liability for aiding and abetting a 
burglary and resulting murder committed by her live-in partner—a scenario that is, 
“to put it mildly, dissimilar to the one at issue here,” Op. 56.  The defendant there 
gave individualized assistance to her partner after the fact in each of a long-running 
series of burglaries, providing “invaluable” services in an “unusual way”—including 
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documenting and liquidating the contraband from each burglary, and serving for 
years as the operation’s “banker, bookkeeper, recordkeeper, and secretary.”  705 
F.2d at 486-487.  This “continuous participation reflected her intent and desire to 
make the [illegal] venture succeed.”  Id. at 488.  The court nowhere suggested that 
knowledge could be based on standardized “arms-length” services used by billions 
of people, much less Defendants’ alleged general awareness that their vast user base 
included persons posting terrorist content in violation of policies prohibiting such 
use.  Op. 70-72. 
In holding otherwise, the panel departed from established aiding-and-abetting 
law and effectively read out of the ATA any meaningful scienter requirement.  That 
alone warrants rehearing.   
B. The Panel’s Holding That The “Principal Violation” Was ISIS’s 
General Campaign Rather Than The Reina Attack Contravenes 
The ATA And Departs From Decisions Of Other Circuits  
Rehearing is independently warranted to address the panel’s ruling that 
aiding-and-abetting liability may rest on allegedly providing generalized assistance 
to supporters of a terrorist organization, rather than to the actual “act of international 
terrorism” that injured the plaintiff.  The panel construed the “relevant ‘principal 
violation’” as “ISIS’s terrorism campaign” or “enterprise,” rather than the Reina 
attack itself.  Op. 60-61, 70-71.  Under this holding, Defendants face liability for 
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aiding and abetting the Reina attack even though nothing they allegedly did had 
anything to do with that attack.   
That conclusion contravenes the ATA’s text, which states that, “[i]n an action 
under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism 
committed, planned, or authorized by [a designated foreign terrorist organization] 
… , liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly 
providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed 
such an act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d) (emphases added).  It 
also contravenes the structure of Section 2333 more generally.  By using the singular 
“act” throughout Section 2333, Congress emphasized that aiding-and-abetting 
liability attaches only when the defendant assists a specific crime, not merely an 
overall “campaign” or “enterprise.”   
The black-letter definition of aiding and abetting likewise requires a link 
between the defendant’s assistance and the wrong that injured the plaintiff.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979) (secondary actor must have 
substantially assisted the primary tortfeasor in “conduct[ing]” the principal tort).  If 
Congress had meant to depart from “the established meaning of th[at] term[]” by 
severing the link between aiding and abetting and the principal wrong, it would have 
done so expressly.  Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995).  The panel’s holding that 
Congress did so stands in tension with how this Court and others have read similar 
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aiding-and-abetting provisions in other statutes.  See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 
1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (Securities Exchange Act aiding and abetting required 
“‘substantial assistance’ in the commission of the primary violation”); Camp, 948 
F.2d at 462 (“[T]here must be a ‘substantial causal connection between the culpable 
conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to plaintiff.’”). 
Consistent with these principles, courts of appeals in all previous ATA cases 
involving social media platforms have focused on whether the defendants assisted 
the specific attack that injured the plaintiff.  In Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., the Sixth 
Circuit examined whether the defendants substantially assisted the person who 
committed “the shooting” at the nightclub.  921 F.3d 617, 626-627 (6th Cir. 2019).  
And in Retana v. Twitter, Inc., the Fifth Circuit emphasized that ATA aiding-and-
abetting liability “focuses on the relationship between the act of international 
terrorism and the secondary actor’s alleged supportive conduct.”  1 F.4th 378, 383 
(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 331 (2d Cir. 2018)) 
(emphasis omitted).   
The panel did not engage with the ATA’s text or these circuit decisions.  
Rather, it recited the facts of Halberstam, noting that the defendant there provided 
substantial assistance to her partner’s burglary “enterprise.”  705 F.2d at 486; see 
Op. 61.  But JASTA’s preamble notes only that Halberstam “provides the proper 
legal framework,” Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2, 130 Stat. 852 (emphasis added); 
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Congress did not provide that Halberstam’s particular (and unusual) facts should be 
used to answer every aiding-and-abetting question.  Even more specifically, the 
“Legal Framework” section of the Halberstam opinion adopts the traditional aiding-
and-abetting formulation: aiding-and-abetting liability requires that “the defendant 
must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.”  705 F.2d at 476-
478 (emphasis added).   
In any event, the allegations here are far afield from Halberstam.  As noted, 
the defendant there was a full and willing participant in, and logically and practically 
aided each of her live-in partner’s burglaries that made up the so-called “enterprise.”  
Here, the complaint alleges no connection whatsoever between Defendants’ alleged 
assistance and the Reina attack.  Accordingly, had the panel followed the ATA’s text 
and the approach taken in other circuits, it would have rejected Plaintiffs’ claim. 
* * * 
Either of the panel’s holdings alone would justify en banc review.  Combined, 
they make this Court’s ATA jurisprudence an extreme outlier, as two recent Second 
Circuit cases—which held that substantial assistance to the “injury-causing act” is 
not always required—make clear.  Honickman, 2021 WL 3197188, at *5; see also 
Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 865-866.  As explained above, the Second Circuit’s approach 
to the knowledge requirement of Section 2333(d) is incorrect.  But even that court 
demanded a far more direct form of knowledge—knowledge that specific customers 
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were associated with Hamas—before the defendant banks could be liable for aiding 
and abetting terrorism.  The panel here held it sufficient to plead general knowledge 
that terrorist supporters were somewhere among the Defendants’ billions of 
customers, even while requiring no connection between the assistance and the 
terrorist act.  That approach—allowing liability based on only generalized 
knowledge and generalized aid—expands secondary ATA liability far beyond the 
breaking point.    
II. THE PANEL’S DECISION THREATENS ORDINARY BUSINESSES WITH 
AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY AND TREBLE DAMAGES  
The panel’s decision is not just wrong.  It threatens major harm to ordinary 
businesses providing standardized goods or services to the general public.  The panel 
would impose aiding-and-abetting liability on defendants who were generally aware 
that their vast user base included adherents of a terrorist organization even where the 
defendants admittedly: (1) lacked “any intent to further or aid [the organization’s] 
terrorist activities” or “objectives”; (2) affirmatively (if imperfectly) tried to avoid 
assisting the organization by “regularly” enforcing rules barring usage by terrorists; 
and (3) had no role whatsoever in planning or assisting the attack that injured the 
plaintiffs.  Op. 72.  The scope of liability under this rule is breathtaking.  
Nationwide, over a dozen cases have asserted ATA claims against online 
social media platforms.  Before the panel’s decision, no court allowed those claims 
to proceed.  In one pre-JASTA case under the ATA’s direct liability provision,  
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18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), this Court was “troubled by the seemingly boundless litigation 
risks that would be posed” by a similarly expansive ATA theory.  Fields v. Twitter, 
Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 2018).  Although the “highly interconnected” nature 
of social media, the internet, and “modern economic and social life” might mean that 
certain uses of Defendants’ websites cause distant “ripples of harm,” the Court 
explained, “[n]othing in § 2333 indicates that Congress intended to provide a remedy 
to every person reached by these ripples.”  Id.; accord Crosby, 921 F.3d at 625.  The 
panel’s ruling here creates just that kind of boundless litigation risk—and indeed, 
ever broader liability because primary liability is expressly limited by the 
requirement that the defendant’s acts caused the plaintiff’s injury, Fields, 881 F.3d 
at 744-745, whereas secondary liability (according to the panel) can attach to any 
terrorist attack, anywhere in the world, without any meaningful showing of 
knowledge or any connection between the attack and the defendant’s conduct.  
The implications of the panel’s decision reach beyond online services.  Other 
courts have rejected attempts to use the ATA to target entities, including banks and 
pharmaceutical companies, with aiding-and-abetting claims challenging the 
provision of standardized services with attenuated connections to terrorist attacks.  
E.g., Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 3d 194, 212 (D.D.C. 2020), 
appeal pending, No. 20-7077 (D.C. Cir.).  The uncertainty created by the panel’s 
expansive decision threatens ordinary business activities across a host of industries. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant rehearing or rehearing en 
banc. 
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The panel addressed appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of three actions seeking damages under the Anti-
Terrorism Act against Google, Twitter, and Facebook on the
basis that defendants’ social media platforms allowed ISIS to
post videos and other content to communicate the terrorist
group’s message, to radicalize new recruits, and to generally
further its mission.  The panel affirmed the judgments in the
Gonzalez and Clayborn appeals and reversed and remanded
in Taamneh.
Members of the families of victims of terrorism in Paris,
Istanbul, and San Bernardino alleged that Google, Twitter,
and Facebook were directly and secondarily liable for ISIS’s
acts of international terrorism.  The Gonzalez plaintiffs
brought claims for both direct and secondary liability against
Google.  The district court concluded that most of plaintiffs’
claims were barred pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, and the direct liability claims
failed to adequately allege proximate cause.  In the Taamneh
and Clayborn cases, the district court concluded that plaintiffs
failed to plausibly allege a secondary liability claim against
Google, Twitter, and Facebook.
The panel held that the district court in Gonzalez properly
ruled that § 230 barred most of plaintiffs’ claims.  The panel
further held that the Gonzalez plaintiffs failed to state an
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.  It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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actionable claim as to their remaining theories of liability.  In
Taamneh, the panel held that the district court erred by ruling
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for aiding-and-abetting
liability under the ATA.  In Clayborn, the panel concluded
that the district court correctly held that plaintiffs failed to
plausibly plead their claim for aiding-and-abetting liability.
Addressing Gonzalez, the panel held that the civil
remedies section of the ATA permits United States nationals
to recover damages for injuries suffered “by reason of acts of
international terrorism.”  The Justice Against Sponsors of
International Terrorism Act of 2016 (JASTA) amended the
ATA to include secondary civil liability for aiding and
abetting, or conspiring to commit, acts of international
terrorism.  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
protects websites from liability for material posted on the
website by someone else.  The panel held that the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal
statutes did not prevent § 230 from applying to the Gonzalez
plaintiffs’ claims because the relevant conduct took place in
the United States.  The panel concluded that JASTA did not
impliedly repeal § 230.  Agreeing with the First and Second
Circuits, the panel held that the exception set forth in
§ 230(e)(1), concerning impairment of the enforcement of
federal criminal statutes, does not extend to actions for civil
damages.  Thus, the Gonzalez plaintiffs’ claims were not
categorically excluded from the reach of § 230 immunity.  
The Gonzalez plaintiffs argued that the immunity afforded
by § 230 did not bar their claims because § 230 immunizes
only those who publish content created by third parties, and
their claims were directed to content created by Google. 
Google argued that the plaintiffs impermissibly sought to
treat Google as a publisher of content created by third parties,
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presumably ISIS, on YouTube.  In Part III.E of its opinion,
the panel affirmed the district court’s ruling that § 230 barred
all of plaintiffs’ claims except to the extent their complaint
presented claims premised on the allegation that Google
shared advertising revenue with ISIS.  Section 230(c)
precludes liability for “(1) a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat . . . as a
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another
information content provider.”  The panel concluded that
plaintiffs’ claims did not inherently require the court to treat
Google as the publisher or speaker of content provided by
ISIS, and the duty that plaintiffs alleged Google violated did
not derive from Google’s status or conduct as a publisher or
speaker.  The panel concluded that Google did not create or
develop content by making a material contribution to its
alleged unlawfulness when it created the “mosaics” by which
ISIS videos were delivered.  The panel held that the court’s
case law foreclosed the argument that Google’s pairing of
ISIS content with selected advertising and other videos
vitiated § 230 immunity.  Accepting as true plaintiffs’
allegation that Google’s algorithms recommended ISIS
content to users, and agreeing with the Second Circuit, the
panel wrote that the algorithms did not treat ISIS-created
content differently than any other third-party created content,
and thus were entitled to § 230 immunity.  
In Part III.F of its opinion, the panel held that § 230 did
not bar the Gonzalez plaintiffs’ claims premised on the
allegation that because it shared advertising revenue with
ISIS, Google should be held directly liable for providing
material support to ISIS and secondarily liable for providing
substantial assistance to ISIS.
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In Parts IV and V, the panel held that the Gonzalez
plaintiffs did not adequately allege claims for direct or
secondary liability under the ATA based on a revenue-sharing
theory.  As to direct liability, plaintiffs failed to plausibly
allege that Google directly perpetrated an act of international
terrorism because they did not allege that Google’s actions
were motivated by anything other than economic self-
enrichment.  As to secondary liability, plaintiffs did not state
a claim on either a theory of aiding and abetting or a theory
of conspiracy liability.
In Part VI, reversing the district court’s dismissal of the
Taamneh action, the panel held that the Taamneh plaintiffs
adequately stated a claim for aiding-and-abetting liability.
In Part VII, affirming the dismissal of the Clayborn
action, the panel held that because the Clayborn plaintiffs did
not plausibly allege that ISIS committed, planned or
authorized the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, they did not
adequately state a claim for aiding and abetting an act of
international terrorism.
Judge Berzon concurred in the majority opinion in full. 
She wrote separately to explain that, although the panel was
bound by Ninth Circuit precedent compelling the outcome in
this case, she joined the growing chorus of voices calling for
a more limited reading of the scope of § 230 immunity. 
Judge Berzon urged the court to reconsider its precedent en
banc to the extent that it holds that § 230 immunity extends
to the use of machine-learning algorithms to recommend
content and connections to users.
Judge Gould concurred in the majority opinion in its Parts
I and II, Part III.A through III.D, Part III.F, and Part VI and
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dissented in part as to Part III.E and Parts IV, V, and VII. 
Judge Gould wrote that he concurred insofar as the majority
would reverse in part the dismissal of revenue-sharing claims
in Gonzalez, and insofar as it would reverse the district
court’s judgment in Taamneh that the complaint failed to
adequately state a claim under the ATA.  Judge Gould wrote
that he dissented as to the majority’s dismissal of the
Gonzalez claims on grounds of § 230 immunity, and of
failure to state a claim for direct or secondary liability under
the ATA, because of the majority’s mistaken conclusion that
there was no act of international terrorism, and he also would
hold that the complaint adequately alleged that there was
proximate cause supporting damages on those claims.  Judge
Gould agreed that claims could proceed in the Taamneh case,
and accordingly agreed with reversing and remanding in that
case.  On the Clayborn case, Judge Gould dissented because
the majority’s conception of an attack authorized by ISIS was
inconsistent with the allegations of the operative complaint
and well-established principles of tort and agency law.
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We address three appeals arising from separate acts of
terrorism—one in Paris, one in Istanbul, and one in San
Bernardino—in which Nohemi Gonzalez, Nawras Alassaf,
Sierra Clayborn, Tin Nguyen, and Nicholas Thalasinos lost
their lives.  The foreign terrorist organization known as ISIS
took responsibility for the attacks in Paris and Istanbul and
lauded the attack in San Bernardino after the fact.  Plaintiffs
are members of the victims’ families.
Plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism
Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333.  The ATA allows United
States nationals to recover damages for injuries suffered “by
reason of an act of international terrorism,” id. § 2333(a), but
the defendant in these cases is not ISIS.  Instead, plaintiffs
allege that Google, Twitter, and Facebook are directly and
secondarily liable for the five murders at issue in these cases. 
The complaints allege that defendants’ social media platforms
allowed ISIS to post videos and other content to communicate
the terrorist group’s message, to radicalize new recruits, and
to generally further its mission.  Plaintiffs also claim that
Google placed paid advertisements in proximity to
ISIS-created content and shared the resulting ad revenue with
ISIS.  In these and other ways, all three complaints allege
defendants are directly liable for committing acts of
international terrorism pursuant to § 2333(a) of the ATA, and
secondarily liable for conspiring with, and aiding and
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abetting, ISIS’s acts of international terrorism pursuant to
§ 2333(d).1
This opinion addresses three separate appeals.  The
Gonzalez appeal concerns claims for both direct and
secondary liability against Google.  In that case, the district
court granted Google’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
most of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims were barred pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), and that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ direct liability
claims failed to adequately allege proximate cause.  The
Taamneh and Clayborn appeals concern claims for secondary
liability against Google, Twitter, and Facebook.  In both of
these cases, the district court granted defendants’ motions to
dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly
allege a secondary liability claim under the ATA.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
conclude the district court in Gonzalez properly ruled that
§ 230 bars most of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims, and that
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs failed to state an actionable claim as
to their remaining theories of liability asserted pursuant to the
ATA.  In Taamneh, we conclude the district court erred by
ruling the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for aiding-and-
abetting liability under the ATA.  The district court did not
reach § 230 immunity in Taamneh.  In Clayborn, we
conclude the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed
1 The acronym “ISIS” refers to “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.” 
ISIS is occasionally referred to as “ISIL” or “The Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant.”  Both names are derived from the Arabic “ad-Dawlah al-
Islamiyah fil-‘Iraq wash-Sham.”  The organization later shortened its
name to “ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah” (“The Islamic State” or “IS”).  For
simplicity, we use the name ISIS.
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to plausibly plead their claim for aiding-and-abetting liability. 
We therefore affirm the judgments in Gonzalez and Clayborn,
and reverse and remand for further proceedings in Taamneh.
I
A
Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U.S. citizen, studied in
Paris, France during the fall of 2015.  On November 13,
2015, when Nohemi was enjoying an evening meal with her
friends at a café, three ISIS terrorists—Abdelhamid Abaaoud,
Brahim Abdeslam, and Chakib Akrouh—fired into the crowd
of diners, killing her. This tragic event occurred within a
broader series of attacks perpetrated by ISIS in Paris on
November 13 (the “Paris Attacks”).  ISIS carried out several
suicide bombings and mass shootings in Paris that day,
including a massacre at the Bataclan theatre.  The day after
the Paris Attacks, ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a
written statement and releasing a YouTube video.
The operative Gonzalez complaint alleges that at the time
of the Paris Attacks, ISIS had become one of the largest and
most widely recognized terrorist organizations in the world. 
The complaint also alleges that ISIS carried out violent
terrorist attacks as a means of instilling terror in the public
and communicating its broader objectives, and that ISIS’s
messages—communicated before, during and after its terror
attacks—are essential components of generating the physical,
emotional, and psychological impact ISIS desires to achieve.
Google owns YouTube, a global online service used to
post, share, view, and comment on videos related to a vast
range of topics.  Users can post content directly on YouTube,
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though Google has the ability to remove any content.  When
Google receives a complaint about a video, it reviews the
video and removes it if it violates Google’s content policies.
The Gonzalez complaint alleges that YouTube “has
become an essential and integral part of ISIS’s program of
terrorism,” and that ISIS uses YouTube to recruit members,
plan terrorist attacks, issue terrorist threats, instill fear, and
intimidate civilian populations.  According to the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs, YouTube provides “a unique and powerful tool of
communication that enables ISIS to achieve [its] goals.”
With regard to the Paris Attacks in particular, the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that two of the twelve ISIS
terrorists who carried out the attacks used online social media
platforms to post links to ISIS recruitment YouTube videos
and “jihadi YouTube videos.”  Abaaoud, one of the attackers
in the café shooting, appeared in an ISIS YouTube video
from March 2014, and delivered a monologue aimed at
recruiting jihadi fighters to join ISIS.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ theory of liability generally
arises from Google’s recommendations of content to users. 
These recommendations are based upon the content and
“what is known about the viewer.”  Specifically, the
complaint alleges Google uses computer algorithms to match
and suggest content to users based upon their viewing history. 
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that, in this way, Google has
“recommended ISIS videos to users” and enabled users to
“locate other videos and accounts related to ISIS,” and that by
doing so, Google assists ISIS in spreading its message.  The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ theory is that YouTube is “useful[] in
facilitating social networking among jihadists” because it
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provides “[t]he ability to exchange comments about videos
and to send private messages to other users.”
The complaint also asserts that Google pairs videos with
advertisements and that it targets advertisements based on
information about the advertisement, the user, and the posted
video.  The complaint alleges that by doing so, Google
exercises control over which advertisements are matched with
videos posted by ISIS on YouTube, creating new unique
content for viewers “by choosing which advertisement to
combine with the posted video with knowledge about the
viewer.”
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges that
Google’s practice is to share a percentage of the revenue it
generates from these ads with the users who post the videos. 
Specifically, the complaint alleges that Google “reviewed and
approved ISIS videos, including videos posted by ISIS-
affiliated users, for monetization through” its placement of
ads on those videos, thereby agreeing to share revenue with
ISIS and ISIS-affiliated users.
According to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs, Google is aware of
ISIS’s presence on YouTube, has received complaints about
ISIS content, has the ability to remove ISIS content from
YouTube, and has “suspended or blocked selected ISIS-
related accounts at various times.”  The complaint asserts that
in spite of Google’s knowledge and control, Google “did not
make substantial or sustained efforts to ensure that ISIS
would not re-establish the accounts using new identifiers.” 
Instead, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege, Google sometimes
declined to remove ISIS accounts because the content posted
by those accounts did not violate YouTube’s policies and, on
other occasions, Google removed only a portion of the
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content posted on ISIS-related accounts but permitted the
accounts to remain active.2
Reynaldo Gonzalez, Nohemi’s father, filed an action
against Google, Twitter, and Facebook on June 14, 2016, and
a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on April 21, 2017.  The
SAC joined additional family members and named only
Google as a defendant.  According to the SAC, Google aided
and abetted international terrorism and provided material
support to international terrorism by allowing ISIS to use
YouTube.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), (d).  Claims One and
Two alleged that Google is secondarily liable for aiding and
abetting acts of international terrorism and for conspiring
with ISIS; Claims Three and Four alleged that Google is
directly liable for providing material support and resources to
ISIS.  Google moved to dismiss all of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
claims on the grounds that they were barred by § 230 of the
CDA.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  The district court granted the
motion to dismiss, but gave the Gonzalez Plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend.
The Third Amended Complaint (TAC) is the operative
complaint.  In it, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs added additional
claims.  The Plaintiffs allege that Google is secondarily liable
for Nohemi’s death because Google aided and abetted an act
of international terrorism and engaged in a conspiracy with a
2 The Gonzalez Plaintiffs also allege that “Google has tools by which
it can identify, flag, review, and remove ISIS YouTube accounts,” but
improperly focuses primarily “on whether the content posted violates
Google’s own ‘Community Standards,’ rather than examin[ing] whether
the account is being used by or for the benefit” of terrorists.  They further
allege that “[e]ven when Google occasionally deletes an account for
violating its Community Standards, it allows these accounts to be quickly
regenerated.”
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perpetrator of an act of international terrorism.  The Gonzalez
TAC also alleges that Google is directly liable under
§ 2333(a) for providing material support and resources to
ISIS, and for concealing this support, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B(a)(1), and 2339C(c).3
Google moved to dismiss the entire TAC based on § 230
immunity, and alternatively moved to dismiss the § 2333(a)
direct liability claims (Claims Three through Six) on the
ground that they failed to plausibly allege Google
proximately caused the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ injury.  The
district court ruled that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by
§ 230, except to the extent Claims Three and Four were
premised on a revenue-sharing theory.  The court concluded
that Claims Three through Six failed to plausibly allege
proximate cause.  The revenue-sharing claims were dismissed
without prejudice; all the other claims were dismissed with
prejudice.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs did not further amend, but
they did timely appeal.
B
Nawras Alassaf, a Jordanian citizen, visited Istanbul,
Turkey with his wife to celebrate the 2017 New Year.  He
was killed on January 1, 2017, when Abdulkadir
Masharipov—an individual affiliated with and trained by
ISIS—carried out a shooting massacre at the Reina nightclub
there (the “Reina Attack”).  Masharipov arrived at the Reina
nightclub shortly after midnight and, during a seven-minute
3 Separately, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that Google provided
funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of global terrorists in
violation of Executive Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and
50 U.S.C. § 1705.
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 16 of 167
Add. 16
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 43 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 17
attack, fired more than 120 rounds into the crowd of 700
people, killing 39 and injuring 69 others.  Masharipov
escaped the nightclub and evaded arrest for over two weeks
but was ultimately apprehended.  On the day after the attack,
ISIS issued a statement claiming responsibility for the Reina
Attack.
Twitter is a social networking service that allows users to
publicly connect with other users and to distribute content
publicly by posting “tweets.”  The Taamneh Plaintiffs allege
that Twitter has the ability to remove tweets and accounts, but
does not do so proactively.  Instead, Twitter reviews content
that is reported by others as violating its rules.
Facebook is also a social networking service that allows
users to communicate with other users and to share and
distribute content publicly.  Facebook has the ability to
remove content posted by its users.
The Taamneh Plaintiffs are relatives of Nawras Alassaf. 
They allege that Google, Twitter, and Facebook were a
critical part of ISIS’s growth.  Much like the Gonzalez
complaint, the Taamneh complaint alleges that ISIS uses
defendants’ social media platforms to recruit members, issue
terrorist threats, spread propaganda, instill fear, and
intimidate civilian populations.  According to the Taamneh
Plaintiffs, ISIS could not have grown into one of the most
recognizable and feared terrorist organizations without the
effective communications platforms provided by defendants
free of charge.
The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that ISIS and
its affiliated entities have used YouTube, Twitter, and
Facebook for many years with “little or no interference.” 
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“Despite extensive media coverage, complaints, legal
warnings, petitions, congressional hearings, and other
attention for providing [their] online social media platforms
and communications services to ISIS, . . . Defendants
continued to provide these resources and services to ISIS and
its affiliates.”  The Taamneh Plaintiffs also allege that
defendants knowingly permitted ISIS and its members and
affiliates to use their platforms, and reviewed ISIS’s use only
in response to third-party complaints.  The complaint further
alleges that even when defendants received complaints about
ISIS’s use of their platforms, the defendants “have at various
times determined that ISIS’s use of [their] [s]ervices did not
violate Defendants’ policies,” and therefore “permitted ISIS-
affiliated accounts to remain active, or removed only a
portion of the content posted on an ISIS-related account . . . .”
The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ claims against Google, Twitter,
and Facebook allege these defendants aided and abetted an
act of international terrorism, conspired with the perpetrator
of an act of international terrorism, and provided material
support to ISIS, by allowing ISIS to use their social media
platforms.  Like the Gonzalez Plaintiffs, the Taamneh
Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ actions violated the ATA. 
Specifically, the Taamneh complaint includes claims for
direct and secondary liability under the ATA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), (d), and state-law claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and wrongful death.
In response to defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the
Taamneh Plaintiffs amended their complaint once as a matter
of right and added additional claims.  The First Amended
Complaint (FAC) is the operative complaint and it alleges
that Google, Twitter, and Facebook are secondarily liable
under § 2333(d) for aiding and abetting an act of international
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terrorism and for conspiring with a perpetrator of an act of
international terrorism.  The Taamneh complaint also alleges
that Google, Twitter, and Facebook are directly liable under
§ 2333(a) for providing material support and resources to
ISIS, and for concealing this support, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B(a)(1), and 2339C(c).4
Defendants moved to dismiss.  The district court ruled the
direct liability claims failed to adequately allege proximate
cause, and that the secondary liability claims failed to state a
claim for conspiracy to commit an act of international
terrorism, or for aiding and abetting an act of international
terrorism.  The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
and the Taamneh Plaintiffs timely appealed.
C
Sierra Clayborn, Tin Nguyen, and Nicholas Thalasinos
attended an office holiday party at the Inland Regional Center
in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015.  Syed
Rizwan Farook, a U.S. citizen, and Tashfeen Malik, Farook’s
wife, entered the building dressed in black and armed with
AR-15 semi-automatic rifles, a 9mm handgun, and assembled
pipe bombs.  Farook and Malik indiscriminately fired more
than 100 rounds into the office gathering (the San Bernardino
Attack).  At some point during the attack, Malik declared on
her Facebook page the couples’ allegiance and loyalty to
former ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.  Clayborn,
Ngyuen, and Thalasinos were among the fourteen people
4 The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ complaint also includes an allegation that
Google, Twitter, and Facebook provided funds, goods, or services to or for
the benefit of global terrorists in violation of Executive Order No. 13224,
31 C.F.R. Part 594, and 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
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murdered in the attack.  Twenty-two others were seriously
wounded.  After the San Bernardino Attack, Farook and
Malik fled the scene and were killed in a police shootout. 
ISIS issued a statement two days later that “[t]wo followers
of Islamic State attacked several days ago a center in San
Bernardino in California, we pray to God to accept them as
Martyrs.”
The Clayborn Plaintiffs are relatives of Sierra Clayborn,
Tin Nguyen, and Nicholas Thalasinos.  Plaintiffs allege that
Twitter, Facebook, and Google aided and abetted
international terrorism and provided material support to
international terrorists in violation of the ATA, by allowing
ISIS to use their platforms.  The Clayborn Plaintiffs allege
Farook and Malik were radicalized by ISIS’s use of social
media.  This complaint includes direct and secondary liability
claims against all three defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2333(a) and (d), 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, and state-law
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful death.
Defendants moved to dismiss.  The district court granted
the motion and dismissed the Clayborn Plaintiffs’ operative
complaint on the grounds that the direct liability claims failed
to adequately allege proximate cause, and that the secondary
liability claims failed to plausibly allege substantial assistance
or that ISIS committed, planned, or authorized the San
Bernardino Attack.  The Clayborn Plaintiffs only appeal the
district court’s ruling that they failed to adequately plead a
secondary liability claim for aiding and abetting international
terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d).
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II
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.  Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir.
2018).
These appeals concern claims for civil liability under the
ATA.  The civil remedies section of the ATA permits United
States nationals to recover damages for injuries suffered “by
reason of an act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a).  The ATA contains criminal provisions, the
violation of which can give rise to a cause of action under
§ 2333(a) provided other conditions are met.  Fields,
881 F.3d at 743.  Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B,
and 2339C criminalize providing material support for
terrorism, providing material support for foreign terrorist
organizations, and financing terrorism, respectively.5
5 Section 2339A(a) prohibits the provision of “material support or
resources” by anyone “knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out” any of several enumerated crimes of
terrorism.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).  Section 2339B(a)(1) prohibits the
knowing provision of “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.”  Id. § 2339B(a)(1).  Section 2339C(c) prohibits the
knowing “conceal[ment] or disguise[] [of] the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control” of any support, resources, or funds, knowing that
such “support or resources are to be provided, or . . . were provided, in
violation of section 2339B.”  Id. § 2339C(c).  Executive Order No. 13224,
31 C.F.R. Part 594 and 50 U.S.C. § 1705 generally prohibit providing
funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of designated global
terrorists.
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“[I]nternational terrorism” is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1).  Acts of international terrorism “involve violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1)(A).  The acts must “appear to be intended—(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.”  Id. § 2331(1)(B).  Finally, the
acts must “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, or transcend national boundaries . . . .” 
Id. § 2331(1)(C).
In 2016, Congress broadened the scope of ATA liability
by enacting the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
(JASTA), Pub. L. No. 144-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016).  JASTA
amended the ATA to include secondary civil liability for “any
person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who
committed” an act of international terrorism that was
“committed, planned, or authorized” by a foreign terrorist
organization.  Pub. L. 114-222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 854
(2016); 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d).  Thus, as amended, the ATA
allows claims for direct liability for committing acts of
international terror pursuant to § 2333(a), or secondary
liability pursuant to § 2333(d) for aiding and abetting, or
conspiring to commit, acts of international terrorism.
III
These cases share some common issues but took different
paths to reach our court.  In Gonzalez, the district court
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primarily relied on § 230 immunity to conclude that all but
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing claims were barred. 
The district court separately concluded the revenue-sharing
claims failed because the TAC did not plausibly allege that
Google proximately caused Nohemi’s death.  The court
allowed the Gonzalez Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their
revenue-sharing claims, but the plaintiffs declined to do so,
and final judgment was entered.  In Taamneh and Clayborn,
the district courts did not consider § 230 immunity.  Instead,
the direct liability claims were dismissed for failure to
plausibly allege proximate cause, and the secondary liability
claims were dismissed for failure to plausibly allege liability
for aiding and abetting or conspiracy.
On appeal, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs begin by arguing that
§ 230 does not apply to their claims at all.  They make three
arguments in support of this contention: (1) § 230 immunity
has no application to extraterritorial claims; (2) Congress
impliedly repealed § 230 when it amended the ATA in 2016;
and (3) § 230 immunity does not apply to ATA claims based
on criminal statutes.  Alternatively, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
argue that their claims, both revenue-sharing and those
unrelated to revenue-sharing, survive the application of § 230. 
Finally, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that the TAC
adequately states claims for direct and secondary liability
under the ATA.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs and the Clayborn
Plaintiffs argue their complaints adequately allege that
defendants violated the ATA by aiding and abetting an act of
international terrorism.6  We begin by considering the
6 Though the district court did not address the application of § 230
immunity to the Taamneh Plaintiffs’ claims, defendants raise § 230 on
appeal as an alternative basis for affirmance.  We decline to reach this
question in the first instance.
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application of § 230 immunity to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
claims.
A
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act as
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56.  Section 230 of the CDA “immunizes
providers of interactive computer services against liability
arising from content created by third parties.”  Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (footnote
omitted).  Congress designed § 230 “to promote the free
exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to
encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene
material.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–1100
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)).  Congress was
concerned with “the ease with which the Internet delivers
indecent or offensive material, especially to minors” and
sought “to empower interactive computer service providers
to self-regulate.”  Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53,
78–79 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  To avoid chilling speech, Congress
“made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’
potentially injurious messages.”  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123
(alteration in original) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
The operative provision, § 230(c)(1), states “[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
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another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1).  We have said that, “[i]n general, this section
protects websites from liability for material posted on the
website by someone else.”  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.,
824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016).
Section 230’s use of the phrase “publisher or speaker”
was prompted by a New York state-court decision that held
an internet service provider legally responsible for a
defamatory message posted to one of its message boards. 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163 (citing Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995) (unpublished)).  Stratton Oakmont concluded
that the internet service provider “had become a ‘publisher’
under state law because it voluntarily deleted some messages
from its message boards ‘on the basis of offensiveness and
bad taste,’ and was therefore legally responsible for the
content of defamatory messages that it failed to delete.”  Id. 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4).  The original
goal of § 230 was modest.  By passing § 230, Congress
sought to allow interactive computer services “to perform
some editing on user-generated content without thereby
becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful
messages that they didn’t edit or delete.”  Id.
B
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs first argue that the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes
prevents § 230 from applying to their claims.  We disagree.
The presumption against extraterritoriality requires that,
“[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the
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contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic
application.”  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S.
Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016).  The Supreme Court “has established
a two-step framework for deciding questions of
extraterritoriality.”  WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018).  “The first step asks
‘whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been
rebutted.’”  Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101). 
The presumption is rebutted only when “the text [of the
statute] provides a ‘clear indication of an extraterritorial
application.’”  Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).  If the presumption is not
rebutted by the statute’s text, “the second step of [the]
framework asks ‘whether the case involves a domestic
application of the statute.’”  Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S.
Ct. at 2101).  This step requires the court to identify the
statute’s focus, and ask “whether the conduct relevant to that
focus occurred in United States territory.”  Id.  “If it did, then
the case involves a permissible domestic application of the
statute.”  Id.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that RJR Nabisco
recognized an exception to this two-step framework where,
as here, all relevant conduct takes place outside the United
States.  To support this proposition, they rely on the Supreme
Court’s statement in RJR Nabisco that “[b]ecause ‘all the
relevant conduct’ regarding those violations ‘took place
outside the United States,’ we did not need to determine . . .
the statute’s ‘focus.’” 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (citation omitted)
(quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108,
124 (2013)).  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs misread RJR Nabisco. 
The passage they rely upon explained only that, on the facts
of Kiobel, an inquiry into the focus of the statute was
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unnecessary because all the relevant conduct was foreign. 
Id.7
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs next argue that even if the RJR
Nabisco framework is applied, the framework demonstrates
that the their claims involve an extraterritorial application of
§ 230.  Again, we are not persuaded.
RJR Nabisco requires that we begin by asking whether the
statute “gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies
extraterritorially.”  136 S. Ct. at 2101.  Neither party
identifies any indication that Congress intended § 230 to
apply extraterritorially, so we proceed to step two.
At step two, to determine whether claims involve a
domestic application of the statute, we must identify “the
statute’s focus.”  Id.  A statute’s focus is “the object of its
solicitude, which can include the conduct it seeks to regulate,
as well as the parties and interests it seeks to protect or
vindicate.”  WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2137 (internal
quotations and alterations omitted).  “If the conduct relevant
to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States . . . , then
7 Google separately argues that because § 230 does not directly
regulate conduct, extraterritoriality principles are not implicated at all. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar situation in a pre-RJR Nabisco case. 
See Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2008). 
There, our court concluded that the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s
statute of repose did not “impermissibly regulate conduct that ha[d]
occurred abroad.”  Id. at 953.  Instead, the statute “merely eliminate[d] the
power of any party to bring a suit for damages . . . after the limitation
period.”  Id.  “Accordingly, the presumption against extraterritoriality
simply [was] not implicated . . . .”  Id.  Because we conclude this case
does not involve an impermissibly extraterritorial application of law under
the RJR Nabisco framework, we need not decide the applicability of
Blazevska.  See also Force, 934 F.3d at 74.
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the case involves a permissible domestic application of the
statute.”  Id. at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101).
The object of § 230(c)(1)’s solicitude is to encourage
providers of interactive computer services to monitor their
websites by limiting liability.  Force, 934 F.3d at 74
(concluding § 230’s “primary purpose is limiting civil
liability in American courts”).  Section 230 “immunizes
providers of interactive computer services against liability
arising from content created by third parties.”  Roommates,
521 F.3d at 1162 (footnote omitted); see also Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1100 (observing § 230(c)(1) “precludes
liability”).  This limitation of liability had the dual purposes
of “promot[ing] the free exchange of information and ideas
over the Internet and . . . encourag[ing] voluntary monitoring
for offensive or obscene material.”  Carafano, 339 F.3d 1122. 
Because the focus of § 230(c)(1) is limiting liability, the
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurs at the location
associated with the imposition of liability.  RJR Nabisco,
136 S. Ct. at 2101.
In other words, because § 230(c)(1) focuses on limiting
liability, the relevant conduct occurs where immunity is
imposed, which is where Congress intended the limitation of
liability to have an effect, rather than the place where the
claims principally arose.  As such, the conduct relevant to
§ 230’s focus is entirely within the United States—i.e., at the
situs of this litigation.  See Force, 934 F.3d at 74 (“The
regulated conduct—the litigation of civil claims in federal
courts—occurs entirely domestically in its application
here.”).  We therefore conclude the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
claims involve a domestic application of § 230.
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C
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs also argue that § 230 immunity
does not shield liability arising from violations of the ATA
because § 230 was impliedly repealed.  Specifically, they
contend that when Congress amended the ATA in 2016 by
enacting JASTA, it impliedly repealed § 230.  In support of
this argument, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs rely on JASTA’s
statement of purpose, which explains that the aim of the
amendment was “to provide civil litigants with the broadest
possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United
States, to seek relief” for acts of international terrorism. 
JASTA § 2(b) (emphasis added).  As explained, JASTA
altered the ATA by adding, among other things, secondary
liability.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d).  Despite its broad purpose,
JASTA did not impliedly repeal § 230.
“[A]bsent a clearly expressed congressional intention,
repeals by implication are not favored.”  Branch v. Smith,
538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).  “An implied repeal will only be found
where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable
conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of
the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’”  Id.
(quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936)).  “Irreconcilable conflict occurs if ‘there is a positive
repugnancy’ between competing provisions or if those
provisions cannot ‘mutually co-exist.’”  King v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Ill., 871 F.3d 730, 740 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
155 (1976)).  “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as
effective.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Radzanower,
426 U.S. at 155).
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To determine whether JASTA had any effect on the
application of § 230, we start by examining the statutory
language, and not—as the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
urge—JASTA’s statement of purpose.  Preambles and
prefatory language are insufficient to alter the substance of
the phrases they precede, even when codified.  See, e.g.,
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969,
1978 (2016) (observing that the “clause announc[ing] an
objective . . . [did] not change the plain meaning of the
operative clause”).  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs do not identify
any substantive provision of JASTA that conflicts with § 230. 
As we have recognized, § 230 protects from liability only a
specific class of defendants facing a particular type of
claim—i.e., it protects providers and users of interactive
computer services from claims seeking to treat them as
publishers or speakers of information provided by others.  See
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100–01; see also § 230(c)(1).  Thus, by
its own terms, § 230 creates “an affirmative defense to
liability under Section 2333 [of the ATA] for only the narrow
set of defendants and conduct to which Section 230 applies.” 
Force, 934 F.3d at 72.  There is no provision of JASTA to the
contrary.  JASTA expanded the scope of § 2333 liability for
acts of international terrorism, see 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), but
it did not modify or repeal § 230 immunity, Force, 934 F.3d
at 72 (“JASTA merely expanded Section 2333’s cause of
action to secondary liability; it provides no obstacle . . . to
applying Section 230.”).
Accordingly, JASTA and § 230(c)(1) can both be
enforced without contradicting the other, or depriving the
other of “any meaning at all.”  Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153
(quoting T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation of Statutory and
Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)).  Courts have “not
hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as
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each reaches some distinct cases.”  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001).  Under
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ reading of JASTA, any liability-
imposing statute enacted after § 230 would have to be
construed to limit § 230 immunity.  Such a reading runs
directly contrary to the presumption against finding implied
repeal.  For these reasons, we conclude JASTA did not
impliedly repeal § 230.
D
Finally, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that § 230 immunity
can never apply to ATA claims because the ATA permits
private civil enforcement of counter-terrorism provisions that
otherwise give rise to criminal liability, and § 230(e)(1)
includes an exception providing that “[n]othing in this section
shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . .
Federal criminal statute.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).  Google
responds that the exception in § 230(e)(1) extends only to
criminal prosecutions, not to actions for civil damages like
this one.  On this point, Google has the better argument.
Courts have consistently held that § 230(e)(1)’s limitation
on § 230 immunity extends only to criminal prosecutions, and
not to civil actions based on criminal statutes.  For example,
the First Circuit concluded that a civil remedy provision in
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act,
which allowed victims to bring suit against perpetrators of
sex trafficking, did not fall within the § 230(e)(1) exception. 
Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016). 
The court principally relied on the meaning of the statutory
phrase “enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute,”
which excludes civil statutes, but also reasoned that any
ambiguity in the subsection’s text was resolved by its title,
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“[n]o effect on criminal law,” id. (alteration in original),
because this language “indicate[d] that the provision [was]
limited to criminal prosecutions,” id.  The Second Circuit
recently agreed with this analysis when it considered the
application of § 230 to ATA claims.  See Force, 934 F.3d
at 72 (“We . . . join the First Circuit in concluding that
Section 230(e)(1) is ‘quite clearly . . . limited to criminal
prosecutions.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 23)).  We agree with the First and
Second Circuits, and hold that § 230(e)(1) is limited to
criminal prosecutions.  Accordingly, § 230(e)(1) does not
preclude the application of § 230(c)(1) immunity.
E
Having concluded that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims are
not categorically excluded from the reach of § 230 immunity,
we next consider the application of § 230 to the Gonzalez
TAC.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that the immunity
afforded by § 230 does not bar their claims because § 230
immunizes only those who publish content created by third
parties, and their claims are directed to content created by
Google.  Google responds that the content the TAC
challenges was indeed created by third parties—presumably,
ISIS—and that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims impermissibly
seek to treat Google as a publisher of that content.  We affirm
the district court’s ruling that § 230 bars all of the TAC’s
claims except to the extent the TAC presents claims premised
on the allegation that Google shared advertising revenue with
ISIS.8
8 The Gonzalez Plaintiffs also argue that it was improper for the
district court to consider the application of § 230 on a motion to dismiss. 
We disagree.  “Whether a particular ground for opposing a claim may be
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Section 230(c)(1) precludes liability for “(1) a provider or
user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff
seeks to treat . . . as a publisher or speaker (3) of information
provided by another information content provider.”9  Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1100–01 (footnote omitted).  We first address the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ theories of liability that are not directed
to revenue-sharing, considering each element of § 230
separately.
1
As to the first element of § 230, the parties do not dispute
that Google is an “interactive computer service” provider as
defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  We agree.  Roommates,
521 F.3d at 1162 n.6 (“[T]he most common interactive
computer services are websites.”); see also Kimzey v. Yelp!,
Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Yelp is plainly a
provider of an ‘interactive computer service’ . . . , a term that
the basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim depends on whether the
allegations in the complaint suffice to establish that ground.”  Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).  Here, “the ‘allegations in the complaint
suffice to establish’ the defense,” and thus the “affirmative defense may
be considered properly.”  Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 215); see also Ricci v. Teamsters
Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (considering
whether § 230 immunity barred plaintiffs’ claims on a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss).
9 Barnes limited its summary of § 230(c)(1) eligibility requirements
to instances where “plaintiff[s] seeks to treat [the defendant], under a state
law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker” because that case only
concerned state law claims.  570 F.3d at 1100 (emphasis added).  In
Roommates, we acknowledged that § 230 immunity is not limited to cases
in which plaintiffs assert state law claims.  521 F.3d at 1164; see also
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 n.4.
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 33 of 167
Add. 33
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 60 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE34
we interpret expansively under the CDA.”  (quotations and
alterations omitted)).
2
As to the second element, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue
their claims do not inherently require a court to treat Google
as a publisher or speaker.  Google responds that the thrust of
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims is that Google did not do
enough to block or remove content, and that such claims
necessarily require the court to treat Google as a publisher. 
On this point, we agree with Google.
What matters when we assess this element is “whether the
cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the
defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by
another.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  This element is satisfied
when “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant
violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a
‘publisher or speaker.’”  Id.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not
treat Google as a publisher, but instead assert a simple “duty
not to support terrorists.”  They maintain that just as the ATA
prohibits a retailer like Wal-Mart “from supplying fertilizer,
knives, or even food to ISIS,” the ATA prohibits Google from
supplying ISIS with a communication platform.  The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ characterization of their claim as
asserting a “duty not to support terrorists” overlooks that
publication itself is the form of support Google allegedly
provided to ISIS.  See Force, 934 F.3d at 65 (recognizing that
supplying a platform and communication services “falls
within the heartland of what it means to be the ‘publisher’ of
information under Section 230(c)(1)”).  The Plaintiffs’ non-
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 34 of 167
Add. 34
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 61 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 35
revenue sharing claims seek to impose liability for the content
Google allowed to be posted on its platform.
Publishing encompasses “any activity that can be boiled
down to deciding whether to exclude material that third
parties seek to post online . . . .”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at
1170–71.  “[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and
deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication
third-party content.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102; see also
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (“[T]he very essence of publishing is making the
decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content
. . . .”).  Here, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs assert that Google failed
to prevent ISIS from using its platform, and thereby allowed
ISIS to disseminate its message of terror.  Because the non-
revenue sharing claims seek to impose liability for allowing
ISIS to place content on the YouTube platform, they seek to
treat Google as a publisher. 
3
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that Google does more than
merely republish content created by third parties; the TAC
alleges that Google “creat[es]” and “develop[s]” the ISIS
content that appears on YouTube, at least in part, and
therefore receives no protection under § 230.  Again, we
disagree.  This argument is precluded by this court’s § 230
precedents.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs are correct that § 230 immunity
only applies to the extent interactive computer service
providers do not also provide the challenged information
content.  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162–63; see also
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.  An “information content
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provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
We have held that a website that “creat[es] or develop[s]”
content “by making a material contribution to [its] creation or
development” loses § 230 immunity.  Kimzey, 836 F.3d
at 1269.  A “material contribution” does not refer to “merely
. . . augmenting the content generally, but to materially
contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”  Roommates,
521 F.3d at 1167–68 (emphasis added).  This test “draw[s]
the line at the ‘crucial distinction between, on the one hand,
taking actions” to display “actionable content and, on the
other hand, responsibility for what makes the displayed
content [itself] illegal or actionable.”  Kimzey, 836 F.3d at
1269 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v.
Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 413–14 (6th
Cir. 2014)).  Other circuits have adopted this “material
contribution” test, acknowledging that making a material
contribution does not mean “merely taking action that is
necessary to the display of the allegedly illegal content,” but
rather, “being responsible for what makes the displayed
content allegedly unlawful.”  Dirty World Ent., 755 F.3d
at 410; see also, e.g., FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d
158, 176 (2d Cir. 2016); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358; Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,
257–58 (4th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d
1187, 1197–1201 (10th Cir. 2009).  Absent this sort of
“material contribution,” Google does not qualify as an
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“information content provider,” and may be eligible for § 230
immunity.  See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269–70.10
Plainly, an interactive computer service does not create or
develop content by merely providing the public with access
to its platform.  A “website does not create or develop content
when it merely provides a neutral means by which third
parties can post information of their own independent
choosing online.”  Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270 (quoting
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358).  Thus, in Kimzey, we concluded
that a provider does not create or develop content when its
website “does ‘absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory
sting of the message’ beyond the words offered by the [third-
party] user.”  Id. (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172).
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs concede that Google did not
initially create any ISIS videos, but allege that Google creates
the “mosaics” by which that content is delivered.  According
to the Gonzalez TAC, Google makes a material contribution
to the unlawfulness of ISIS content by pairing it with selected
advertising and other videos because “pairing” enhances user
engagement with the underlying content.  Our case law
forecloses the argument that this type of pairing vitiates § 230
immunity.
10 The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue in passing that the district court erred
by “conflat[ing]” the definitions of “creation” and “development” in
§ 230(f)(3).  According to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs, because Roommates
described its “material contribution” test in the context of construing
“development,” it “has nothing to do with the definition of ‘creation.’” 
Whatever the distinction between creation and development, our case law
makes clear that an entity that does not materially contribute to the alleged
unlawfulness of the content is neither a creator nor a developer for
purposes of § 230(f)(3).  See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269–70.
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In Roommates, we recognized that a website is not
transformed into a content creator or developer by virtue of
supplying “neutral tools” that deliver content in response to
user inputs.  See 521 F.3d at 1171; see also id. at 1169;
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270.  Roommates relied on our earlier
decision in Carafano, which concerned a prankster’s
unauthorized creation of a libelous profile impersonating
actress Christianne Carafano on an online dating site. 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171; see also Carafano, 339 F.3d
at 1121–22.  Carafano sued the online dating site for invasion
of privacy, misappropriation of the right of publicity,
defamation, and negligence.  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121–22.
We determined that the dating website in Carafano
“provided neutral tools specifically designed to match
romantic partners depending on their voluntary inputs.” 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172.  The website was not
transformed into the creator or developer of libelous content
contained in users’ dating profiles, even though its
matchmaking functionality allowed that content to be more
effectively disseminated.  See id.  Carafano held that the
dating website’s “decision to structure the information
provided by users [in order to] . . . offer additional features,
such as ‘matching’ profiles with similar characteristics” was
consistent with § 230 immunity.  339 F.3d at 1124–25.  “[S]o
long as a third party willingly provides the essential published
content, the interactive [computer] service provider receives
full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection
process.”  Id. at 1124.
Critically, Carafano’s “neutral tools” were neutral
because the website did not “encourage the posting of
defamatory content” by merely providing a means for users
to publish the profiles they created.  Roommates, 521 F.3d at
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1171.  “[I]ndeed, the defamatory posting was contrary to the
website’s express policies.”  Id.
In contrast, the defendant in Roommates operated a
website for matching renters with prospective tenants that did
contribute to the alleged illegality.  Before users could search
listings or post housing opportunities, the website required
them to create profiles.  Id. at 1161.  To do so, users were
directed through a series of questions to disclose their sex,
sexual orientation, and whether they had children.  Id.  They
were also required to describe their preferred renter or tenant
with respect to these same three criteria, and encouraged to
“provide ‘Additional Comments’ describing themselves and
their desired roommate in an open-ended essay.”  Id.
The plaintiffs in Roommates alleged that the website
operator violated federal and state laws barring discrimination
in housing.  Id. at 1162.  The defendant website operator
argued that it was entitled to § 230 immunity.  Id.  Our en
banc court concluded the website—by requiring users to
disclose their sex, sexual orientation, whether they had
children, and the traits they preferred in their roommate—was
designed to encourage users to post content that violated fair
housing laws.  Id. at 1161, 1164–66.  “By requiring
subscribers to provide the information as a condition of
accessing its service,” and requiring subscribers to choose
between “a limited set of pre-populated answers” the website
became “much more than a passive transmitter,” and instead
became “the developer, at least in part, of that information.” 
Id. at 1166.  The Roommates website did not employ “neutral
tools”; it required users to input discriminatory content as a
prerequisite to accessing its tenant-landlord matching service. 
See id. at 1169.  The website therefore lost its § 230 immunity
with respect to the discriminatory content it prompted, but it
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retained immunity for generically asking users to provide
“Additional Comments” without telling them “what kind of
information they should or must include.”  Id. at 1174.
We recently revisited the scope of § 230 immunity in
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th
Cir. 2019).  There, an online messaging board called the
Experience Project allowed users to share first-person
experiences, post and answer questions, and interact with
other users about various topics.  Id. at 1094.  A user named
Wesley Greer posted an inquiry about opportunities to buy
heroin, and received a response from another user.  Id. at
1095.  A day after meeting up with the responder, Greer died
because the heroin he purchased had been laced with
fentanyl.  Id.  Greer’s mother filed suit against the website
operator, and the website moved to dismiss based on § 230
immunity.  Id. at 1095–96.
The plaintiff in Dyroff argued that the website created and
developed online content because the website “used features
and functions, including algorithms, to analyze user posts . . .
and recommend other user groups.”  Id. at 1098.  We
concluded “[t]hese functions—recommendations and
notifications—[were] tools meant to facilitate the
communication and content of others,” and “not content in
and of themselves.”  Id.  The message board in Dyroff
employed neutral tools similar to the ones challenged by the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs.  Though we accept as true the TAC’s
allegation that Google’s algorithms recommend ISIS content
to users, the algorithms do not treat ISIS-created content
differently than any other third-party created content, and
thus are entitled to § 230 immunity.  Id.; see also Roommates,
521 F.3d at 1171–72; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124.
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We conclude the TAC does not allege that Google’s
YouTube service is materially distinguishable from the
matchmaking website at issue in Carafano or the algorithms
employed by the message board in Dyroff.  It alleges that
Google recommends content—including ISIS videos—to
users based upon users’ viewing history and what is known
about the users.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that Google
similarly targets users for advertising based on the content
they have selected and other information about users.  In this
way, a user’s voluntary actions inform Google about that
user’s preferences for the types of videos and advertisements
the user would like to see.  Rather than suggesting matches
for dating, Google matches what it knows about users based
on their historical actions and sends third-party content to
users that Google anticipates they will prefer.  This system is
certainly more sophisticated than a traditional search engine,
which requires users to type in textual queries, but the core
principle is the same: Google’s algorithms select the
particular content provided to a user based on that user’s
inputs.  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175 (observing that
search engines are immune under § 230 because they provide
content in response to a user’s queries “with no direct
encouragement to perform illegal searches or to publish
illegal content”).
The Gonzalez complaint is devoid of any allegations that
Google specifically targeted ISIS content, or designed its
website to encourage videos that further the terrorist group’s
mission.  Instead, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest
that Google provided a neutral platform that did not specify
or prompt the type of content to be submitted, nor determine
particular types of content its algorithms would promote.  The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs concede Google’s policies expressly
prohibited the content at issue.  See id. at 1171.  Accordingly,
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the type of algorithm challenged here, without more, is
indistinguishable from the one in Dyroff and it does not
deprive Google of § 230 immunity.
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion.  In a case
involving allegations that Facebook unlawfully provided a
communications platform to Hamas in violation of the ATA,
the Second Circuit concluded that Facebook was entitled to
§ 230 immunity.  Force, 934 F.3d at 64–72.  The plaintiffs in
Force, surviving family members of victims allegedly
murdered by Hamas, sought to treat Facebook as a publisher
of third-party information, even where “it use[d] tools such as
algorithms that [were] designed to match that [third-party]
information with a consumer’s interests.”  Id. at 66.  The
Second Circuit recognized that Facebook’s algorithms may
have made content more visible or available, but held this did
not amount to developing the underlying information.  Id. at
70.  Force further observed that since the early days of the
Internet, websites “have always decided . . . where on their
sites . . . particular third-party content should reside and to
whom it should be shown” but no case law denies § 230
immunity “because of the ‘matchmaking’ results of such
editorial decisions.”  Id. at 66–67.  Our precedent requires
that we reach the same outcome and we hold, consistent with
our case law, that Google is entitled to § 230 immunity with
respect to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ theories of liability that are
not directed to revenue-sharing.
Our dissenting colleague argues § 230 should not
immunize Google from liability for the claims related to its
algorithms, which the dissent characterizes as amplifying and
contributing to ISIS’s originally posted content.  The dissent
shares the views expressed by the partial concurrence and
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dissent in Force.  934 F.3d at 76–89 (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
As explained, Force also arose from terrorist attacks.  The
Force plaintiffs alleged that “Facebook collect[ed] detailed
information about its users” and Facebook’s algorithms
“utilize[d] the collected data to suggest friends, groups,
products, services and local events, and [to] target ads based
on each user’s input.”  Id. at 82 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
For two reasons, the partial dissent in Force argued that
Facebook’s friend- and content-suggestion algorithms created
new content, and thus Facebook was not entitled to § 230
immunity.  Id.  First, the partial dissent reasoned that
Facebook’s algorithms communicated their own
message—i.e., the algorithms suggested the user would likely
be interested in certain additional content.  Id.  Second,
Facebook’s friend- and content-suggestion algorithms created
and maintained “real-world social networks.”  Id.
Citing our circuit’s decision in Roommates, the partial
dissent in Force reasoned that suggestions generated by
Facebook’s algorithms based on users’ shared interest in
terrorism “directly related to the alleged illegality of the site,”
and therefore Facebook went beyond the role of a mere
publisher.  Id. at 82–83.  Respectfully, this is not a correct
reading of Roommates.  The Roommates website required
users to identify themselves by sex, sexual orientation, and
whether they had children, then directed users to describe
their preferred tenant or landlord using pre-populated answers
concerning the same criteria.  521 F.3d at 1161, 1169–70.  In
this way, the website prompted discriminatory responses that
violated fair housing laws.  Id. at 1169–70.  Because the
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website itself generated the options for selecting a tenant or
landlord based on discriminatory criteria, our en banc court
concluded the website materially contributed to the
unlawfulness of the posted content.  Id.
As we have explained, Google’s algorithms function like
traditional search engines that select particular content for
users based on user inputs.  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175
(observing search engines are entitled to § 230 immunity
because they provide content in response to users’ inquires
“with no direct encouragement to perform illegal searches or
to publish illegal content”).  The TAC does not allege that
Google’s algorithms prompted ISIS to post unlawful content. 
Nor does the TAC allege that Google’s algorithms treated
ISIS-created content differently than any other third-party
created content.  See id. at 1171–72.  Contrary to the dissent’s
assertion, we do not hold that “machine-learning algorithms
can never produce content within the meaning of Section
230.”  We only reiterate that a website’s use of content-
neutral algorithms, without more, does not expose it to
liability for content posted by a third-party.  Under our
existing case law, § 230 requires this result.
The dissent concedes algorithms can be neutral, but it
argues § 230 immunity should not apply when the published
“message itself is the danger.”  But this is not where Congress
drew the line.  At the time Congress enacted § 230, many
considered it “impossible for service providers to screen each
of their millions of postings for possible problems.” 
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis added) (quoting
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31).  Against this backdrop, Congress
did not differentiate dangerous, criminal, or obscene content
from innocuous content when it drafted § 230(c)(1).  Instead,
it broadly mandated that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive
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computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content
provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
We share the dissent’s concerns about the breadth of
§ 230.  As the dissent observes, “there is a rising chorus of
judicial voices cautioning against an overbroad reading of the
scope of Section 230 immunity,” and the feasibility of
screening for dangerous content is being revisited.  For
example, websites are leveraging new technologies to detect,
flag, and remove large volumes of criminal content such as
child pornography.11  In light of the demonstrated ability to
detect and isolate at least some dangerous content, Congress
may well decide that more regulation is needed.  In the
meantime, our decision does not extend what the dissent
rightly describes as § 230’s sweeping scope.
11 According to the Department of Justice, “the vast majority of
[National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC)] reports
come from direct messaging services and are usually generated as a result
of platforms’ use of automated hashing measures (such as PhotoDNA),
grooming indicators, artificial intelligence and other technologies to
identify and report child sexual abuse material.”  DOJ Office of Public
Affairs, Acting AG and Five Country Statement on the Temporary
Derogation to the ePrivacy Directive to Combat Child Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse, United States Department of Justice (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-ag-and-five-country-statement-te
mporary-derogation-eprivacy-directive-combat-child.  Facebook reports
that “[i]n addition to photo-matching technology, [Facebook is] using
artificial intelligence and machine learning to proactively detect child
nudity and previously unknown child exploitative content when it’s
uploaded” and to report it to NCMEC.  See  Antigone Davis, New
Technology to Fight Child Exploitation, Facebook (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/10/fighting-child-exploitation.
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In his partial concurrence and partial dissent in Force,
Chief Judge Katzmann provided a thorough analysis of
§ 230’s legislative history.  Force, 934 F.3d at 77–80
(Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The Force partial dissent persuasively explains that when it
enacted § 230, “Congress was focused squarely on protecting
minors from offensive online material” and sought to
“provide[] ‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil liability
for providers or users of an interactive computer service.”  Id.
at 79–80 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf.
Rep.)).  Despite this clear goal, the language Congress
adopted in § 230(c)(1) cuts a much wider swath.  Id.
(“Whatever prototypical situation its drafters may have had
in mind, § 230(c)(1) does not limit its protection to situations
involving ‘obscene material’ provided by others, instead
using the expansive word ‘information.’”).  Chief Judge
Katzmann urged his colleagues to conclude § 230(c)(1) need
not be interpreted to immunize websites’ friend- and content-
suggestion algorithms, but as we explain, Ninth Circuit case
law forecloses his argument.
In sum, though we agree the Internet has grown into a
sophisticated and powerful global engine the drafters of § 230
could not have foreseen, the decision we reach is dictated by
the fact that we are not writing on a blank slate.  Congress
affirmatively immunized interactive computer service
providers that publish the speech or content of others.12
12 The dissent would create a new federal common law cause of action
treating social media companies as makers and sellers of products through
forced advertising, thereby circumventing § 230’s expansive immunity. 
Even if we agree Congress should act to narrow the scope of § 230
immunity or regulate the use of neutral algorithms, we are not free to
manufacture entirely new causes of action merely because the political
branches have not acted.  The Supreme Court has explained “[t]he vesting
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F
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing theory is
distinct from the other theories of liability raised in the TAC. 
This theory is premised on the allegation that because it
shared advertising revenue with ISIS, Google should be held
directly liable for providing material support to ISIS pursuant
to § 2333(a) and secondarily liable for providing substantial
assistance to ISIS pursuant to § 2333(d).  The district court’s
order excluded the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing
claims from its application of § 230.  On appeal, Google does
not separately respond to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-
sharing claims.  Instead, Google lumps all of the TAC’s
theories together for purposes of its § 230 argument.  Based
on our review of case law, the question whether § 230
immunizes an interactive computer service provider’s
revenue-sharing payments appears to be one of first
impression for the courts of appeals.  We conclude that § 230
does not immunize Google from the claims premised on
revenue-sharing.
Plaintiffs allege that Google generates revenue by selling
advertising space through its AdSense program, including
advertising space that appears on YouTube.  Through
AdSense, Google sells advertising opportunities and displays
advertisements to YouTube viewers accessing other content. 
Google targets advertisements based on the content of the
of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to
authority to formulate federal common law . . . nor does the existence of
congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to
develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress acts.”  Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981)
(internal citation omitted).
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advertisements, what is known about the viewer, and the
content of the posted video.  If a YouTube user elects to
participate in the AdSense program, Google shares with the
user a portion of the revenue generated by the advertisements
on the user’s videos.  For example, suppose a user
participating in the AdSense program posts a video tutorial
about proper house-painting techniques.  In this scenario,
viewers of the video tutorial might see advertisements for
paint or paintbrushes, and Google would share a portion of
the resulting ad revenue with the user that posted the video
tutorial.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that “each YouTube video
must be reviewed and approved by Google before Google
will permit advertisements to be placed with that video,” and
that “Google has reviewed and approved ISIS videos” for
advertising.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs also allege that, because
it approved ISIS videos for the AdSense program, Google
shared a percentage of revenues generated from those
advertisements with ISIS.
We have explained that § 230 grants immunity from
claims seeking to hold providers of interactive computer
services liable as publishers or speakers of third-party
content.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing allegations
are not directed to the publication of third-party information. 
These allegations are premised on Google providing ISIS
with material support by giving ISIS money.  Thus, unlike the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ other allegations, the revenue-sharing
theory does not depend on the particular content ISIS places
on YouTube; this theory is solely directed to Google’s
unlawful payments of money to ISIS.
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It is well settled that § 230 “bars only liability that treats
a website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by
somebody else.”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851.  Perhaps
the best indication that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ revenue-
sharing allegations are not directed to any third-party content
is that Google’s alleged violation of the ATA could be
remedied without changing any of the content posted by
YouTube’s users.  See id.; see also HomeAway.com, Inc. v.
City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2019)
(concluding that a city ordinance that did “not proscribe,
mandate, or even discuss the content of the listings that the
[plaintiffs] display[ed] on their websites” fell outside the
scope of immunity provided by § 230).  The Gonzalez
Plaintiffs’ allegations of revenue-sharing do not seek to hold
Google liable for any content provided by a third-party. 
Accordingly, we conclude that § 230 does not bar the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims premised on sharing revenue with
ISIS.13
IV
Having concluded that § 230 only immunizes Google
from liability for all of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ non-revenue
sharing claims, we next address whether, based on the TAC’s
revenue-sharing theory, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ adequately
allege claims for direct liability and secondary liability under
the ATA.  We address the direct liability claims first.
13 The district court dismissed the revenue-sharing claims without
prejudice for failure to adequately allege proximate cause.  The Gonzalez
Plaintiffs chose not to amend, and a final judgment was subsequently
entered on that basis.
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The civil remedies provision of the ATA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), “allows any United States national ‘injured in his
or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or
heirs,’ to sue in federal court and recover treble damages and
attorney’s fees.”  Fields, 881 F.3d at 743 (quoting § 2333(a)). 
It is undisputed that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs, Taamneh
Plaintiffs, and Clayborn Plaintiffs are United States nationals.
The ATA includes several criminal provisions, “the
violation of which can provide the basis for a cause of action
under § 2333(a).”  Id.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that
Google directly committed acts of international terrorism by
providing material support for terrorism, providing material
support for foreign terrorist organizations, and financing
terrorism in violation of sections 2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1), and
2339C(c), respectively.  They also allege that Google violated
Executive Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and
50 U.S.C. § 1705.
Section 2333(a) is directed to “act[s] of international
terrorism.”  “[I]nternational terrorism” is statutorily defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).  See generally Fields, 881 F.3d at 743
n.3; Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 326–27 (2d Cir.
2018).  Acts constituting international terrorism must “appear
to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”  Id. § 2331(1)(B).
The operative Gonzalez complaint contends that Google’s
conduct qualified as an act of “international terrorism,” citing
§ 2331(1).  We conclude their complaint fails to plausibly
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allege that Google directly perpetrated an act of international
terrorism as required by § 2331(1)(B).
Whether an act appears to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect a
government, “does not depend on the actor’s beliefs, but
imposes on the actor an objective standard to recognize the
apparent intentions of actions.”  Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster
Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 207 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014); see also
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685,
694 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is a matter of external
appearance rather than subjective intent, which is internal to
the intender.”).
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that the knowing provision
of resources to a terrorist organization necessarily constitutes
“international terrorism,” and satisfies the requirements
identified in § 2331(1)(B).  We disagree.  Nothing in the
statutory scheme suggests that material support always
qualifies as international terrorism because such conduct may
or may not objectively appear to be intended to intimidate or
coerce.  Medical assistance rendered to known terrorists by
Doctors Without Borders illustrates this point.  See Boim,
549 F.3d at 699.  Such assistance might arguably provide
material support to terrorists in violation of § 2339B, but it
would not appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population, or to affect the conduct of a government. 
See id.  To qualify as international terrorism, the defendant’s
acts must satisfy each of the criteria contained in § 2331(1),
Linde, 882 F.3d at 325–26; see also Fields, 881 F.3d at 743
n.3, and “the provision of material support to a terrorist
organization does not invariably equate to an act of
international terrorism,” Linde, 882 F.3d at 326.
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The Gonzalez Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Seventh
Circuit’s en banc decision in Boim, but that reliance is
misplaced.  The issue in Boim was whether defendants who
had donated money to Hamas and Hamas-affiliated
charities—knowing that Hamas used its resources to finance
the killing of Israeli Jews—could be held liable under the
ATA for Hamas’s 1994 murder of an American teenager in
Israel.  Boim, 549 F.3d at 688–690.  The en banc court stated
that a knowing donor’s contributions to Hamas would satisfy
the definitional requirements of “international terrorism” set
forth in § 2331(1).  Id. at 690, 694.  Boim reasoned that
“donations to Hamas . . . would enable Hamas to kill or
wound, or try to kill” more people in Israel.  Id. at 694.  The
Seventh Circuit concluded that such donations would appear
to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population
because of the foreseeability of these consequences.14  Id. 
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ reliance on Boim is misplaced
because the allegations here are not at all similar to those in
Boim, which involved voluntary donations specifically and
purposefully directed to a foreign terrorist organization.
Taking as true the allegation that Google shared
advertising revenue with ISIS as part of its AdSense program,
that action does not permit the inference that Google’s actions
objectively appear to have been intended to intimidate or
coerce civilians, or to influence or affect governments.  The
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kemper v. Deutsche Bank AG,
911 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2018), illustrates this point.  There, the
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege
14 We express no view on whether Boim would be decided the same
way today.  Notably, that decision was issued before Congress enacted
JASTA, thereby creating secondary liability for aiding and abetting acts
of international terrorism.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).
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that Deutsche Bank’s institution of procedures to evade U.S.
sanctions and facilitate Iranian banking transactions qualified
as international terrorism.  Id. at 390.  The court reasoned that
Deutsche Bank’s actions did “not appear intended to
intimidate or coerce any civilian population or government”
because, “[t]o the objective observer, its interactions with
Iranian entities were motivated by economics.”  Id.
Similarly here, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs did not allege that
Google’s actions were motivated by anything other than
economic self-enrichment.  The TAC alleges that Google is
a commercial service in the business of selling advertising,
and that “Google uses the AdSense monetization program to
earn revenue, and as an incentive to encourage users to post
videos on YouTube.”  These allegations are easily
distinguished from those involving donations to a known
terrorist organization.  See Boim, 549 F.3d at 690, 694.  The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs did not allege that Google shared ISIS’s
vision and objectives, nor that Google intended ISIS to
succeed in any future acts of terrorism.  Rather, the
complaint’s allegations suggest that Google split ad revenue
with ISIS in furtherance of its own financial best interest.
The TAC fails to allege that Google’s provision of
material support appeared to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a
government as required by the ATA.  See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1)(B).  For this reason, the Gonzalez complaint does
not adequately allege the requirements necessary to establish
direct liability for an act of international terrorism pursuant to
§ 2333(a), and we need not reach whether the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Google’s actions
proximately caused Nohemi Gonzalez’s death.
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V
Turning to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ secondary liability
claims based on revenue-sharing, Google argues that the
Gonzalez complaint fails to state a claim for secondary
liability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  We agree.15
As originally enacted, the ATA allowed only claims
alleging direct liability against the perpetrators of acts of
international terrorism.  Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82,
97 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Linde, 882 F.3d at 319–20.  In
2016, Congress amended the ATA by enacting JASTA,
which extends civil liability to persons who aid and abet by
providing substantial assistance to persons who commit acts
of international terrorism, and to those who conspire to
commit such acts.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  Secondary
liability for aiding or abetting acts of terrorism applies only
when the principal act of international terrorism is
“committed, planned, or authorized by an organization . . .
designated as a foreign terrorist organization.”  Id.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs raise claims for both aiding-and-
abetting and conspiracy liability.  We address these theories
separately.
15 The district court concluded that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs advanced
a revenue-sharing theory only with respect to their claims for direct
liability.  We find the TAC somewhat ambiguous on this point, but
assume for purposes of deciding this appeal that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
raised a revenue-sharing theory with respect to both their direct liability
and secondary liability claims.
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A
Under § 2333(d)(2) of the ATA, “liability may be asserted
as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
substantial assistance” to “the person who committed . . .  an 
act of international terrorism” as set forth in § 2333(a). 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  JASTA specifies that the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1983), describes “the proper legal framework” for
assessing aiding-and-abetting liability under § 2333(d).  Pub.
L. No. 144-222, § 2(a)(5), 130 Stat. at 852; see also Siegel v.
HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 933 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.
2019).
Halberstam addressed the scope of secondary liability for
common law causes of action.  See 705 F.2d at 474.  The
plaintiff, Elliott Halberstam, was the widow of Michael
Halberstam.  Id.  Michael Halberstam was a physician killed
by Bernard Welch during the course of a burglary.  Id. 
Halberstam’s widow brought a wrongful death action against
Linda Hamilton, Welch’s live-in girlfriend, alleging that
Hamilton was civilly liable for Michael Halberstam’s death,
both as an aider-abettor and a co-conspirator.  Id. at 474–76. 
Hamilton provided assistance to Welch during the course of
his multi-year campaign of burglaries, including preparing
letters of sale for stolen goods, falsifying tax returns to
conceal income derived from stolen goods, maintaining
accounts on Welch’s behalf, and handling financial
transactions.  Id. at 475, 486, 488.  The D.C. Circuit
ultimately concluded that Hamilton was civilly liable for
Halberstam’s death, even though Welch killed Halberstam
during a robbery and Hamilton was not present.  The court
concluded that Hamilton was liable under a conspiracy theory
and also an aiding-and-abetting theory.  Id. at 489.
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The scenario presented in Halberstam is, to put it mildly,
dissimilar to the one at issue here.  But Congress selected
Halberstam as the governing standard for secondary liability
ATA claims because Halberstam “has been widely
recognized as the leading case regarding Federal civil aiding
and abetting . . . liability.”  Pub. L. No. 144-222, § 2(a)(5),
130 Stat. at 852.
In Halberstam, the D.C. Circuit identified three elements
that a plaintiff must prove in order to establish aiding-and-
abetting liability: “(1) the party whom the defendant aids
must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the
defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides
the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and
substantially assist the principal violation.”  705 F.2d at 477.
1
The first element of aiding and abetting liability requires
a showing that the party the defendant aided committed an act
of international terrorism that injured the plaintiff.  18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(d)(2); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; see also Siegel,
933 F.3d at 223.16  The parties dispute whether the relevant
principal actor is the ISIS organization as a whole or the
individual terrorists who perpetrated the Paris Attacks.  We
agree with the Gonzalez Plaintiffs that ISIS is the relevant
16 As noted, the ATA’s secondary liability provision only applies
where a designated “foreign terrorist organization” “committed, planned,
or authorized” the act of international terrorism. § 2333(d)(2).  The parties
do not dispute that the Paris Attacks were an act of international terrorism,
nor do they dispute that the killing of Nohemi Gonzalez during the Paris
Attacks was an injury to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs.
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“person who committed . . . an act of international terrorism.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).
The TAC alleges that coordinated teams of ISIS terrorists
planned and carried out the Paris Attacks.  Specifically, it
alleges that the café shooters who murdered Nohemi
Gonzalez—Abaaoud, Abdeslam, and Akrouh—were
members of ISIS.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs further allege that
Abaaoud, the operational leader of the Paris Attacks, traveled
to Syria to join ISIS in March 2013, joined ISIS while in
Syria, and publicly declared his affiliation with ISIS.  We
accept as true the allegations that, in 2014, Abaaoud posted
a link on his Facebook profile to an ISIS recruiting video in
which he described his life and role with ISIS, and, that in
2015, ISIS’s English-language magazine, Dabiq, featured an
interview with Abaaoud.  These allegations distinguish the
TAC from the claims presented in Crosby v. Twitter, Inc.,
where the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ ATA claims
because the complaint contained “no allegations that ISIS was
involved with the Pulse Night Club shooting” perpetrated by
Omar Mateen.  921 F.3d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 2019); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  We conclude the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
satisfied the first element of aiding-and-abetting liability
because the TAC plausibly alleged that ISIS, a designated
terrorist organization, “committed, planned, or authorized”
the Paris Attacks.
2
The second element of aiding-and-abetting liability
requires a showing that Google was generally aware of its
role in ISIS’s terrorist activities at the time it provided
assistance to ISIS.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2); Halberstam,
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705 F.2d at 477; see also Linde, 882 F.3d at 329.  The
Gonzalez Plaintiffs also satisfied this element.
Just as the Halberstam court concluded that Linda
Hamilton was generally aware of her role in Bernard Welch’s
ongoing burglary operation because she “knew about and
acted to support” it, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs must plausibly
allege that, by sharing revenue with ISIS, Google was aware
that it was assuming a role in ISIS’s terrorist activities.  See
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488; see also Linde, 882 F.3d at 329
(requiring a showing that “the bank was ‘generally aware’
that [by providing financial services,] it was thereby playing
a ‘role’ in Hamas’s violent or life-endangering activities”
(quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477)).  Notably, this
element does not require a showing of “the specific intent
demanded for criminal aiding and abetting culpability,” i.e.,
an “intent to participate in a criminal scheme as ‘something
that he wishes to bring about and seek by his action to make
it succeed.’”  Linde, 882 F.3d at 329 (quoting Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014)).  Nor does it require
that Google “knew of the specific attacks at issue.”  Id.
The TAC adequately alleges that Google was aware of the
role it played in ISIS’s terrorist activities.  Specifically, the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that Google knowingly shared
advertising revenue with ISIS and that Google did so despite
numerous reports from news organizations that Google
placed advertisements on ISIS videos.  Under these
circumstances, the allegation that Google knowingly gave
“fungible dollars to a terrorist organization” plausibly alleges
that Google was aware of the role it played in activities that
“may be ‘dangerous to human life.’”  Cf. Kemper, 911 F.3d
at 390; see also Fields, 881 F.3d at 748; Boim, 549 F.3d
at 693.
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We are mindful that “aiding and abetting an act of
international terrorism requires more than the provision of
material support to a designated terrorist organization.” 
Linde, 882 F.3d at 329.  Thus, the mens rea required for the
general awareness element of secondary liability under
§ 2333(d) may not be coextensive with the showing required
for material support under § 2339B.  The latter “requires only
knowledge of the organization’s connection to terrorism, not
intent to further its terrorist activities or awareness that one is
playing a role in those activities.”  See id. at 330 (citing
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–17)
(2010); see also, e.g., Siegel, 933 F.3d at 224 (concluding
plaintiffs failed to plead general awareness with allegations
“suggest[ing] that in providing banking services to [a Saudi
Arabian bank], HSBC had little reason to suspect that it was
assuming a role in [al-Qaeda in Iraq’s] terrorist activities”). 
But here, we are satisfied that the allegations indicating
Google knowingly contributed money to ISIS suffice to show
that Google understood it played a role in the violent and life-
endangering activities undertaken by ISIS, and therefore
establish the second element of aiding-and-abetting liability
for purposes of § 2333(d)(2).
3
The third element of aiding-and-abetting liability requires
that the plaintiff show the defendant knowingly and
substantially assisted the act of terrorism that injured the
plaintiff.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2); see also Halberstam,
705 F.2d at 488 (holding the defendant must have “knowingly
and substantially assist[ed] the principal violation”).  This
element contains two components: (1) “knowing[]”
assistance, and (2) “substantial[]” assistance.  See
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; see also id. at 488 (evaluating
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whether Linda Hamilton assisted Bernard Welch “with
knowledge that he had engaged in illegal acquisition of
goods” separate from considering whether her “assistance
was ‘substantial’”).
The Halberstam court identified six factors relevant to
assessing whether the substantial assistance component is
satisfied: “(1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the
amount of assistance given by defendant, (3) defendant’s
presence or absence at the time of the tort, (4) defendant’s
relation to the principal, (5) defendant’s state of mind, and
(6) the period of defendant’s assistance.”  Linde, 882 F.3d
at 329 (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84).17
The parties dispute whether the relevant “principal
violation” for analyzing the third element is ISIS’s broader
campaign of terrorism or the Paris Attacks.  See Halberstam,
705 F.2d at 488.  But Halberstam explained that the extent of
liability under aiding-and-abetting encompasses
foreseeability, such that a defendant “who assists a tortious
act may be liable for other reasonably foreseeable acts done
in connection with it.”  705 F.2d at 484.  For example, the
common law cases Halberstam drew upon established that a
17 In dicta, the Second Circuit suggested that these factors determine
“whether the defendant’s assistance was sufficiently knowing and
substantial to qualify as aiding and abetting.”  Linde, 882 F.3d at 329 n.10
(emphasis added).  However, Halberstam appears to treat “knowing”
assistance as an inquiry separate from “substantial” assistance.  See
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478 (explaining that the listed factors aid “in
making th[e] determination” of “how much encouragement or assistance
is substantial enough” (emphasis added)).  Indeed, the Halberstam court
explicitly acknowledged that “the scienter requirement in the third element
of aiding-abetting” requires that “an aider-abettor must knowingly assist
the underlying violation.”  See id. at 485 n.14.
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thirteen-year-old boy who broke into a church with some
companions could be held liable for damage to the church
caused by his companions’ failure to extinguish torches they
used to light their way in the church attic.  Id. at 482–83
(citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621,
625–26 (Kan. 1968)).  Because the need for lighting could
have been anticipated, “the boy who had not used a torch, nor
even expected one to be lighted, could be liable for the
damage caused by the torches.”  Id. at 483.  By contrast, the
Halberstam court cited an example from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts where liability was not imposed: if A
supplies wire cutters to B to allow B to unlawfully enter the
land of C to recapture chattels belonging to B, and B
intentionally sets fire to C’s house in the course of his
trespass, A is not liable for the destroying the house.  Id. at
483 n.12 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, cmt.
d (1976)).
Halberstam concluded that Linda Hamilton was liable for
Welch killing Michael Halberstam because of the nature and
extent of her assistance to Welch’s illegal burglary enterprise. 
Id. at 488.  In the court’s view, the killing “was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the activity Hamilton helped
Welch to undertake.”  Id.  “[W]hen she assisted him, it was
enough that she knew he was involved in some type of
personal property crime at night—whether as a fence, burglar,
or armed robber made no difference—because violence and
killing is a foreseeable risk in any of these enterprises.”  Id. 
We have little difficulty concluding that the Paris Attacks
were a foreseeable result of ISIS’s broader campaign of
terrorism.  Accordingly, when assessing whether the TAC
satisfies the third element of aiding-and-abetting liability, we
consider ISIS’s broader campaign of terrorism to be the
relevant “principal violation.”
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 61 of 167
Add. 61
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 88 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE62
Pursuant to § 2333(d)(2), liability attaches to an aider-
abettor who “knowingly provid[es] substantial assistance.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant “knowingly gave ‘substantial
assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful conduct.” 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478; see also id. at 485 n.14 (noting
“the scienter requirement in the third element” addresses the
issue of “whether an aider-abettor must knowingly assist the
underlying violation”).
We conclude that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs adequately
allege knowing assistance.  The TAC alleges “each YouTube
video must be reviewed and approved by Google” before
advertisements are placed with that video, and “Google has
reviewed and approved ISIS videos . . . for ‘monetization,’”
and Google therefore “shared revenue with ISIS.”  The TAC
alleges that, prior to the Paris Attacks, numerous news
organizations reported on Google’s placement of
advertisements in or alongside ISIS videos, and Google
responded to these media reports by stating it worked to
prevent ads from appearing on any video once it determined
the content was not appropriate for advertising partners.
In Halberstam, the knowledge requirement of the third
element was satisfied because Linda Hamilton’s actions
“were performed knowingly to assist Welch in his illicit
trade.”  705 F.2d at 486; see also id. at 488 (noting that
Hamilton had “assisted Welch with knowledge that he had
engaged in illegal acquisition of goods”).  Here, the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs allege that Google reviewed and approved ISIS
videos for monetization and thereby knowingly provided ISIS
with financial assistance for its terrorist operations. 
According to the TAC, Google did so despite its awareness
that these videos were created by ISIS and posted by ISIS
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using known ISIS accounts.  Taking these allegations as true,
they are sufficient to plausibly allege that Google’s assistance
was knowing as required by § 2333(d)(2).
That leaves the question whether the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege that Google’s assistance was “substantial.” 
Based on our review of the six Halberstam factors, we
conclude the Gonzalez Plaintiffs did not allege that Google’s
assistance rose to this level.  See Linde, 882 F.3d at 329; see
also Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84.
As to the first factor—the nature of the act
encouraged—Halberstam explained that the nature of the
principal’s act “dictates what aid might matter, i.e., be
substantial.”  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.  For example,
verbal support might be of great import when a “defendant’s
war cry for more blood” contributes to an “assaulter’s
hysteria,” but less important in a case involving a defamation. 
See id.  Here, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that Google
assisted ISIS’s long-running terrorist campaign.  Financial
support is “indisputably important” to the operation of a
terrorist organization, id. at 488, and any money provided to
the organization may aid its unlawful goals.  Fields, 881 F.3d
at 748; cf. Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225.
The second factor considers “the amount of assistance
given by the defendant.”  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478.  This
factor recognizes that not all assistance is equally important,
see id. at 484, and the TAC contains no information about the
amount of assistance provided by Google.  It only alleges that
Google shared some advertising revenue with ISIS.
Third, we consider the defendant’s “presence or absence
at the time of the tort” to assess whether the defendant’s
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assistance was “substantial.”  Id. at 478.  The Gonzalez
Plaintiffs concede that Google was not present at the time of
the Paris Attacks.  However, if the relevant tort is viewed as
ISIS’s broader campaign of terrorism, including the
dissemination of propaganda on Google’s website before and
after the Paris Attacks, Google was arguably present for at
least some of the terroristic activities that comprise the
“principal violation.”
The fourth factor considers the defendant’s “relation” to
the principal,  recognizing that some persons—e.g., those in
positions of authority, or members of a larger group—may
possess greater powers of suggestion.  Id. at 478, 484. 
Halberstam also cautioned that courts should be “especially
vigilant” in evaluating a spouse’s assistance, “so as not to
infuse the normal activities of a spouse with the aura of a
concerted tort.”  Id. at 484.  Google allowed members of ISIS
who posted videos on YouTube to opt into AdSense, and by
approving ISIS videos for monetization, Google agreed to
share some percentage of the resulting advertising revenue
with those ISIS members.  Thus, the allegations in the TAC
describe arms-length business transactions between Google
and YouTube users who opted into the AdSense program.
The fifth factor is directed to the defendant’s “state of
mind.”  Id. at 478.  Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind
may show that a defendant was “one in spirit” with the
principal actor.  Id. at 484.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs do not
allege that Google had any intent to finance, promote, or
carry out ISIS’s terrorist acts.  See Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225. 
Nor does the TAC suggest that Google shared any of ISIS’s
objectives.  Instead, the allegations show, at most, that
Google intended to profit from the AdSense program.  The
TAC incorporates by reference articles that indicate Google
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took some steps to prevent ads from appearing on ISIS
videos.18
Finally, the sixth factor concerns the “duration of the
assistance provided.”  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. 
Halberstam explained that “[t]he length of time an alleged
aider-abettor has been involved with a tortfeasor almost
certainly affects the quality and extent of their relationship
and probably influences the amount of aid provided as well;
additionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant’s state
of mind.”  Id.  Here, the TAC lacks specific allegations about
the length of time Google provided assistance to ISIS in the
form of revenue-sharing, but it cites several news articles
from March 2015 and March 2016 describing the placement
of advertisements on YouTube videos posted by ISIS.  The
TAC also provides an example from a video published on
May 28, 2015.  Thus, at most, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege
that advertisements were placed on ISIS’s YouTube videos
during those periods of time.
We conclude that these allegations fall short of
establishing that Google’s assistance was sufficiently
“substantial” for purposes of § 2333(d)(2) liability.  When we
review an order granting a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss we are
required to assess whether the allegations in the complaint,
taken as true, state a claim of substantial assistance.  See
Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.
2021) (“Our case law does not permit plaintiffs to rely on
anticipated discovery to satisfy Rules 8 and 12(b)(6); rather,
18 See, e.g., Ads Shown Before YouTube ISIS Videos
Catch Companies Off-Guard ,  NBC News (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/ads-shown-
isis-videos-youtube-catchcompanies-guard-n320946.
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pleadings must assert well-pleaded factual allegations to
advance to discovery”).
Although monetary support is undoubtedly important to
ISIS’s terrorism campaign, the TAC is devoid of any
allegations about how much assistance Google provided.  As
such, it does not allow the conclusion that Google’s
assistance was substantial.  Nor do the allegations in the TAC
suggest that Google intended to assist ISIS.  Accordingly, we
conclude the Gonzalez Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for
aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA.  We do not
consider whether the identified defects in the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing claims—principally, the absence
of any allegation regarding the amount of the shared
revenue—could be cured by further amendment because the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs were given leave to amend those claims
and declined to do so.  See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller,
104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
B
Section 2333(d)(2) also permits claims for secondary
liability “as to any person . . . who conspires with the person
who committed . . . an act of international terrorism” as set
forth in § 2333(a).  As with aiding-and-abetting liability,
JASTA specifies that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Halberstam provides “the proper legal framework” for
assessing conspiracy liability under § 2333(d).  Pub. L. No.
144-222, § 2(a)(5), 130 Stat. at 852.  Halberstam concluded
that proof of conspiracy requires three elements: (1) “an
agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful
manner,” (2) “an overt act in furtherance of the agreement by
someone participating in it,” and (3) “injury caused by the
act.”  705 F.2d at 487.  We conclude the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
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TAC does not state an actionable claim for conspiracy
liability.
The TAC’s allegations are insufficient to plausibly
suggest that Google reached an agreement with ISIS to carry
out the Paris Attacks that caused Nohemi Gonzalez’s death. 
Halberstam requires the overt act causing plaintiffs’ injury
must be “done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common
scheme.”  Id. at 477.  Google’s sharing of revenues with
members of ISIS does not, by itself, support the inference that
Google tacitly agreed to commit homicidal terrorist acts with
ISIS, where Nohemi Gonzalez’s murder was an overt act
perpetrated pursuant to, and in furtherance of, that common
scheme.19  We therefore conclude that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim for conspiracy liability under the ATA,
and affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of the
TAC.
VI
We now turn to the Taamneh appeal.  As we have
explained, although the complaints in Gonzalez and Taamneh
are similar, our decision in Taamneh is largely dictated by the
path Taamneh took to reach our court.  Because the bulk of
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed on
the basis of § 230 immunity, our decision in Gonzalez
principally focuses on whether the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
19 The Gonzalez Plaintiffs seek to enlist the TAC’s allegation that
“Google . . . conspired with ISIS, its members[,] and affiliates” to
promote, plan, and carry out “the acts of international terrorism that
injured the plaintiffs.”  But this conclusory allegation is insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–56 (2007).
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revenue-sharing theory sufficed to state a claim under the
ATA.  In contrast, the district court in Taamneh did not reach
§ 230; it only addressed whether the Taamneh Plaintiffs
plausibly alleged violations of the ATA for purposes of Rule
12(b)(6).  The Taamneh appeal is further limited by the fact
that the Taamneh Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of
their aiding-and-abetting claim.
The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim stems
from Abdulkadir Masharipov’s murder of Nawras Alassaf at
the Reina nightclub on January 1, 2017. Masharipov’s
connection to ISIS is not disputed.  He filmed his
“martyrdom” video, wherein he stated that he was going to
carry out a suicide attack in the name of ISIS, and requested
that his son grow up to be a suicide bomber like him.20  About
one year before the Reina Attack, ISIS instructed Masharipov
to move to Turkey with his family and await further orders. 
ISIS provided Masharipov with an assault rifle, ammunition,
and stun grenades, and directed Masharipov when and where
to attack.  ISIS also sent Masharipov footage taken inside the
Reina nightclub, and Masharipov viewed it at length to
memorize the floor plan in preparation for his attack. 
1
The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim is
governed by the standards set forth in Halberstam.  The first
Halberstam element requires that “the party whom the
20 The operative complaint alleges “[m]artyrdom videos, shared via
Defendants’ websites, are tools of propaganda frequently used by ISIS. 
These videos are used as psychological weapons in ISIS’s attempt to
establish validity for their actions, inspire fear in their enemies, or spread
their ideology for political or religious ambitions.”
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defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an
injury.”  705 F.2d at 477.  The parties do not dispute that the
Reina Attack was an “act of international terrorism” that was
“committed, planned, or authorized” by ISIS.  Nor do the
parties dispute that the Reina Attack caused the Taamneh
Plaintiffs’ injury—the killing of Nawras Alassaf.
2
The second Halberstam element of aiding-abetting
liability requires the defendant to be “generally aware of his
role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time
that he provides the assistance.”  Id.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs
also satisfied this element.
The Taamneh Plaintiffs allege that, at the time of the
Reina Attack, defendants were generally aware that ISIS used
defendants’ platforms to recruit, raise funds, and spread
propaganda in support of their terrorist activities.  The FAC
alleges that, despite “extensive media coverage” and legal
and governmental pressure, defendants “continued to provide
these resources and services to ISIS and its affiliates, refusing
to actively identify ISIS’s Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube
accounts, and only reviewing accounts reported by other
social media users.”  These allegations suggest the
defendants, after years of media coverage and legal and
government pressure concerning ISIS’s use of their platforms,
were generally aware they were playing an important role in
ISIS’s terrorism enterprise by providing access to their
platforms and not taking aggressive measures to restrict
ISIS-affiliated content.  See Linde, 882 F.3d at 329; see also
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477.
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3
The third Halberstam element requires the plaintiff to
allege the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the
principal violation.  705 F.2d at 477.  We conclude the
Taamneh Plaintiffs’ complaint satisfied this element.
The Taamneh Plaintiffs adequately allege that defendants
knowingly assisted ISIS.  Specifically, the FAC alleges that
ISIS depends on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to recruit
individuals to join ISIS, to promote its terrorist agenda, to
solicit donations, to threaten and intimidate civilian
populations, and to inspire violence and other terrorist
activities.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that
each defendant has been aware of ISIS’s use of their
respective social media platforms for many years—through
media reports, statements from U.S. government officials,
and threatened lawsuits—but have refused to take meaningful
steps to prevent that use.  The FAC further alleges that
Google shared revenue with ISIS by reviewing and approving
ISIS’s YouTube videos for monetization through the
AdSense program.  Taken as true, these allegations
sufficiently allege that defendants’ assistance to ISIS was
knowing.
We next consider whether the Taamneh Plaintiffs
plausibly allege that defendants’ assistance was “substantial,”
applying the six Halberstam factors.21  First, the act
21 Many of the allegations we discuss in the context of Taamneh were
also raised in a similar form in the Gonzalez TAC.  But because of the
application of § 230 immunity in Gonzalez, we did not have occasion to
consider them in our evaluation of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-
abetting claim.
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encouraged is ISIS’s terrorism campaign, and the FAC
alleges that this enterprise was heavily dependent on social
media platforms to recruit members, to raise funds, and to
disseminate propaganda.  The FAC alleges that by providing
ISIS with access to robust communications platforms free of
charge, defendants facilitated ISIS’s ability to reach and
engage audiences it could not otherwise reach, and served as
a matchmaker for people around the globe who were
sympathetic to ISIS’s vision.  It also alleges ISIS’s terrorist
enterprise relies on financial support, as any money provided
to the organization may aid its unlawful goals.  Fields,
881 F.3d at 748.
The second factor—the amount of assistance given by a
defendant—is addressed by the Taamneh Plaintiffs’
allegation that the social media platforms were essential to
ISIS’s growth and expansion.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs allege
that, without the social media platforms, ISIS would have no
means of radicalizing recruits beyond ISIS’s territorial
borders.  Before the era of social media, ISIS’s predecessors
were limited to releasing short, low-quality videos on
websites that could handle only limited traffic.  According to
the FAC, ISIS recognized the power of defendants’ platforms,
which were offered free of charge, and exploited them.  ISIS
formed its own media divisions and production companies
aimed at producing highly stylized, professional-quality
propaganda.  The FAC further alleges that defendants’ social
media platforms were instrumental in allowing ISIS to instill
fear and terror in civilian populations.  By using defendants’
platforms, the Taamneh Plaintiffs allege that ISIS has
expanded its reach and raised its profile beyond that of other
terrorist groups.  These are plausible allegations that the
assistance provided by defendants’ social media platforms
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was integral to ISIS’s expansion, and to its success as a
terrorist organization.
The third factor considers the defendant’s presence or
absence at the time of the tort.  At oral argument, Taamneh
Plaintiffs unambiguously conceded the act of international
terrorism they allege is the Reina Attack itself.  There is no
dispute that defendants were not present during the Reina
Attack.
Fourth, we consider the defendant’s relation to the
principal actor, ISIS.  The FAC indicates that defendants
made their platforms available to members of the public, and
that billions of people around the world use defendants’
platforms.  By making their platforms generally available to
the market, defendants allowed ISIS to exploit their
platforms; but like the Gonzalez TAC, these allegations
indicate that defendants had, at most, an arms-length
transactional relationship with ISIS.  The alleged relationship
may be even further attenuated than the ones defendants have
with some of their other users because the FAC alleges
defendants regularly removed ISIS content and ISIS-affiliated
accounts.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs do not dispute that
defendants’ policies prohibit posting content that promotes
terrorist activity or other forms of violence.
The fifth factor concerns the defendant’s state of mind. 
Here, the Taamneh Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants
had any intent to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist activities, see
Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225, or that defendants shared any of
ISIS’s objectives.  Indeed, the record indicates that
defendants took steps to remove ISIS-affiliated accounts and
videos.  With respect to advertisements on ISIS YouTube
videos, the articles incorporated into the complaint suggest
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that Google took at least some steps to prevent ads from
appearing on ISIS videos.
The sixth factor addresses the period of the defendant’s
assistance.  The Taamneh Plaintiffs allege that defendants
provided ISIS with an effective online communications
platforms for many years.  The FAC alleges that ISIS-
affiliated accounts first appeared on Twitter in 2010. 
According to the Taamneh Plaintiffs’ FAC, ISIS used
Facebook as early as 2012, and used YouTube as early as
2013.
Taking the FAC’s allegations as true, we conclude the
Taamneh Plaintiffs adequately allege that defendants’
assistance to ISIS was substantial.  The FAC alleges that
defendants provided services that were central to ISIS’s
growth and expansion, and that this assistance was provided
over many years.
We are mindful that a defendant’s state of mind is an
important factor, and that the FAC alleges the defendants
regularly removed ISIS-affiliated accounts and content.  See
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (noting that Hamilton’s state of
mind “assume[d] a special importance” because her knowing
assistance evidenced “a deliberate long-term intention to
participate in an ongoing illicit enterprise” and an “intent and
desire to make the venture succeed”).  But the Taamneh
Plaintiffs also allege that defendants allowed ISIS accounts
and content to remain public even after receiving complaints
about ISIS’s use of their platforms.
We also recognize the need for caution in imputing
aiding-and-abetting liability in the context of an arms-length
transactional relationship of the sort defendants have with
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users of their platforms.  Not every transaction with a
designated terrorist organization will sufficiently state a claim
for aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA.  But given
the facts alleged here, we conclude the Taamneh Plaintiffs
adequately state a claim for aiding-and-abetting liability.
VII
Finally, we turn to Clayborn.  The claims in Clayborn
arise from a fatal shooting in San Bernardino, California in
which Sierra Clayborn, Tin Nguyen, and Nicholas Thalasinos
lost their lives.  The district court did not address § 230
immunity and the Clayborn Plaintiffs only appeal the
dismissal of their ATA claim for aiding-and-abetting liability.
The Clayborn Plaintiffs allege that Google, Twitter, and
Facebook provided key assistance to the two shooters, Farook
and Malik.  To plausibly allege an aiding-and-abetting claim
under the ATA, the Clayborn Plaintiffs must allege that ISIS
“committed, planned, or authorized” the San Bernardino
Attack.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2); see also Halberstam,
705 F.2d at 477.  The district court held the Clayborn
Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that ISIS committed,
authorized, or planned the San Bernardino Attack because the
ties between the attack and ISIS were “insufficient to
plausibly plead claims for indirect liability.”  The court
interpreted § 2333(d)(2) to require “evidence that ISIS itself
planned or carried out the attack,” requiring more than
allegations that ISIS sought to “generally radicalize”
individuals and that ISIS promoted terrorist attacks.
On appeal, the Clayborn Plaintiffs argue three “central
allegations” sufficiently connect ISIS to Farook and Malik:
(1) ISIS claimed responsibility for the San Bernardino Attack
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after the fact; (2) Malik pledged allegiance to then-ISIS
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi at some point during the attack;
and (3) “the FBI confirmed evidence that Farook had face to
face meetings a few years prior to the attack with five people
the Bureau investigated and labeled [as] having ‘links to
terrorism.’”  From these allegations, the Clayborn Plaintiffs
urge us to infer “that ISIS authorized the San Bernardino
shooting sometime before the attack.”
We conclude the operative complaint does not plausibly
allege that ISIS “committed, planned, or authorized” the San
Bernardino Attack.  It is undisputed that Farook and Malik
planned and carried out the mass killing, but the Clayborn
Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest only that ISIS approved of the
shooting after learning it had occurred, not that it authorized
the attack beforehand.  The allegations in the operative
complaint indicate some connection between the shooters and
ISIS is possible, but more is needed in order to plausibly
allege a cognizable claim for aiding-and-abetting liability. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are
true . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
The Sixth Circuit decision in Crosby aligns with our
conclusion.  In Crosby, plaintiffs filed claims against Google,
Twitter, and Facebook under the ATA following the mass
shooting at the Pulse Night Club in Orlando, Florida. 
621 F.3d at 619.  The plaintiffs alleged “ISIS ‘virtually
recruited’ people through online content, [the shooter] saw
this content at some point before the shooting, and [the
shooter] injured Plaintiffs.”  Id. at 626.  The Crosby plaintiffs
also alleged that ISIS took responsibility for the attack after
the fact.  Id. at 619.  Even taking the allegations as true, the
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Sixth Circuit concluded the complaint alleged the shooter was
“self-radicalized” and never had any contact with ISIS, and
failed to allege that ISIS gave permission for the attack.  Id. 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit held “there [were] insufficient facts to
allege that ISIS ‘committed, planned, or authorized’ the Pulse
Night Club shooting.”  Id. at 626.
The dissent would hold that the Clayborn Plaintiffs
adequately stated a claim for aiding and abetting liability. 
Specifically, the dissent relies on the Clayborn Plaintiffs’
allegation that Farook and Malik used a tactic a Department
of Justice report described as “a frequent, well documented
practice in international terrorism incidents” that had been
outlined in Al Qaeda and ISIS magazines disseminated on
defendants’ platforms.  We disagree.  Farook and Malik’s use
of well-known terrorist tactics do not give rise to an inference
that their attack was “implicitly authorized” by ISIS.
The dissent urges us to apply common law principles of
agency to conclude that ISIS authorized the San Bernardino
Attack by ratifying it after the fact.  We cannot agree this
element is adequately alleged.  Section 2333(d)(2) requires
plaintiffs to demonstrate the act of international terrorism was
“committed, planned, or authorized” by a foreign terrorist
organization.  The language Congress adopted gives no
indication that the “committed, planned, or authorized”
element is satisfied merely because a foreign terrorist
organization praises an act of terrorism.
Even if Congress intended “authorized” to include acts
ratified by terrorist organizations after the fact, ISIS’s
statement after the San Bernardino Attack fell short of
ratification.  The complaint alleges that ISIS stated, “Two
followers of Islamic State attacked several days ago a center
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in San Bernardino in California, we pray to God to accept
them as Martyrs.”  This clearly alleges that ISIS found the
San Bernardino Attack praiseworthy, but not that ISIS
adopted Farook’s and Malik’s actions as its own.  See
Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 4.01 cmt. b, (1933) (“The
act of ratification consists of an externally observable
manifestation of assent to be bound by the prior act of another
person.”).
Because the Clayborn Plaintiffs’ allegations do not
plausibly allege that ISIS “committed, planned, or
authorized” the San Bernardino Attack, the Clayborn
Plaintiffs did not adequately state a claim for aiding and
abetting an act of international terrorism under § 2333(d)(2). 
See Crosby, 921 F.3d at 626.22
VIII
The plaintiffs in these three cases suffered devastating
losses from acts of extreme and senseless brutality, and their
claims highlight an area where technology has dramatically
outpaced congressional oversight.  There is no indication the
drafters of § 230 imagined the level of sophistication
algorithms have achieved.  Nor did they foresee the
22 The district court did not reach whether the San Bernardino Attack
was an “act of international terrorism.”  (emphasis added).  This question
appears to be much closer in Clayborn than either of the other appeals
before us.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C).  In Clayborn, the attack was
planned and executed in the United States by a U.S. citizen and his wife. 
Although the San Bernardino Attack was undoubtably an act of terror, it
is less clear whether the complaint alleged sufficient international activity
to qualify the San Bernardino Attack as an instance of “international
terrorism.”  Having held the Clayborn Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for
secondary liability on other grounds, we do not decide that question.
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circumstance we now face, in which the use of powerful
algorithms by social media websites can encourage, support,
and expand terrorist networks.  At the time § 230 was
enacted, it was widely considered “impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for
possible problems.”  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis
added) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31).  But it is
increasingly apparent that advances in machine-learning
warrant revisiting that assumption.  Indeed, social media
companies are reportedly making laudable strides to develop
tools to identify, flag, and remove inherently illegal content
such as child pornography.23  Section 230’s sweeping
immunity is likely premised on an antiquated understanding
of the extent to which it is possible to screen content posted
by third parties.
There is no question § 230(c)(1) shelters more activity
than Congress envisioned it would.  Whether social media
companies should continue to enjoy immunity for the third-
party content they publish, and whether their use of
algorithms ought to be regulated, are pressing questions that
Congress should address. 
IX
With respect to Gonzalez, we affirm the district court’s
ruling that § 230 immunity bars the plaintiffs’ non-revenue
sharing claims.  Separately, we conclude the TAC’s direct
liability revenue-sharing claims did not plausibly allege that
Google’s actions qualified as acts of international terrorism
within the meaning of § 2331(1), and that the secondary
liability revenue-sharing claims failed to plausibly allege
23 Supra note 11.
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either conspiracy or aiding-and-abetting liability under the
ATA.
With respect to Taamneh, we reverse the district court’s
judgment that the FAC failed to adequately state a claim for
secondary liability under the ATA.
With respect to Clayborn, we affirm the judgment of the
district court that Clayborn Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for secondary liability under the ATA.24
The judgment in No. 18-16700 is AFFIRMED.
The judgment in No. 18-17192 is REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
The judgment in No. 19-15043 is AFFIRMED.
24 Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) moves to file an
amicus brief in this appeal.  We grant the motion, and grant the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs’ motion to file an oversized reply brief in order to respond to
EFF.  In its amicus brief, EFF raises several arguments concerning the
First Amendment.  We often “decline to consider” amicus briefs that seek
“to raise issues not raised or briefed by the parties.”  Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1053 n.11 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Day v. Apoliona, 496 F.3d 1027, 1035 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007)).  Here,
because the parties did not raise the First Amendment, the panel declines
to consider EFF’s arguments on this issue.
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BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion in full.  I write separately
to explain that, although we are bound by Ninth Circuit
precedent compelling the outcome in this case, I join the
growing chorus of voices calling for a more limited reading
of the scope of section 230 immunity.  For the reasons
compellingly given by Judge Katzmann in his partial dissent
in Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020), if not bound by Circuit
precedent I would hold that the term “publisher” under
section 230 reaches only traditional activities of publication
and distribution—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, or alter content—and does not include activities
that promote or recommend content or connect content users
to each other.  I urge this Court to reconsider our precedent en
banc to the extent that it holds that section 230 extends to the
use of machine-learning algorithms to recommend content
and connections to users.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) provides: “No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”  “This grant of immunity
applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not
also an ‘information content provider,’ which is defined as
someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of’ the offending content.”  Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).  Although the statute was enacted in
response to the risk of liability for defamation, the language
of the statute applies to any cause of action based on the
publication or speaking of information content.  See Barnes
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v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).  This
Court has held that immunity under section 230 extends to
“(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
(2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of
action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided
by another information content provider.”  Dyroff v. Ultimate
Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020) (quoting Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1100–01).
The key issue as to the non-revenue-sharing claims in
Gonzalez v. Google is whether Google, through YouTube, is
being treated “as a publisher” of videos posted by ISIS for
purposes of these claims.  We have previously held that
“publication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding
whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-
party content.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  A website’s
decisions to moderate content, restrict users, or allow third
parties full freedom to post content and interact with each
other all therefore fall squarely within the actions of a
publisher shielded from liability under section 230.
But the conduct of the website operators here—like the
conduct of most social media website operators today—goes
very much further.  The platforms’ algorithms suggest new
connections between people and groups and recommend long
lists of content, targeted at specific users.  As Judge Gould’s
dissent cogently explains, the complaint alleges that the
algorithms used by YouTube do not merely publish user
content.  Instead, they amplify and direct such content,
including violent ISIS propaganda, to people the algorithm
determines to be interested in or susceptible to those
messages and thus willing to stay on the platform to watch
more.  Dissent at 96–97.  Similarly, “Facebook uses the
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algorithms to create and communicate its own message: that
it thinks you, the reader—you, specifically—will like this
content.  And . . . Facebook’s suggestions contribute to the
creation of real-world social networks.”  Force, 934 F.3d
at 82 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
In my view, these types of targeted recommendations and
affirmative promotion of connections and interactions among
otherwise independent users are well outside the scope of
traditional publication.  Some sites use their algorithms to
connect users to specific content and highlight it as
recommended, rather than simply distributing the content to
anyone who chooses to engage with it.  Others suggest that
users communicate with designated other users previously
unknown to the recipient of the suggestion.  See Dyroff,
934 F.3d at 1095.  Traditional publication has never included
selecting the news, opinion pieces, or classified ads to send to
each individual reader based on guesses as to their
preferences and interests, or suggesting that one reader might
like to exchange messages with other readers.  The actions of
the social network algorithms—assessing a user’s prior posts,
friends, or viewing habits to recommend new content and
connections—are more analogous to the actions of a direct
marketer, matchmaker, or recruiter than to those of a
publisher.  Reading the statute without regard to our post-
Barnes case law, I would hold that a plaintiff asserting a
claim based on the way that website algorithms recommend
content or connections to users is not seeking to treat the
interactive computer service as a “publisher” within any usual
meaning of that term.  Instead, the website is engaging in its
own communications with users, composing and sending
messages to users concerning what they might like to view or
who they might like to interact with.
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Nothing in the history of section 230 supports a reading
of the statute so expansive as to reach these website-
generated messages and functions.  Section 230 “provide[d]
internet companies with immunity from certain claims ‘to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services.’” HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City
of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)).  But as Judge Katzmann thoroughly
explained in his dissent in Force, the aim of section 230 was
to avoid government regulation of internet content while
“empower[ing] interactive computer service providers to self-
regulate, and . . . provid[ing] tools for parents to regulate,
children’s access to inappropriate material.”  Force, 934 F.3d
at 79 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  A New York state court had just held that an Internet
provider that hosted online bulletin boards could be held
liable for defamation as a publisher because it actively
monitored and removed offensive content.  See Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished)).  So section
230, responding to Stratton Oakmont, prevented providers
from being treated as the publisher of third-party content,
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), and eliminated liability for actions
taken to restrict access to objectionable material, id.
§ 230(c)(2).  Although “Congress grabbed a bazooka to swat
the Stratton-Oakmont fly,” Force, 934 F.3d at 80 (Katzmann,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), still, neither
the text nor the history of section 230 supports a reading of
“publisher” that extends so far as to reach targeted,
affirmative recommendations of content or of contacts by
social media algorithms.
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BUT: As the majority opinion explains, our case law
squarely and irrefutably holds otherwise.  There is just no
getting around that conclusion, as creatively as Judge Gould’s
dissent tries to do so.
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093,
involved a social networking website that allowed users
anonymously to share their experiences on any topic and post
and answer questions.  Importantly, the website, Experience
Project, also “recommended groups for users to join, based on
the content of their posts and other attributes, using machine-
learning algorithms.”  Id. at 1095.  One user, Wesley Greer,
posted a question about buying drugs in a heroin-related
group, and the website sent him a notification when a nearby
drug dealer posted in the same group.  Id.  Greer bought
heroin laced with fentanyl from the dealer and died from the
drug.  Id.
Dyroff held that “[b]y recommending user groups and
sending email notifications, [the website] was acting as a
publisher of others’ content.  These functions—
recommendations and notifications—are tools meant to
facilitate the communication and content of others.  They are
not content in and of themselves.”  Id. at 1098.  To me, those
two sentences actually illustrate why the recommendation and
email notifications are not actions taken in the role of
publisher.  The activities highlighted do involve
communication by the service provider, and so are activities
independent of simply providing the public with content
supplied by others.
The recommendations and notifications in Dyroff are not
meaningfully different than the recommendations and
connections provided by the social media companies in the
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cases at issue here.  Greer’s mother alleged that Experience
Project “steered users to additional groups dedicated to the
sale and use of narcotics” and “sent users alerts to posts
within groups that were dedicated to the sale and use of
narcotics,” both actions that relied on algorithms to amplify
and direct users to content.  Id. at 1095.  Like the
recommendations provided by YouTube, Experience
Project’s recommendations communicated to each user that
the website thought that user would be interested in certain
posts and topics.  And, as here, the recommended connection
was to individuals openly engaged in illegal activity, and the
consequences were fatal.  Just as the terrorist group’s deadly
activities were, according to the complaints in these cases,
facilitated by recommending their gruesome message to
potential recruits, so the drug dealers’ illegal activities in
Dyroff were directly facilitated by connecting them with
potential customers.  And in both instances, the consequences
of the service provider’s recommendations were deadly.
The problem in our case law goes considerably further
back than Dyroff.  Before Dyroff, Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, held that
section 230 did not immunize a website that “induced third
parties to express illegal preferences” by including
discriminatory criteria in a required form for people setting
up profiles, 521 F.3d at 1165.  Roommates.com operated a
website listing rentals and people seeking rooms and required
subscribers to list information about their own and their
preferred roommates’ sex, sexuality, and family status. 
Roommates held that although the information itself was
provided by third parties, the mandatory nature of the
information and the “limited set of pre-populated answers”
made Roommates.com into “much more than a passive
transmitter of information provided by others; it becomes the
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developer, at least in part, of that information.”  Id. at 1166. 
Roommates distinguished between “providing neutral tools
[for users] to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit
searches” or “allow[ing] users to specify whether they will or
will not receive emails by means of user-defined criteria” and
operating “in a manner that contributes to the alleged
illegality.”  Id. at 1169.
As the majority discusses, Maj. Op. at 38, Roommates
relied on our prior decision in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that a dating
website was not liable for an unauthorized and libelous
profile created by a third party, see id. at 1122, 1125.  The
dating website “provided neutral tools specifically designed
to match romantic partners depending on their voluntary
inputs.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172.  Carafano determined
that the website was being treated as a publisher and that the
“additional features, such as ‘matching’ profiles with similar
characteristics” were not sufficient to make the website into
the “creator” or “developer” of the content in user profiles
under 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  339 F.3d at 1125; see id.
at 1124–25.  Instead, the Court determined that such features
were more akin to editing or selection.  Id. at 1124.  A tool
matching two people who choose to share similar information
about themselves is nearly identical to Facebook’s algorithm
suggesting possible connections and is similar to algorithms
recommending new videos based on past user viewing habits,
and to the recommendation and notification functions of the
Experience Project at issue in Dyroff.  Dyroff concluded that
“[t]he [Experience Project’s] recommendation and
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notification functions,” like the tools in Carafano, could not
give rise to liability, because they “helped facilitate . . . user-
to-user communication, but . . . did not materially contribute
. . . to the alleged unlawfulness of the content,” 934 F.3d
at 1099.
The partial dissent considers the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
allegations “more akin to those in Roommates.com than
Dyroff because of the unique threat posed by terrorism
compounded by social media.”  Dissent at 99.  But the subject
matter of the third-party content does not dictate whether an
interactive computer service is being treated as a publisher of
that content.  Nor does the test proposed in the partial dissent,
which focuses on “message[s] designed to recruit individuals
for a criminal purpose” and material contribution “to a
centralized cause giving rise to a probability of grave harm,”
id. at 100, meaningfully distinguish our case law, particularly
Dyroff.  The sale of heroin is a criminal purpose, and many
drug dealers operate as part of criminal networks.  Although
the harm caused by a terrorist attack is immense, the harm
caused by the sale of fentanyl-laced heroin is certainly
“grave”—it led to Greer’s death in Dyroff.  The allegation
that the recommendation to users of illegal terrorist messages
establishes the illegality of Google’s actions under the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, exactly parallels the
allegation in Dyroff that the dissemination of messages
connecting drug dealers to buyers contributed to the harms
Congress intended to combat by prohibiting drug trafficking.
I therefore concur in full in the majority opinion, as we
are bound by this Court’s precedent in Dyroff extending
immunity under section 230 to targeted recommendations of
content and connections.  But I agree with the dissent and
Judge Katzmann that recommendation and social connectivity
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algorithms—as distinct from the neutral search functions
discussed in Roommates—provide a “message” from the
social media platforms to the user about what content they
will be interested in and other people with whom they should
connect.  Transmitting these messages goes beyond the
publishers’ role insulated from liability by section 230.
I urge the Court to take this case en banc to reconsider our
case law and hold that websites’ use of machine-generated
algorithms to recommend content and contacts are not within
the publishing role immunized under section 230.  These
cases demonstrate the dangers posed by extending section
230 immunity to such algorithmic recommendations, an
extension, in my view, compelled by neither the text nor
history of the statute.  As Judge Gould and Judge Katzmann
both emphasize, algorithms on social media sites do not offer
just one or two suggestions; they operate cumulatively and
dominate the user experience.  “The cumulative effect of
recommend[ations] . . . envelops the user, immersing her in
an entire universe filled with people, ideas, and events she
may never have discovered on her own.”  Force, 934 F.3d
at 83 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  If viewers start down a path of watching videos that the
algorithms link to interest in terrorist content, their immersive
universe can easily become one filled with ISIS propaganda
and recruitment.  Even if the algorithm is based on content-
neutral factors, such as recommending videos most likely to
keep the targeted viewers watching longer, the platform’s
recommendations of what to watch send a message to the
user.  And that message—“you may be interested in watching
these videos or connecting to these people”—can radicalize
users into extremist behavior and contribute to deadly
terrorist attacks like these.
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I concur—but, for the reasons stated, reluctantly—in the
majority opinion.
GOULD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
I
I concur in part in the majority opinion in its Parts I and
II, Part III.A through III.D, Part III.F, and Part VI, but
respectfully dissent in part as to Part III.E, and Parts IV, V,
and VII.  These cases involve several shooting or bombing
incidents involving ISIS terrorists at far-flung worldwide
locations of Paris, France; Istanbul, Turkey; and San
Bernardino, California, in the United States.  They also
involve claims that Internet or social media companies such
as Google, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter contributed to
acts of terrorism because of the operation of their procedures
and platforms.  I concur insofar as the majority would reverse
in part the dismissal of revenue-sharing claims in Gonzalez v.
Google, and insofar as it would reverse the district court’s
judgment in Taamneh v. Twitter that the complaint failed to
adequately state a claim for secondary liability under the
Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”).  However, I respectfully
dissent as to the majority’s dismissal of the Gonzalez claims
on grounds of Section 230 immunity, and of failure to state a
claim for direct or secondary liability under the ATA, because
of the majority’s mistaken conclusion that there was no act of
international terrorism, and I also would hold that the
complaint adequately alleged that there was proximate cause
supporting damages on those claims.
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I further note that the majority here makes its dismissive
rulings solely on the pleadings and with no discovery to
illuminate Plaintiffs’ well-plead factual contentions.  Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of claims
without pondering evidence in cases where a complaint fails
to state a claim.  FRCP 12(b)(6) has an important role to play
in efficiently clearing the courts of suits that lack plausible
allegations or where a legal barrier like preemption exists. 
Yet in a case that does not warrant such a prompt dismissal,1
we do the legal system a disservice by dismissing a case
before considering the evidence that can arise in a properly
monitored discovery period.  A defendant that actually has
immunity is a good candidate for 12(b)(6) dismissal, but if
the district court’s conception of the scope of immunity is
incorrect, as I believe it was here, then its dismissal under that
rule will be untenable.
I would hold that Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) does not bar the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’
claims for direct and secondary liability under the ATA, and
I would allow those claims to proceed to the district court for
a reasonable period for discovery.  I agree that claims can
proceed in the Taamneh case, and accordingly agree with
reversing and remanding in that case.  And on the Clayborn
1 Doubtless the Defendant social media companies would benefit
from 12(b)(6) dismissal at the outset—in a case where they are actually
immune—to avoid expensive and time-consuming discovery procedures. 
However, while that relief would be “swift,” it would not necessarily be
just.  I am reminded of the often-quoted observation by Justice Potter
Stewart, when he was a U.S. Circuit Judge and before his elevation to the
Supreme Court, that: “Swift justice demands more than just swiftness.” 
Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 385 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (capitalization altered).  This observation has currency in civil
cases as well, and not only in the criminal justice context.
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v. Twitter case, I respectfully dissent because I think that the
majority’s conception of an attack authorized by ISIS is
inconsistent with the allegations of the operative complaint
and well-established principles of tort and agency law. 
Further, on all these claims, I would permit amendment if
sought by plaintiffs based on a theory that the claims are
supported by specialized federal common law that may be
applied in cases involving a particularly strong national
interest and a gap in applicable statutory law.2
I further urge that regulation of social media companies
would best be handled by the political branches of our
government, the Congress and the Executive Branch, but that
in the case of sustained inaction by them, the federal courts
are able to provide a forum responding to injustices that need
to be addressed by our justice system.  Here, that means to me
that the courts should be able to assess whether certain
procedures and methods of the social media companies have
created an unreasonably dangerous social media product that
proximately caused damages, and here, the death of many.
The issues here cannot be considered without
contemplating the specific facts alleged in the operative
2 We do not ordinarily consider an issue that was not raised in the
district court, e.g., Am. President Lines Ltd. v. Int’l Longshore &
Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore Div., Unit 60, 721 F.3d 1147, 1157
(9th Cir. 2013), and similarly do not normally consider issues that are not
presented to us in the briefing, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 149 F.3d
1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998).  However, these rules have exceptions that are
applied by us in extraordinary cases where permitting such an issue to be
considered is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  See Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).  Here, the three complaints involve
sufficiently strong interests of the families with loved ones lost to the ISIS
attacks, so that these cases fall within the exception to the rule.
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complaints.  Because the treatment by the majority of the
facts of the three cases captioned above is not contested by
me, I mention only the briefest thumbnail sketch of what is
involved in the three cases that are now on appeal:
Gonzalez v. Google, 18-16700, involved an ISIS shooting
in Paris on November 13, 2015, which took the life of
Nohemi Gonzalez, a 26-year-old U.S. citizen.  This shooting
was one among a broader series of ISIS attacks in Paris on the
same day, including several suicide bombings and mass
shootings.
Taamneh v. Twitter, 18-17192, concerns the notorious
January 1, 2017 mass shooting by an ISIS operative at the
Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey, which left 39 people
dead, 69 others injured, and resulted in the death of Nawras
Alassaf.
Clayborn v. Twitter, 19-15043, concerns the December 2,
2015 attack by ISIS supporters at the Inland Regional Center
in San Bernardino, California, which left 14 people dead and
22 others injured.
All of these terrorist incidents involved ISIS’s supporters. 
In all three cases, Plaintiffs alleged that Google, through
YouTube, and Twitter and Facebook, through their features,
provided material support to international terrorism and aided
and abetted international terrorism in violation of the ATA,
as amended in 2016 by the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).  I would hold that the challenged
conduct of the social media companies is not immunized by
Section 230 and that the complaints’ allegations are sufficient
to plausibly allege that the Defendant social media companies
violated positive statutory law and proximately caused
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damages to Plaintiffs.  In addition, I would hold that the same
types of claims can permissibly be asserted as a matter of
federal common law upon amendment of the complaints.  See
infra, Section V.
II
My colleagues hold that Section 230 immunizes Google
from the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims that the YouTube
platform’s content-generating algorithms aid and abet
international terrorism by repeatedly recommending the
propaganda videos of ISIS to users and by broadly
disseminating violent and radicalizing terrorist messages.3  It
is true that: “No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
3 The problem I challenge is not that the social media companies
republish harmful propaganda from ISIS; the problem is the algorithms
devised by these companies to keep eyes focused on their websites. 
Historian Anne Applebaum, who has evaluated the stresses on
democracies in several countries in light of modern communications and
technology, notes the following: “[S]ocial media algorithms themselves
encourage false perceptions of the world.  People click on the news they
want to hear; Facebook, YouTube, and Google then show them more of
whatever it is that they already favor, whether it is a certain brand of soap
or a particular form of politics.  The algorithms radicalize those who use
them too.  If you click on perfectly legitimate anti-immigration YouTube
sites, for example, these can lead you quickly, in just a few more clicks,
to white nationalist sites and then to violent xenophobic sites.  Because
they have been designed to keep you online, the algorithms also favor
emotions, especially anger and fear.  And because the sites are addictive,
they affect people in ways they don’t expect.  Anger becomes a habit. 
Divisiveness becomes normal.  Even if social media is not yet the primary
news source for all Americans, it already helps shape how politicians and
journalists interpret the world and portray it.  Polarization has moved from
the online world into reality.”  See Anne Applebaum, Twilight of
Democracy—The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism (1st ed. 2020).
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information provided by another information content
provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  But in my view, Section
230 was not intended to immunize, nor does its literal
language suggest that it immunizes, companies providing
interactive computer services from liability for serious harms
knowingly caused by their conduct.  Plaintiffs raise a genuine
factual issue of whether Defendants knew that ISIS and its
supporters were inserting propaganda videos into their
platforms, which permits the inference that these social media
companies were aware of the risks to the public from
incipient terrorists who, inflamed by ISIS videos, would
wreak havoc upon “infidels” who might be encountered by
them.
Even if under Section 230 Google should not be
considered the publisher or speaker of propaganda messages
posted by ISIS or its sympathizers, the YouTube platform
nonetheless magnified and amplified those communications,
joining them with similar messages, in a way that contributed
to the ISIS terrorists’ message beyond what would be done by
considering them alone.  Because ISIS depended on recruits
to carry out its campaign of worldwide hatred and violence,
disseminating its terrorist messages through its propaganda
videos was a proximate cause of the terrorist attacks at issue
here.  When fairly read with notice pleading principles in
mind, the complaints plausibly allege ISIS’s dependence on
recruitment through social media’s free publicity and vast
network.
I do not believe that Section 230 was ever intended to
immunize such claims for the reasons stated in Chief Judge
Katzmann’s cogent and well-reasoned opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part in Force v. Facebook, Inc.,
934 F.3d 53, 76–89 (2d Cir. 2019).  Chief Judge Katzmann’s
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partially dissenting opinion in Force v. Facebook is appended
as Attachment A to this partial dissent.  Although I
substantially agree with Judge Katzmann’s reasoning
regarding Section 230 immunity, I add some thoughts of my
own.  In short, I do not believe that Section 230 wholly
immunizes a social media company’s role as a channel of
communication for terrorists in their recruiting campaigns
and as an intensifier of the violent and hatred-filled messages
they convey.  The law should not give social media platforms
total immunity, and in my view it does not, because the
conduct plausibly alleged does have “some direct
relationship,” Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 744 (9th
Cir. 2018), between the asserted injuries of the Plaintiff
families and the Defendant social media companies’ conduct. 
Further, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged aiding and abetting
claims because providing the channels of communication for
inflammatory videos should be considered substantial
assistance to the primary violations of terrorist shootings or
bombings.
The majority splits Plaintiffs’ claims into two categories:
claims based on Google’s content-generating algorithms (the
“non-revenue sharing claims”), and claims based on ISIS’s
use of Google’s advertising program, AdSense (the “revenue
sharing claims”).  The majority ultimately concludes that
Section 230 shields Google from liability for its content-
generating algorithms.  I disagree.  I would hold that
Plaintiffs’ claims do not fall within the ambit of Section 230
because Plaintiffs do not seek to treat Google as a publisher
or speaker of the ISIS video propaganda, and the same is true
as to the content-generating methods and devices of Facebook
and Twitter.
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Accepting plausible complaint allegations as true, as we
must, Google, through YouTube, and Facebook and Twitter
through their various platforms and programs, acted
affirmatively to amplify and direct ISIS content, repeatedly
putting it in the eyes and ears of persons who were
susceptible to acting upon it.  For example, YouTube’s
platform did so by serving up an endless stream of violent
propaganda content after any user showed an inclination to
view such material.  At the same time, it permitted its
platforms to be used to convey recruiting information for
ISIS-seeking potential terrorists.
Consider how the Google/YouTube algorithm appears to
operate: To illustrate, let’s assume that a person went to
YouTube and asked it to play a favorite song of some artist
like Elvis Presley or Linda Ronstadt, or a classical symphony
by Ludwig van Beethoven or Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, or
a jazz piece by Miles Davis or Charlie Parker.  After that
requested song played, the viewer or listener would see
automatically a queue of similar or related videos showing
either other songs of the requested artist or of some other
artists within similar genre.  Similarly, if one went to
YouTube to see a video about the viewer’s favorite National
Park, the viewer would soon see a line of videos about other
national parks or similar scenery.  And here’s the difficulty:
If a person asked YouTube to play a video showing one
bloody ISIS massacre or attack, other such ISIS attacks would
be lined up, or even starting to play automatically.  Thus, the
seemingly neutral algorithm instead operates as a force to
intensify and magnify a message.  That poses no problem
when the video shows Elvis Presley or Linda Ronstadt
performing a musical song, or shows a beautiful National
Park.  But when it shows acts of the most brutal terrorism
imaginable, and those types of images are magnified and
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repeated over and over again, often coupled with incendiary
lectures, then the benign aspects of Google/YouTube,
Facebook and Twitter have been transformed into a chillingly
effective propaganda device, the results of which were
effectively realized in this case.
Section 230 of the CDA was aimed at giving Internet
companies some breathing space to permit rapid growth of
them and the economy by providing that when information
was posted on a website, the interactive computer service
hosting that website would not be liable for the substance of
the content posted by the user.  Pub. L. 104-104, § 509, 110
Stat. 56, 56, 137–39; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857–58
(1997).  Our circuit has developed and consistently applied a
three-part test, the Barnes factors, for when immunity applies. 
See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093,
1097 (9th Cir. 2019).  Under those factors, a defendant is
entitled to Section 230 immunity when: (1) the defendant is
“a provider or user of an interactive computer service,
(2) whom the plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause
of action, as a publisher or speaker,” (3) “of information
provided by another information content provider.”  Id.
at 1097 (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009)).
The factor at issue here is the second.  Although Section
230 arguably means that Google and YouTube cannot be
liable for the mere content of the posts made by ISIS, that
provision in no way provides immunity for other conduct of
Google or YouTube or Facebook or Twitter that goes beyond
merely publishing the post.  Here, Plaintiffs allege that
Google’s “Services” include not just publishing content, but
also “use of Google’s infrastructure, network, applications,
tools and features, communications services,” and other
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specialized tools like “Social Plugins” and “Badges.”  Similar
allegations are made about other platforms’ tools and
procedures.  I would affirm in part to the extent the district
court applied Section 230 immunity to YouTube or other
platforms simply carrying the posts from ISIS on its platform,
but not to the extent that it amplified and in part developed
the terrorist message by encouraging similar views to be
given to those already determined to be most susceptible to
the ISIS cause.
I believe that my view is consistent with our decision in
Dyroff.  The majority relies on Dyroff for the proposition that
Google’s algorithms, which recommend ISIS content to
users, are “neutral tools” meant to facilitate communication
and the content of others.  According to my colleagues, then,
under Section 230, Google does not transcend the role of a
publisher by merely recommending terrorism-related content
based on past content viewed.
In Dyroff, Plaintiff challenged a social networking
website called “Experience Project,” which allowed users to
anonymously share their first-person experiences, post and
answer questions, and interact with other users about different
topics.  934 F.3d at 1094.  The website interface “did not
limit or promote the types of experiences users
shared”—instead, it was up to the user to use the site’s “blank
box” approach to generate content.  Id.  The site also used
machine-learning algorithms to recommend groups for users
to join based on the content of their posts.  Id. at 1095. 
Plaintiff alleged that the site’s functions, including
recommendations of new groups and notifications from
groups of which the user is a member, facilitated an illegal
drug sale that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s son, Wesley
Greer.  Id.  Greer posted on the site asking about where to
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find heroin in a particular city, and a fellow user responded
and sold fentanyl-laced heroin to Greer.  Id.  Greer was sent
an email notification when the other user posted, which
resulted in the drug transaction.  Id.  We held that the site was
entitled to Section 230 immunity because Plaintiff sought to
treat the defendant as the publisher of Greer and his dealer’s
content.  Id. at 1097.
We distinguished the facts in Dyroff from Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157, 1167–69 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  In Roommates, we
held that Section 230 did not immunize a website that
matched people renting rooms with people looking for
somewhere to live from liability under federal and state
housing anti-discrimination laws.  Id. at 1161–62.  The
Roommates.com website design guided users through
required discriminatory criteria, “inducing third parties to
express illegal preferences,” id. at 1165, and therefore the
website itself “directly participate[d] in developing the
alleged illegality.”  Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1099.  In Dyroff, then,
we drew a distinction between true material contribution to a
third party’s content—which would involve “responsibility
for what makes the displayed content illegal or
actionable”—and “actions (traditional to publishers) that are
necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable
content.”  Id. (quoting Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263,
1269 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)).
I would hold that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ allegations are
more akin to those in Roommates.com than Dyroff because of
the unique threat posed by terrorism compounded by social
media.  ISIS content on YouTube is a pervasive phenomenon. 
Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he expansion and success of ISIS is
in large part due to its use of the internet and social media
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platforms to promote and carry out its terrorist activities.” 
One study by the Counter Extremism Project found that
between March and June 2018, 1,348 ISIS videos were
uploaded to YouTube, garnering 163,391 views.4  Though
websites using neutral tools like algorithms are generally
immunized by Section 230, I would hold that where the
website (1) knowingly amplifies a message designed to
recruit individuals for a criminal purpose, and (2) the
dissemination of that message materially contributes to a
centralized cause giving rise to a probability of grave harm,
then the tools can no longer be considered “neutral.”  Further,
a lack of reasonable review of content posted that can be
expected to be harmful to the public, like ISIS’s violent
propaganda videos, also destroys neutrality.5
4 The Counter Extremism Project, White Paper, The eGlyph
Web Crawler: ISIS Content on YouTube (July 2018),
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/eGLYPH_web_c
rawler_white_paper_July_2018.pdf.
5 Google suggests in its briefing that it tries to keep ISIS content from
YouTube.  But the record in this case suggests that if so, the control has
been ineffective.  The record shows that despite extensive media coverage,
legal warnings, and congressional hearings, social media companies
continued to provide a platform and communication services to ISIS
before the Paris attacks, and these resources and services went heedlessly
to ISIS and its affiliates, as the social media companies refused to actively
identify ISIS YouTube accounts, and only reviewed accounts reported by
other YouTube users.  If, for example, a social media company must take
down within a reasonable time sites identified as infringing copyrights, it
follows with stronger logic that social media companies should take down
propaganda sites of ISIS, once identified, within a reasonable time to
avoid death and destruction to the public, which may be victimized by
ISIS supporters.  Moreover, if social media companies can ban certain
speakers who flout their rules by conveying lies or inciting violence, as
was widely reported in the aftermath of tweets and posts relating to the
recent “insurrection” of January 6, 2021, then it is hard to see why such
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In the case of terrorist recruiting, the dissemination itself
“contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the
conduct,” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168, in a way that
disseminating other violent videos would not.  There can be
no doubt that ISIS’s use of violence and threats of violence is
part of its program of terrorism.  Contrary to the majority’s
contention that Google “merely provid[ed] the public with
access to its platform,” Google affirmatively sent a message
in substance to users that individuals who enjoy watching
ISIS content may also be interested in joining its ranks. 
Much as allowing a roommate-matching website to screen
candidates by discriminatory criteria presents the same harm
as doing such screening in person or by telephone (which is
clearly prohibited by statute), a search engine that knowingly
transmits recruitment messages to prospective terrorists
presents the exact danger—material support to the terrorist
cause—that Congress intended to combat with the ATA. 
Though indeed there are some situations where tools like
algorithms can be “neutral,” where the message itself is the
danger, the tool necessarily contributes to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.6
companies could not police and prohibit the transmission of violent ISIS
propaganda videos, in the periods preceding a terrorist attack.  See
Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump,
Capping Online Revolt,  N.Y.  TIMES (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twitter-trump-
suspended.html.
6 The majority contends that my view, which considers the danger
inherent in the message amplified by Google, is inconsistent with
congressional intent in enacting Section 230(c)(1).  Though it is true that
an interactive computer service is immune when it is “treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added), the same
portion of the statute makes clear that for Section 230 to apply, the
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Plaintiffs’ allegations underscore the danger of
amplifying ISIS’s recruiting messages.  Plaintiffs allege that
ISIS has used YouTube “to cultivate and maintain an image
of brutality, to instill greater fear and intimidation,” and to
distribute videos “made in anticipation of the [Paris] attack
showing each of the ISIS terrorists who carried out the attacks
telling of their intentions and then executing a captive for the
camera.”  Plaintiffs allege that ISIS “not only uses YouTube
for recruiting, planning, inciting, and giving instructions for
terror attacks,” but also uses it “to issue terroristic threats . . .
intimidate and coerce civilian populations, take credit for
terror attacks, communicate its desired messages about the
terror attacks . . . [and] demand and attempt to obtain results
from the terror attacks.”
I note that Chief Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in part
and dissent in part in Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53,
76–89 (2d Cir. 2019), relied on a reading of Roommates.com
that is consistent with my view here.  Chief Judge Katzmann
contended that Facebook is developing content by actively
providing friend suggestions between users who have
expressed similar interests—in other words, the algorithms
provided a “message” from Facebook to the user.  Id.
plaintiffs must be attempting through their suit to treat the website as a
publisher or speaker.  But emphasizing the danger of the terrorist message
shows that because Google is amplifying ISIS’s recruitment
message—and thus acting as a content generator, not merely a
publisher—the inherent danger of dissemination materially contributes to
the illegality of the conduct.  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168.  If a
website is acting as a publisher, then under Section 230 it will be immune
no matter what information it publishes from another source.  But if, as is
the case here, the dangerous nature of the message makes amplifying that
message transform what would otherwise be mere publishing into content
development, then the website is no longer immune under Section 230.
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at 82–83.  In the same way, YouTube is “proactively creating
networks of people,” id. at 83, who are sympathetic to the
ISIS cause, and Google is delivering the message that those
YouTube users may be interested in contributing to ISIS in a
more tangible way.
Furthermore, propagating ISIS messages has an
amplification effect that is greater than the sum of each
individual connection.  See Force, 934 F.3d at 83 (Katzmann,
J., dissenting in part) (“The cumulative effect of
recommending several friends, or several groups or events,
has an impact greater than the sum of each suggestion.  It
envelops the user, immersing her in an entire universe filled
with people, ideas, and events she may never have discovered
on her own.”).  Plaintiffs allege that Google does so in part by
“us[ing] YouTube to direct viewers to other online sites,
postings, media, and other social network media.”  When an
ISIS recruitment video manages to reach one person via
YouTube that it might not otherwise have reached, that
person could join the cause by donating their time, money, or
even their life.7  With each person that joins its ranks, ISIS
grows in power and resources.  It is the fact of recruitment to
7 As the Counter Extremism Project observes, “there is a clear
link between extremist videos and individuals who have sought to
support or join ISIS.  A joint study from the University of
Chicago’s Project on Security and Threats and the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Center found that
83% of Americans who committed or were charged with ISIS-related
crimes between March 2014 and August 2016 watched ISIS
propaganda videos.”  See White Paper, eGlyph at 2 (citing Robert
Pape, et al., “The American Face of ISIS,” Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (Feb. 2017), https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-
aspi/import/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf?2Tbn8TshXmujb1ft8f7P
IR7sukzyr hka).
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a centralized organization with the ability to cause
disproportionate harm that distinguishes a terrorist venture
from a “normal” criminal venture (as in Dyroff).  In Dyroff,
though the website connected Greer with a drug dealer that he
might not have otherwise met, the singular connection
between the two was unlikely to contribute to a centralized
effort to commit international atrocities.  I contend that the
ATA codifies a “duty not to provide material support to
terrorism” precisely because Congress recognized the
exponential impact of such conduct.  See Force, 934 F.3d
at 83–84 (Katzmann, J., dissenting in part) (noting that “ATA
torts are atypical” because the Act premises liability “not on
publishing qua publishing, but rather on Facebook’s
provision of services and personnel to Hamas”).
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Section 230
does not immunize Google from liability for its content-
generating algorithms insofar as they develop a message to
ISIS-interested users.  The same reason supports lack of
immunity for the other Defendant social media companies’
use of their own algorithms, procedures, users, friends, or
other means to deliver similar content from ISIS to the users
of the social media.  But even if Dyroff cannot be fairly
distinguished, then our circuit should take this case en banc
to modify or clarify the rule that machine-learning algorithms
can never produce content within the meaning of Section
230,8 or the Supreme Court should take up the proper
8 The majority distinguishes Chief Judge Katzmann’s dissent in Force
in part by emphasizing that “Ninth Circuit case law forecloses his
argument,” though it recognizes that the Force dissent maintains that
Section 230(c)(1) “need not be interpreted to immunize websites’ friend-
and-content-suggestion algorithms.”
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interpretation of Section 230 and bring its wisdom and
learning to bear on this complex and difficult topic.9
III
Having determined that Section 230 does not immunize
Google for liability for either set of claims (non-revenue
I disagree that our case law must be read to foreclose the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs’ argument, but the majority’s apparent recognition that friend-
and-content-suggestion algorithms could fairly be interpreted as outside
of Section 230’s ambit lends support to a potential en banc call in this
case.
9 Recently, Justice Thomas commented in connection with the denial
of a writ of certiorari in Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group
USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020), that the Court would soon find it
appropriate to take up a case interpreting Section 230.  Justice Thomas
notes that a new look at the statute is warranted because “[w]hen Congress
enacted the statute, most of today’s major Internet platforms did not
exist.”  Id. at 13 (Thomas, J., writing separately).  Despite this, “many
courts have construed the law broadly to confer sweeping immunity on
some of the largest companies in the world.”  Id.  Justice Thomas goes on
to explain that courts’ views of Section 230 have gone from a “modest
understanding” to beyond what plausibly could have been intended by
Congress, including conferring immunity “even when a company
distributes content that it knows is illegal.  Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
In this separate statement, Justice Thomas made clear his view that the
scope of Section 230 immunity should be narrowed in line with
congressional intent.  I agree with Justice Thomas that Section 230 has
mutated beyond the specific legal backdrop from which it developed, and
I cannot join a majority opinion that seeks to extend this sweeping
immunity further.  When one considers the analysis in the statement of
Justice Thomas in Malwarebytes, the dissent of Chief Judge Katzmann in
Force v. Facebook, and the concurring opinion of Judge Tymkovich in
FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009), I believe that there
is a rising chorus of judicial voices cautioning against an overbroad
reading of the scope of Section 230 immunity.
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sharing and revenue sharing), I next consider whether
Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for direct liability under the
ATA.
The majority holds that Section 230 immunizes Google
from liability for Plaintiffs’ non-revenue sharing claims, so it
does not address whether Plaintiffs adequately alleged
primary liability for those claims.  Having held that Section
230 does not preclude it from considering that issue for the
revenue sharing claims, however, the majority concludes that
Plaintiffs still do not state a claim for primary liability under
that theory.  Specifically, my colleagues would decide that
Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Google committed an
act of international terrorism, or that Google’s actions
proximately caused Nohemi Gonzalez’s death.  I address both
bases for the majority’s conclusion in turn.
A
I would hold that the Plaintiffs plausibly stated a claim
that Google could be held primarily liable under the ATA
based on both Google’s revenue-sharing procedure and
Google’s content-generating algorithms.  At the motion to
dismiss stage, we accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Campidoglio LLC v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 870 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
The civil remedies provision of the ATA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), allows a United States national who is a victim of
“an act of international terrorism” to sue for damages in
federal court.  Acts constituting international terrorism
“involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are
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a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).  Such acts must “appear
to be intended . . . (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”  Id. § 2331(1)(B).
1
The majority acknowledges that Section 230 does not
shield Google from liability on the revenue sharing claims
because the allegations are “premised on Google providing
ISIS with material support by giving ISIS money.”  I concur
with that aspect of the opinion, but I would also add that
providing monetary support to a foreign terrorist
organization, with the constructive knowledge that that
money would likely be used as part of the terrorist enterprise,
qualifies as an “act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a).
I begin with the contours of Plaintiffs’ revenue sharing
claim.  The complaint alleges that Google is aware of ISIS’s
presence on YouTube because it has received complaints
about ISIS content, and it has “suspended or blocked selected
ISIS-related accounts at various times.”  Plaintiffs also allege
that Google shares a percentage of the revenue it generates
from pairing advertisements and videos with the video poster. 
Through Google’s commercial service, AdSense, users can
register their accounts for “monetization.”  Plaintiffs allege
that ISIS uses the AdSense monetization program to earn
revenue.  Before the YouTube video can be approved for
advertisements, Google must review and approve the video. 
Google has therefore “reviewed and approved ISIS videos,
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including videos posted by ISIS-affiliated users, for
‘monetization’ through Google’s placement of ads in
connection with those videos.”  Through those approvals,
Google gains constructive knowledge of the fact that it
provided financial support to ISIS and incentivized ISIS to
continue to post videos on YouTube.  Plaintiffs’ allegations
about Google’s knowledge is bolstered by contentions that
various news outlets reported on the kind of ads appearing
before ISIS YouTube videos.
The majority mistakenly concludes that Google’s conduct
could not qualify as international terrorism because it is not
“intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to
influence or affect a government.”  I disagree.  The standard
for intent under the ATA is not subjective; rather, it is a
“matter of external appearance.”  Boim v. Holy Land Found.
for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).  I would hold that, on the facts alleged, a knowing
provision of resources to a terrorist organization constitutes
aid to international terrorism because an entity like Google
appears to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of
its actions.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 8A (1965).
The majority relies on Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d
314 (2d Cir. 2018), to conclude that knowingly providing
material support to a terrorist organization is not “an act of
international terrorism” if it is motivated by economics. 
Besides the fact that Linde is a sister circuit decision that is
not binding on our court, its facts and holding are also
distinguishable.  In Linde, the court expressly held that it was
error for the district court to instruct the jury that proof that
Arab Bank provided material support to a designated foreign
terrorist organization, in violation of § 2339B, “necessarily
proved the bank’s commission of an act of international
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 108 of 167
Add. 108
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 135 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 109
terrorism.”  Id. at 325.  Thus, the Second Circuit held only
that violating § 2339B does not inherently create an act of
terrorism.  The court’s reasoning continually references the
context of its decision: whether it could find that the jury
instruction error was harmless.  Id. at 327 (holding that “the
mere provision of routine banking services to organizations
and individuals said to be affiliated with terrorists does not
necessarily establish causation”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the court did
not even decide whether Arab Bank’s financial services to
Hamas should be viewed as “routine” under the court’s
precedent, because that issue raised a question of fact for the
jury to decide.  Id.
Even accepting that providing material aid “does not
invariably equate” to an act of international terrorism under
§ 2331(1), Linde, 883 F.3d at 326, there are clearly situations
where providing such aid operates to endanger human life
and manifests an apparent intent to coerce or intimidate
civilians or to influence or affect governments.  The Seventh
Circuit’s Boim decision represents such a case, despite the
majority incorrectly characterizing Plaintiffs’ reliance on it as
“misplaced.”  In Boim, the court held that a jury could find
defendants liable under the ATA when they had donated
money to Hamas and Hamas-affiliated charities, knowing that
Hamas used such money to finance violence towards at least
some American citizens.  549 F.3d at 690.  Because donating
money to Hamas was like “giving a loaded gun to a child,” it
did not matter that the act of giving money is not a violent act
itself because, in context, it would be “dangerous to human
life.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The Seventh Circuit recognized
that imposing liability for providing money to a terrorist
group “makes good sense as a counterterrorism measure,”
because “[d]amages are a less effective remedy against
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terrorists and their organizations than against their financial
angels.”  Id.
Boim relied on the foreseeability of the consequences of
donating to Hamas to support its sensible holding that the
donations would appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population.  Id. at 694; see also Linde, 883 F.3d at
327 (discussing Boim’s reasoning and stating that “given such
foreseeable consequences,” the donations met the statutory
definition for an act of terrorism).  The court analogized
donating to a terrorist organization to giving a small child a
loaded gun because in both cases, the actor is “doing
something extremely dangerous and without justification.” 
Id. at 693.  “If the actor knows that the consequences are
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still
goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact
desired to produce the result.”  Id. (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 8A (1965)).  The fact that the actor was
not motivated by a desire for the child to shoot anyone is of
no matter to the tort inquiry.  Id.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs allege that Google knew ISIS was
using its AdSense program, and that therefore Google knew
it was providing material support to a terrorist organization. 
The fact that Google was not motivated by a desire to
augment ISIS’s efforts to recruit other terrorists is irrelevant. 
The majority’s argument—that Google’s interactions with
ISIS via revenue sharing are not intended to intimidate or
coerce civilian populations because Google was “motivated
by economics”—is an arbitrary line divorced from Section
2333’s text and established principles of tort law.  Boim—a
decision properly based upon Section 2333’s text and
history—does not attempt to draw a line based on motivation. 
In fact, it rejects such a line as irrelevant to the question of
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 110 of 167
Add. 110
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 137 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 111
intent because a person intends what he knows is
substantially certain to result from his act.  549 F.3d at 693. 
My colleagues attempt to distinguish Boim by noting that a
donor to Hamas would likely share that organization’s vision
and objectives, but Boim did not rely on that aspect of
targeted donation.  Instead, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
“[a] knowing donor to Hamas” is “a donor who knew the
aims and activities of the organization.”  Id. at 693–94
(emphasis added).  It was the donor’s knowledge of Hamas’
activities, rather than his approval of it, that gave rise to
liability.
2
Because amplifying ISIS’s message and creating new
networks of prospective terrorist recruits foreseeably provides
material support to a terrorist organization, I would likewise
hold that the complaint in Gonzalez v. Google states a claim
that Google is primarily liable on a non-revenue sharing
theory.
Terrorism is, in part, psychological warfare.  The record
shows that for ISIS terrorism is a psychological weapon. 
ISIS’s most potent and far-reaching weapon is the Internet. 
The Gonzalez complaint alleges that “Google’s YouTube
platform has played an essential role in the rise of ISIS,”
which has become one of the largest perpetrators of violence
in the world.  ISIS uses YouTube to recruit members, plan
terrorist attacks, issue threats, take credit for attacks, and
demand and attempt to obtain results from the attacks by
influencing government policies and conduct.  While one of
ISIS’s goals is to commit acts of violence, “the physical
attack itself and the harm to the individual victims of the
attack” is just one piece of the puzzle—ISIS also uses terror
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attacks as a means to communicate its political message and
instill fear in those it considers its combatants.  Thus, the
impact of ISIS’s terrorism is dependent upon its ability to
communicate its message and reach its intended audiences. 
Id.  Plaintiffs allege that “ISIS’s use of violence and threats
of violence [are] part of its program of terrorism, designed
. . . to gain attention, instill fear and ‘terror’ in others, send a
message, and obtain results.”  Because the communication of
ISIS violence and threats is part of the terrorist attack,
repeated postings and encouraged viewings of ISIS videos, as
effected by Google’s algorithms, is also part of the attack.
When a terrorist group blows up or shoots up or carves up
passengers on an airplane, railroad car or a subway car, they
do not do it merely to destroy property or injure people
involved in those bombings, shootings, and knifing attacks. 
Instead, they aim to create fear in the public so that people
will be afraid to use airplanes or railroad cars or subways or
any general public area to go about their business as usual. 
Publicizing the event is just as essential to terrorists’ success
as is the bombing, shooting, or knifing itself.  So-called
“neutral” algorithms created by Facebook, Twitter, and
Google, are then transformed into deadly missiles of
destruction by ISIS, even though they were not initially
intended to be used that way.  But once there is a consistent
stream of conduct by ISIS, it should be understood that
defendants who passively ignore that conduct can be held to
have intended the natural and probable consequences of their
actions.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 8A (1965).
Just as sharing revenue with ISIS is “dangerous to human
life,” Boim, 549 F.3d at 690 (citation omitted), so is
amplifying its message and encouraging recruitment to its
ranks.  Perhaps even more so because unlike money, which
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is fungible, YouTube has a virtual monopoly on hosting
extremist videos.10  ISIS can get operating funds from a
variety of sources, but very few platforms have the
international network and infrastructure to which YouTube
has access.  Imposing liability on social media platforms for
affirmatively amplifying ISIS’s message can therefore “cut
the terrorists’ lifeline.”  See id. at 691.
B
Direct liability claims under the ATA require that
plaintiffs show they suffered injury “by reason of an act of
international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  The “by
reason of” phrasing has been understood to impose a
requirement of proximate causation.  See, e.g., Fields v.
Twitter, 881 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2018).  To meet this
requirement, “a plaintiff must show at least some direct
relationship between the injuries that he or she suffered and
the defendant’s acts.”  Id. at 744.
On my view of the case, the proximate cause issue must
be reached, and I believe that it is satisfied.  The ATA’s
purpose in part is to provide a financial remedy to victims of
terrorism.  Indeed, ATA’s legislative history demonstrates
Congress’s intent to authorize the “imposition of liability at
any point along the causal chain of terrorism.”  S. Rep. No.
102-342, at 22 (1992) (referencing “the flow of money” to
terrorist groups).
10 See, e.g., Neima Jahromi, The Fight for the Future of YouTube,
NEW YORKER (July 8, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-
technology/the-fight-for-the-future-of-youtube.
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My view is consistent with our decision in Fields v.
Twitter.  In Fields, we acknowledged that acts of international
terrorism are foreseeable consequences of financial support
to a terrorist organization, but we also noted that such
fungibility “does not relieve claimants of their burden to
show causation.”  Id. at 749.  Fields requires that a plaintiff
plausibly allege a “direct relationship between a defendant’s
act and [a plaintiff’s] injur[ies],” id. at 748, and that element
is met here because there is a sufficient nexus.
Plaintiffs allege that ISIS operatives involved in the Paris
Attacks posted links to ISIS YouTube videos.  The sum of
Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate that the terrorists
responsible for Plaintiffs’ injuries used YouTube as an
integral component of recruiting, and that such recruiting is
necessary to carry out attacks at the scale of those in Paris.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that at least two of the
twelve ISIS terrorists who carried out the Paris Attacks,
Abaaoud and Laachraoui, used online social media platforms
to post links to ISIS recruitment YouTube videos and “jihadi
YouTube videos.”  Plaintiffs allege that Abaaoud,
“considered the operational leader of the Paris Attack,” was
an active user of social media, including YouTube.  In a
March 2014 ISIS YouTube video, “Abaaoud gave a
monologue (in French) recruiting jihadi fighters for ISIS.”
Plaintiffs also allege that at the time of the attacks these
two ISIS terrorists, who were “instrumental in the Paris
Attack,” were members of or at least involved with ISIS
networks in Belgium called “The Zerkani Network” and
Sharia4Belgium.  The Belgian networks “used and relied on
social media to build and maintain connections with ISIS
recruits.”  Plaintiffs allege that there was a pervasive network
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of ISIS recruiters in Belgium, which has been called “the
epicenter of the Islamic State’s efforts to attack Europe.” 
Sharia4Belgium maintained several active YouTube
channels, still active at the time of the Paris Attacks, “which
it used to post sermons, speeches, news events, and other
materials to lure, recruit, and indoctrinate young Muslims to
travel to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.”  Plaintiffs allege that
there was significant overlap and coordination over time
between Sharia4Belgium and “The Zerkani Network.” 
Plaintiffs allege that Laachraoui was involved with
Sharia4Belgium at the time of the Paris Attacks, and his
social media accounts appear to show that he followed ISIS
social media and posted links to jihadi YouTube videos on
his own account.
Though Plaintiffs do not specifically allege how the
perpetrators of the Paris Attack were radicalized, such an
allegation is not necessary to plausibly state their claim.  It is
enough that the complaint alleged that the perpetrators
themselves actively used YouTube to recruit others to ISIS,
gaining resources with which to plan and implement their
attacks; absent the participation of the social media
companies for their own profit-centered purposes, terrorist
groups like ISIS would not have these resources. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged that “The Zerkani Network”
recruited one of the shooters, Abaaoud, “an active user of
social media, including YouTube,” and also alleged that the
network “used and relied on social media” to recruit,
permitting the inference that it is probable Abbaoud was
radicalized through social media.  Viewing these allegations
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as we
must, Campidoglio, 870 F.3d at 970, Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged a sufficient nexus between Google’s conduct and the
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Paris Attack victims’ injuries to satisfy a proximate cause
threshold standard.11
A possible analogy may help to illustrate how the social
media companies’ enhancement and spread of ISIS
propaganda promoting violence and seeking to convert
recruits has a direct relation to the damages caused here. 
Let’s assume that a person on one side of a crowded football
stadium fires a high-powered rifle aimed at a crowd on the
opposite side of the stadium, filled with people, though all
identities are unclear.  Would the majority here say that the
rifle shot striking an unidentified viewer on the other side of
the stadium had no “direct relation” to the shooter and that
the shot did not proximately cause a resulting death?  I think
not.  There is direct relation between shooter and victim there
sufficient to satisfy Fields and there is similar direct relation
here between the challenged conduct of the Defendant social
media companies and the victims of ISIS violence in these
cases to say that the challenged conduct, if shown to be
illegal, was a proximate cause of damages.
11 It is worth noting that the contrary conclusion, espoused by the
majority, would put these and future plaintiffs in an untenable position. 
If we required plaintiffs to specify exactly how an individual terrorist
became radicalized without the benefit of discovery, then it is unlikely that
any such claims could go forward.  At the motion to dismiss stage, with
notice pleading principles in mind, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs need only
plausibly allege “some direct relation” between the terrorist’s actions and
the social media companies’ conduct.  See Fields, 881 F.3d at 749
(citation omitted).  Here, Plaintiffs alleged that the perpetrator of the Paris
Attack was a member of a particular network that used social media to
recruit its members, and that the perpetrator himself was a regular user of
social media.  Given that it is unlikely potential terrorists will announce
the avenues by which they were radicalized, such inferences are
permissible.
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IV
I next turn to whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
claims against Google for secondary liability under JASTA. 
As with primary liability, the majority addressed only the
revenue sharing claims in its opinion, but I would hold that
for either set of claims, Plaintiffs have successfully stated a
claim for secondary liability.
Congress amended the ATA by enacting JASTA in 2016,
Pub. L. No. 144-222, 130 Stat. 854 (Sept. 28, 2016), which
extends liability to persons who aid and abet by providing
substantial assistance to persons who commit acts of
international terrorism, and those who conspire to commit
such acts.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  Under § 2333(d)(2) of the
ATA, “liability may be asserted as to any person who aids
and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance” to
“the person who committed . . . an act of international
terrorism.”  Id.  I recognize the proper legal framework for
analyzing such claims as that described in Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Like the majority, I
first conclude that the first two Halberstam factors have been
satisfied here: (1) the party whom the defendant aids
performed a wrongful act that caused an injury; and (2) the
defendant was “generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he
provide[d] the assistance.”  Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477.  For
the first element, the complaint plausibly alleges that the
Paris Attacks were “committed, planned, or authorized” by
ISIS, a designated terrorist organization.  See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(d)(2).  For the second element, I agree that Google
was “generally aware of its role in ISIS’s terrorist activities”
at the time it used its content-generating algorithms to send a
message to YouTube users and at the time it shared revenue
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through AdSense.  In both cases, Google was aware that it
assumed a role in ISIS’s terrorist activities.  See Halberstam,
705 F.2d at 488; see also Linde, 882 F.3d at 329 (noting that
the element does not require a showing of “specific intent” as
in criminal aiding and abetting, nor does it require that the
defendant “knew of the specific attacks at issue”).
Unlike my colleagues, however, I also conclude that the
final element is met: the defendant “knowingly and
substantially assisted[ed] the principal violation.” 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.  The majority acknowledges
that Google knowingly assisted the principal violation, but
denies that such assistance was “substantial.”12
I would hold that Google’s assistance via its content-
generating algorithms and revenue sharing was both knowing
and substantial.  I need not view the non-revenue sharing
claims and revenue sharing claims in isolation in this portion
of my analysis.  Because I conclude that both sets of Plaintiffs
claims are not barred by Section 230, it is the sum of
Google’s conduct that must be considered when assessing
whether the assistance was substantial.  The Halberstam court
identified six factors relevant to assessing whether the
substantial assistance component is satisfied: “(1) the nature
of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by
12 It may be that what is considered by one person to be “substantial
assistance” is considered by another merely de minimis or inconsequential. 
But even if that is so, it would be a better procedure to leave that decision
to fairly selected jurors with proper jury instructions explaining the
“substantial assistance” element.  But to me it is clear that ISIS could not
exist and renew itself without constant recruitment of foot soldiers to carry
out its violent missions, often at the cost of their own lives, so I regret that
I cannot persuade my colleagues here to adopt a more permissive standard
for substantial assistance.
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 118 of 167
Add. 118
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 145 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 119
defendant, (3) defendant’s presence or absence at the time of
the tort, (4) defendant’s relation to the principal,
(5) defendant’s state of mind, and (6) the period of
defendant’s assistance.”  Linde, 882 F.3d at 329 (citing
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84).
Under the first factor, the Halberstam court emphasized
that the nature of the principal’s act “dictates what aid might
matter, i.e., be substantial.”  705 F.2d at 484.  The remaining
factors must be viewed through this lens.  ISIS’s long-running
and far-ranging terrorist campaign depends on the continued
provision of money and recruits.  Google provided both.  As
the majority acknowledges, financial support is “indisputably
important” to operating a terrorism campaign, and any money
provided to the organization may aid its goals.  See id. at 488;
Fields, 881 F.3d at 748.  The majority also acknowledges, in
the context of reversing the district court’s dismissal of
Taamneh, that YouTube videos encourage ISIS’s terrorism
campaign—an enterprise that is “heavily dependent on social
media platforms to recruit members, to raise funds, and to
disseminate propaganda.”  Google provided free exposure to
a dangerous organization, thereby facilitating ISIS’s ability to
reach and rouse prospective recruits.  The Gonzalez
complaint alleges that ISIS through YouTube exaggerated its
territorial expansion by disseminating videos with maps
showing ISIS’s claims that it controlled certain regions where
other groups had pledged allegiance to ISIS.  The fourth
factor also weighs in favor of recognizing substantial
assistance: defendant’s “relation” to the principal—or the
extent to which an entity “may possess greater powers of
suggestion.”  YouTube’s role in cultivating extremist
behavior has been widely acknowledged and the platform
reaches a virtually unlimited number of potential recruits due
to the ubiquity of the Internet.  The sixth factor, “duration of
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the assistance provided,” concerns the length of time an
alleged aider and abettor has been involved with the
tortfeasor.  See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484 (emphasis
omitted).  Though the complaint in Gonzalez lacks specific
evidence about the length of time Google provided assistance
to ISIS, Plaintiffs allege the placement of ISIS recruiting
videos going back at least four years before the Paris Attacks,
in 2014.  The complaint also alleged through news sources
that advertisements were placed on ISIS’s YouTube videos as
early as March 2015, three years before the Paris Attacks.  I
would hold that years of hosting ISIS content and providing
it with a percentage of revenue is sufficient duration.  Though
Plaintiffs do not allege that Google shared ISIS’s terrorist
goals, Halberstam also directs that under the fifth factor,
defendant’s “state of mind,” the court can consider the
duration factor because it “almost certainly affects the quality
and extent” of the aid, the amount of aid provided, and “it
may afford evidence of the defendant’s state of mind.”  Id. 
Even considering state of mind on its own and viewing that
factor in light of “the nature of the act encouraged,” see id.,
providing financial assistance and exposure to—to put it
mildly—a dangerous group, is sufficient for state of mind to
weigh against Google.  As I see it, the conduct of Google,
Twitter, and Facebook as related to the risks of terrorist
attacks by ISIS, absent their more active review and policing
of sites, is either recklessly indifferent or willfully blind, as
they enjoy increased advertising revenue associated with
eyeballs on videos or posts about ISIS attacks.
Taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, I would hold that these allegations establish that
Google’s assistance was sufficiently “substantial” for
purposes of § 2333(d)(2).  These same considerations apply
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in all three cases, so in each I would hold there was
substantial assistance for purposes of § 2333(d)(2).
I add a brief comment about the Clayborn v. Twitter case. 
There the majority would uphold dismissal of the claims
because of its view that Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that
ISIS “committed, planned, or authorized” the San Bernardino
attack, as is required under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  The
majority relies on a Sixth Circuit decision, Crosby v Twitter,
Inc., 921 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2019), but its reasoning is not
persuasive and does not bind or even guide our circuit,
because there, the complaint produced “no allegations that
ISIS was involved with the Pulse Night Club shooting.”  Id.
at 626.  However, the record here is distinctly and plainly to
the contrary: The complaint expressly alleges that prior to or
during the attack, one of the perpetrators—Tashfeen
Malik—declared on her Facebook page the two shooters’
allegiance and loyalty to an ISIS leader.  Two days after the
attack, ISIS issued a statement on a radio station claiming
responsibility for the attack.  The FBI confirmed that one of
the shooters, a few years before the attack, had face-to-face
meetings with five people known to have “links to terrorism.” 
Further, Plaintiffs allege that FBI investigators found an
explosive device placed at the crime scene that was likely
intended to be detonated by the arrival of first responders.  A
Department of Justice report described this as “a frequent,
well documented practice in international terrorism
incidents.”  Importantly, FBI investigators explained that this
“terrorist tactic ha[d] been outlined in Al Qaeda’s Inspire
Magazine, as well as in ISIS’s Dabiq Magazine.”  Plaintiffs
allege that these magazines are disseminated on Defendants’
platforms.  Together, these allegations permit the fair
inference that the attack which was planned for at least one
year was inspired by—and implicitly authorized by—ISIS.
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In my view, even if Malik had been “self-radicalized”
without direct communications or meetings with ISIS
operatives, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the self-
radicalization process included exposure to the violent
recruiting videos of ISIS, along with lectures from incendiary
advocates of violence against non-believers.  According to
the complaint, in Senate Judiciary Committee testimony,
then-FBI Director James Comey described the pair as having
“consum[ed] poison on the internet” and been “radicalized to
jihadism and to martyrdom via social media platforms
available to them.”  Finally, even assuming the perpetrators
had little advance connection with ISIS, well-established
principles of agency law illustrate that authorization can
occur not only by advance planning, but also by ratification. 
See Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 4.01(1) (1933) (defining
ratification as “the affirmance of a prior act done by another,
whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting
with actual authority”).13  Because the San Bernardino
13 Contrary to the majority’s contention, there is support for applying
common law agency principles to secondary liability for acts of
international terrorism.  For one thing, “statutes are presumed not to
disturb the common law, ‘unless the language of a statute [is] clear and
explicit for this purpose.’”  State Eng’r of Nev. v. S. Fork Band of Te-
Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev., 339 F.3d 804, 814 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983)).  In my view, nothing in
the statute precludes consideration of common law principles.  Second, the
Supreme Court has stated that apparent authority principles “ha[ve] long
been the settled rule in the federal system.”  Am. Soc’y of Mechanical
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567 (1982).  Section
2333(d)(2) assigns liability for injuries arising from acts of international
terrorism, where that act was authorized by a terrorist organization.  See
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  In my view, asking whether a terrorist
organization authorized a particular terrorist act is properly viewed under
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shooters pledged themselves to ISIS before or during the
attack, and an act is ratifiable “if the actor acted or purported
to act as an agent on the person’s behalf,” id. § 4.03, the
attack can be considered authorized by ISIS.
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint in Clayborn
makes allegations sufficient to state a claim for liability under
the ATA.
V
In my view, the claims asserted in the three complaints on
appeal should all be sustained and permitted to go forward in
discovery based on the statutory law standards above
discussed.  But even if I am incorrect in my view of the
governing statutory law, those claims should be able to go
forward with complaint amendment based on a still extant
specialized federal common law in aid of national security
against terrorism.  After the general common law regime of
Swift v. Tyson was overruled by Erie, a sphere of specialized
federal common law remains and could support Plaintiffs’
claims here.  See e.g., 19 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4514 (3d ed. 2021). 
As the Wright & Miller treatise explains, “the federal
common law that has developed since Erie differs from the
federal general common law [rejected in] Swift v. Tyson
because it falls within an area of federal or national
competence.”  Id. (footnote omitted); see also 17A Moore’s
Federal Practice, Civil § 124.40 (2020).  Many federal court
precedents have applied these principles, which are
particularly well-suited when claims involve an area of
the common-law agency framework as a question of whether the
perpetrator was acting as an agent of the terrorist organization.
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heightened federal interest, such as international terrorism, or
when gaps exist in a federal regulatory scheme.  E.g., Boyle
v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988); Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
456–57 (1957); King Jewelry, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp.,
316 F.3d 961, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2003).14
Also, our court should not ignore other potential areas of
human conduct that can be negatively impacted by an
unregulated social media regime, coupled with efforts by
groups hostile to the idea of American democracy to use
social media in order to divide or terrorize our public.  Areas
of particular concern include impacts of social media in
realms such as election law, the laws governing public order
and protest, and even insurrection.
We should not of course ignore the tremendous, indeed
almost unquantifiable, benefits to the public from social
media.  Social media permits friends to stay in contact, as for
example with a club or group from high school or college,
lets people make new friends, or even lets people see or be
exposed to new sights from different parts of the world. 
People met through social media, who may have different
interests, perspectives, and priorities from other social media
users, can in many cases enrich those users’ lives.  Places
visited on the internet, often encouraged or directed through
social media, can serve the same benign function.  But at the
14 Contrary to the majority’s contention, my view on when federal
common law may be created is narrow.  Though the federal courts “are
not free to manufacture entirely new causes of action merely because the
political branches have not acted,” I believe that we can act where gaps
are present in an existing federal statutory scheme and the claim involved
is one of unique federal concern.
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 124 of 167
Add. 124
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 151 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE 125
same time, benefit alone cannot end the inquiry.  Social
media activities also carry with them some risks and
detriments to the public.  For example, there is no doubt that
modern pharmaceutical drugs give benefits to the public that
were impossible at earlier times and are greatly valued by
those who use them.  But drugs can also have harmful
impacts and, accordingly, they are regulated by the Food &
Drug Administration.  Similarly, modern aircraft help people
move from one part of our world to another with great speed
and ease, but we regulate airlines through the Federal
Aviation Administration.  One could go on and on as almost
every major activity in the modern world faces some type of
federal regulation.
This regulation of the social media companies would best
be examined by congressional committees with subpoena
power and the ability to create new regulatory laws if needed
and desirable.  Or the government could create a new federal
agency or Board or add powers or some supplemental
standards to an existing federal agency, leaving the regulation
of social media in part to a federal executive agency that is
committed to bringing its technical expertise and knowledge
of any areas of specialized federal concerns such as
international terrorism and threats to democracy to bear on
this issue.  A specialized federal agency could call witnesses
for testimony, assist meaningfully in a congressional task to
prepare appropriate legislative guidance or prohibitions, have
investigators to look into areas of concern, establish
regulatory standards, and possibly also include an arm to
enforce the law and its standards.  See, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926) (recognizing congressional
authority to create federal agencies and define their scope and
jurisdiction).
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VI
These cases, and others like them pending in the federal
courts, try for basic justice, but there is a fundamental
question whether the federal courts are best suited to deliver
it.  I conclude with the following thoughts.
First, it would be preferable if the political branches of
government, the legislature or the Executive Branch, would
seriously grapple with the issue of unregulated social media
power being used to amplify or to distort views asserted by
users, and sometimes even by hostile nations using social
media to wage asymmetric warfare or to impair democracy. 
But if Congress continues to sleep at the switch of social
media regulation in the face of courts broadening what
appears to have been its initial and literal language and
expressed intention under Section 230, then it must fall to the
federal courts to consider rectifying those errors itself by
providing remedies to those who are injured by dangerous
and unreasonable conduct.
Second, it would be preferable if the social media
companies monitored their own activities sufficiently to
protect the public, but in my view, to date they have not done
that.  It was one thing, at the dawn of the Internet era, to give
protection to Internet companies to facilitate growth.  But it
is quite another thing to provide broad immunity at a time
such as now when such companies are remarkably large and
with massive staffs and perhaps the best technical abilities. 
It is not realistic to anticipate that social media companies
will self-police adequately in the face of their incentives to
maximize profits by maximizing advertising revenues, which
means increasing the eyeballs directed to their websites.  The
large corporations controlling the platforms at issue in these
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appeals can instead be expected to act in their own best
financial interest, and to me, it makes absolutely no sense to
leave such decisions to the self-interested proclamations of
CEOs or other employees of the various social media
companies.15  Society for centuries has known that it is folly
to ask the fox to guard the henhouse.
Third, the problem with a lack of social media regulation
goes even beyond the dreadfully important subject of
terrorism.  Indeed, in connection with 21st-century political
elections, some commenters have expressed concerns that
social media has the ability to distort and tribalize public
opinion, to spread falsehoods as well as truth, and to funnel
like-minded news reports to groups in a way that makes them
think there are “alternative facts” or “competing realities”
that exist, rather than recognize more correctly that there are
“truth” and “lies.”16
Fourth, to the extent any of our Ninth Circuit precedent
stands in the way of a sensible resolution of claims like those
presented on appeal here, where terrorist organizations like
ISIS have obviously played Google and YouTube like a
fiddle, then in my view we should take these or other related
cases en banc to give a full review.
15 E.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest.”).
16 See Ross Douthat, Why Do So Many Americans Think
the Election Was Stolen?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/opinion/sunday/trump-election-
fraud.html?smid=tw-share.
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 127 of 167
Add. 127
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 154 of 279
GONZALEZ V. GOOGLE128
Fifth, because the issues are difficult and only the
Supreme Court can speak with authority ultimately on federal
law, it would be desirable for the Supreme Court to take up
the subject of Section 230 immunity and perhaps any related
First Amendment issues, to the extent claims relating to
terrorist speech are properly considered under that
framework.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. made famous
and enshrined in our law the idea that: “The life of the law
has not been logic, it has been experience.”  OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, Lecture I
(1881).  But when almost all claims against social media
companies are dismissed at the outset because of an
overbroad view of Section 230 immunity, how is society to
develop the experience that can guide its development of law
in a sensible way that protects people from undue harm? 
Justice Holmes also developed the idea that speech should not
be constrained absent “clear and present danger,” see Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  To some degree this
test still resounds in our First Amendment law.  See United
States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010).  A
variation on this view culminated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969), where the Supreme Court suggested that
imminent lawless action was necessary before speech should
be constrained.  But perhaps given the current state of society,
and the catastrophic dangers to the public that can be posed
by terrorist activities, public safety may require that speech
be limited when it poses a clear and increasing or gathering
danger, rather than only “imminent” danger as reflected in
Brandenburg, which I consider the Supreme Court’s last
word on this subject.
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I also note that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous pen
pal and intellectual collaborator, Sir Frederick Pollock,17 in
his beginning primer of the law of torts, suggested that a
principal force underlying all the varied types of tort cases
was the desire of courts to provide a doctrinal basis for
remedy in the case of injuries from harmful and unreasonable
conduct.  Pollock suggested that a “tort is an act or omission
(not merely the breach of a duty arising out of a personal
relation, or undertaken by contract) which is related to harm
suffered by a determinate person in one of the following
ways.”  See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM
CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 20 (4th ed. 1895). 
Among those ways a person can be harmed were these two,
which are pertinent in assessing whether Plaintiffs’ claims
can be asserted as part of a federal common law: “(c) it may
be an act or omission causing harm which the person so
acting or so omitting did not intend to cause, but might and
should with due diligence have foreseen and prevented,” and
“(d) it may in special cases consist in not avoiding or
preventing that which the party was bound, absolutely or
within limits to avoid or prevent.”  Id.  Here, it could be
expected that through federal common law development or
statutory positive law, the social media companies will be
held to some reasonable standard of conduct when they have
17 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. & Sir Frederick Pollock,
Holmes–Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr Justice Holmes and
Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874–1932 (2d ed. 1961).
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failed to regulate their own actions in the interests of the
public.18
As a matter of federal common law, I would hold that
when social media companies in their platforms use systems
or procedures that are unreasonably dangerous to the
public—as in the case where their systems line up repeated
messages in aid of terrorists like ISIS—or when they omit to
act to avoid harm when omitting the act is unreasonably
dangerous to the public—as in the case where they fail to
review and self-regulate their websites adequately to notice
and remove propaganda videos from ISIS that are likely to
cause harm—then there should be a federal common law
claim available against them.  Consider the most widely used
standard for products liability cases.  See Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).  This suggests that
manufacturers are responsible in tort if they make
unreasonably dangerous products that cause individual or
social harm.  Section 402A states: “One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused” to the user or a third party. 
Id.  Here and similarly, social media companies should be
viewed as making and “selling” their social media products
through the device of forced advertising under the eyes of
users.  Viewed in this light, they should be tested under a
federal tort principle with a standard similar to and adapted
from this Restatement language under a federal common law
18 Developing federal common law on these issues will require the
diligent and combined efforts of the federal courts and of legal scholars. 
See, e.g., Hon. Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Annual John Randolph Tucker
Lecture, Partners in a Process: The Academy and the Courts, 37 WASH.
& LEE. L. REV. 1041 (1981).
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development.  If social media companies use “neutral”
algorithms that cause unreasonably dangerous consequences,
under proper standards of law with limiting jury instructions,
they might be held responsible.  Developing a federal
common law standard would be superior to merely dismissing
all claims against social media companies based on an over-
broad interpretation of Section 230 delivering a blanket
immunity, which in my view is inconsistent with
congressional intent and detrimental to the interests of the
general public.
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ATTACHMENT A
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KATZMANN, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with much of the reasoning in the excellent majority opinion, and I
join that opinion except for Parts I and II of the Discussion. But I must respectfully
part companywith themajority on its treatment of Facebook’s friend and content
suggestion algorithms under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).1
1 I agree with the majority that the CDA’s exception for enforcement of criminal
laws, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims, see ante, at 50 54. However,
I find the question to be somewhat closer than the majority does, in part because some of
the statutes enumerated in § 230(e)(1) themselves contain civil remedies. Section 230(e)(1)
states that “[n]othing in [§ 230] shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section
223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual
exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.” One of those
enumerated chapters—Chapter 110 of Title 18—includes a civil suit provision for victims
of specific child sex crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Meanwhile, 47 U.S.C. § 223—which
prohibits obscene or harassing phone calls—specifies that civil fines may be levied
“pursuant to civil action by,” or “after appropriate administrative proceedings” of, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and it authorizes the Attorney General
to bring civil suits to enjoin practices that violate the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(5)(B)
(b)(6). If § 230(e)(1) covers “enforcement” of the listed chapters in their entirety, it is
difficult to see how it would not cover other provisions that authorize civil suits for
violations of criminal laws, particularly given that the enumerated list is followed by “or
any other criminal law.”
However, as detailed post, § 230 was designed as a private sector driven
alternative to a Senate plan that would allow the FCC “either civilly or criminally, to
punish people” who put objectionable material on the Internet. 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045
(1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); accord id. at 22,045 46 (statement of Rep. Wyden); see Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 & n.24 (1997). On the House floor, author Christopher Cox
disparaged the idea of FCC enforcement and then stated: “Certainly, criminal
enforcement of our obscenity laws as an adjunct is a useful way of punishing the truly
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As to the reasons for my disagreement, consider a hypothetical. Suppose
that you are a published author. One day, an acquaintance calls. “I’ve been reading
over everything you’ve ever published,” he informs you. “I’ve also been looking
at everything you’ve ever said on the Internet. I’ve done the same for this other
author. You two have very similar interests; I think you’d get along.” The
acquaintance then gives you the other author’s contact information and photo,
along with a link to all her published works. He calls back three more times over
the next week with more names of writers you should get to know.
Now, you might say your acquaintance fancies himself a matchmaker. But
would you say he’s acting as the publisher of the other authors’ work?
Facebook and the majority would have us answer this question “yes.” I,
however, cannot do so. For the scenario I have just described is little different from
how Facebook’s algorithms allegedly work. And while those algorithms do end
up showing users profile, group, or event pages written by other users, it strains
guilty.” 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (emphasis added). This history, along with the provision’s
title, strongly suggests that § 230(e)(1) was intended as a narrow criminal law exception.
It would be odd, then, to read § 230(e)(1) as allowing for civil enforcement by, among
others, the FCC, even if only in aid of criminal law enforcement.
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the English language to say that in targeting and recommending these writings to
users—and thereby forging connections, developing new social networks—
Facebook is acting as “the publisher of . . . information provided by another
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
It would be one thing if congressional intent compelled us to adopt the
majority’s reading. It does not. Instead, we today extend a provision that was
designed to encourage computer service providers to shield minors from obscene
material so that it now immunizes those same providers for allegedly connecting
terrorists to one another. Neither the impetus for nor the text of § 230(c)(1) requires
such a result. When a plaintiff brings a claim that is based not on the content of the
information shown but rather on the connections Facebook’s algorithms make
between individuals, the CDA does not and should not bar relief.
The Anti Terrorism Act (“ATA”) claims in this case fit this bill. According
to plaintiffs’ Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“PSAC”)—which we must
take as true at this early stage—Facebook has developed “sophisticated
algorithm[s]” for bringing its users together. App’x 347 ¶ 622. After collecting
mountains of data about each user’s activity on and off its platform, Facebook
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unleashes its algorithms to generate friend, group, and event suggestions based
onwhat it perceives to be the user’s interests. Id. at 345 46 ¶¶ 608 14. If a user posts
about a Hamas attack or searches for information about a Hamas leader, Facebook
may “suggest” that that user become friends with Hamas terrorists on Facebook
or join Hamas related Facebook groups. By “facilitat[ing] [Hamas’s] ability to
reach and engage an audience it could not otherwise reach as effectively,”
plaintiffs allege that Facebook’s algorithms provide material support and
personnel to terrorists. Id. at 347 ¶ 622; see id. at 352 58 ¶¶ 646 77. As applied to the
algorithms, plaintiffs’ claims do not seek to punish Facebook for the content others
post, for deciding whether to publish third parties’ content, or for editing (or
failing to edit) others’ content before publishing it. In short, they do not rely on
treating Facebook as “the publisher” of others’ information. Instead, they would
hold Facebook liable for its affirmative role in bringing terrorists together.
When it comes to Facebook’s algorithms, then, plaintiffs’ causes of action do
not run afoul of the CDA. Because the court below did not pass on the merits of
the ATA claims pressed below, I would send this case back to the district court to
decide themerits in the first instance. Themajority, however, cuts off all possibility
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for relief based on algorithms like Facebook’s, even if these or future plaintiffs
could prove a sufficient nexus between those algorithms and their injuries. In light
of today’s decision and other judicial interpretations of the statute that have
generally immunized social media companies—and especially in light of the new
reality that has evolved since the CDA’s passage—Congress may wish to revisit
the CDA to better calibrate the circumstances where such immunization is
appropriate and inappropriate in light of congressional purposes.
I.
To see how far we have strayed from the path on which Congress set us out,
we must consider where that path began. What is now 47 U.S.C. § 230 was added
as an amendment to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a statute designed to
deregulate and encourage innovation in the telecommunications industry. Pub. L.
104 104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 56, 137 39; see Reno, 521 U.S. at 857. Congress devoted
much committee attention to traditional telephone and broadcast media; by
contrast, the Internet was an afterthought, addressed only through floor
amendments or in conference. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857 58. Of the myriad issues the
emerging Internet implicated, Congress tackled only one: the ease with which the
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Internet delivers indecent or offensive material, especially to minors. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, tit. V, subtit. A, 110 Stat. at 133 39. And § 230
provided one of two alternative ways of handling this problem.
The action began in the Senate. Senator James J. Exon introduced the CDA
on February 1, 1995. See 141 Cong. Rec. 3,203. He presented a revised bill on June
9, 1995, “[t]he heart and the soul” of which was “its protection for families and
children.” Id. at 15,503 (statement of Sen. Exon). The Exon Amendment sought to
reduce the proliferation of pornography and other obscene material online by
subjecting to civil and criminal penalties those who use interactive computer
services to make, solicit, or transmit offensive material. Id. at 15,505.
The House of Representatives had the same goal—to protect children from
inappropriate online material—but a very different sense of how to achieve it.
Congressmen Christopher Cox (R California) and Ron Wyden (D Oregon)
introduced an amendment to the Telecommunications Act, entitled “Online
Family Empowerment,” about two months after the revised CDA appeared in the
Senate. See id. at 22,044. Making the argument for their amendment during the
House floor debate, Congressman Cox stated:
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 138 of 167
Add. 138
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 165 of 279
7
We want to make sure that everyone in America has an open
invitation and feels welcome to participate in the Internet. But as you
know, there is some reason for people to be wary because, as a Time
Magazine cover story recently highlighted, there is in this vast world
of computer information, a literal computer library, some offensive
material, some things in the bookstore, if you will, that our children
ought not to see.
As the parent of two, I want tomake sure thatmy children have access
to this future and that I do not have to worry about what they might
be running into on line. I would like to keep that out of my house and
off my computer.
Id. at 22,044 45. Likewise, CongressmanWyden said: “We are all against smut and
pornography, and, as the parents of two small computer literate children, mywife
and I have seen our kids find their way into these chat rooms that make their
middle aged parents cringe.” Id. at 22,045.
As both sponsors noted, the debate between the House and the Senate was
not over the CDA’s primary purpose but rather over the best means to that shared
end. See id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (“How should we do this? . . . Mr. Chairman,
what we want are results. We want to make sure we do something that actually
works.”); id. (statement of Rep. Wyden) (“So let us all stipulate right at the outset
the importance of protecting our kids and going to the issue of the best way to do
it.”). While the Exon Amendment would have the FCC regulate online obscene
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materials, the sponsors of theHouse proposal “believe[d] that parents and families
are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace and protect our children than
our Government bureaucrats.” Id. at 22,045 (statement of Rep. Wyden). They also
feared the effects the Senate’s approach might have on the Internet itself. See id.
(statement of Rep. Cox) (“[The amendment] will establish as the policy of the
United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal
Government of what is on the Internet, that we do not wish to have a Federal
Computer Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet . . . .”).
The Cox Wyden Amendment therefore sought to empower interactive computer
service providers to self regulate, and to provide tools for parents to regulate,
children’s access to inappropriate material. See S. Rep. No. 104 230, at 194 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.); 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (statement of Rep. Cox).
There was only one problemwith this approach, as the House sponsors saw
it. A New York State trial court had recently ruled that the online service Prodigy,
by deciding to remove certain indecent material from its site, had become a
“publisher” and thus was liable for defamation when it failed to remove other
objectionable content. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710,
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at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished). The authors of § 230 saw the
Stratton Oakmont decision as indicative of a “legal system [that] provides amassive
disincentive for the people who might best help us control the Internet to do so.”
141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (statement of Rep. Cox). Cox Wyden was designed, in large
part, to remove that disincentive. See S. Rep. No. 104 230, at 194.
The House having passed the Cox Wyden Amendment and the Senate the
Exon Amendment, the conference committee had before it two alternative visions
for countering the spread of indecent online material to minors. The committee
chose not to choose. Congress instead adopted both amendments as part of a final
Communications Decency Act. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, §§ 502, 509,
110 Stat. at 133 39; Reno, 521 U.S. at 858 n.24.2 The Supreme Court promptly struck
down two major provisions of the Exon Amendment as unconstitutionally
2 It helped that the Cox Wyden Amendment exempted from its deregulatory
regime the very provisions that the Exon Amendment strengthened, see
Telecommunications Act of 1996, §§ 502, 507 508, 509(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 133 39, and that
Congress stripped from the House bill a provision that would have denied jurisdiction
to the FCC to regulate the Internet, compare id. § 509, 110 Stat. at 138 (eliminating original
§ 509(d)), with 141 Cong. Rec. 22,044 (including original § 509(d)).
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overbroad under the First Amendment, leaving the new § 230 as the dominant
force for securing decency on the Internet. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
Section 230 overruled Stratton Oakmont through two interlocking
provisions, both of which survived the legislative process unscathed. The first,
which is at issue in this case, states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The
second provision eliminates liability for interactive computer service providers
and users for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable,”
or “any action taken to enable or make available to . . . others the technical means
to restrict access to [objectionable] material.” Id. § 230(c)(2). These two subsections
tackle, in overlapping fashion, the two jurisprudential moves of the Stratton
Oakmont court: first, that Prodigy’s decision to screen posts for offensiveness
rendered it “a publisher rather than a distributor,” 1995 WL 323710, at *4; and
second, that by making good faith efforts to remove offensive material Prodigy
became liable for any actionable material it did not remove.
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The legislative history illustrates that in passing § 230 Congress was focused
squarely on protecting minors from offensive online material, and that it sought
to do so by “empowering parents to determine the content of communications
their children receive through interactive computer services.” S. Rep. No. 104 230,
at 194. The “policy” section of § 230’s text reflects this goal. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(3) (4).3 It is not surprising, then, that Congress emphasized the narrow
civil liability shield that became § 230(c)(2), rather than the broad rule of
construction laid out in § 230(c)(1). Indeed, the conference committee summarized
§ 230 by stating that it “provides ‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil liability
for providers or users of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict or
3 The policy section of the statute also expresses Congress’s desire “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(2). It is therefore true that “Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the
robust nature of Internet communication.” Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25,
28 (emphasis added) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997));
see ante, at 24. As the legislative history laid out in this opinion shows, however, one
cannot fully understand the purpose of § 230 without considering that it was one
chamber’s proposal in a disagreement between the two houses of Congress over how best
to shield children from indecent material, and that in that contest the House was
principally concerned with two things: (1) overruling Stratton Oakmont and
(2) preventing “a Federal Computer Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating
the Internet.” 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (statement of Rep. Cox).
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to enable restriction of access to objectionable online material”—a description that
could just as easily have applied to § 230(c)(2) alone. S. Rep. No. 104 230, at 194.
Congress also titled the entirety of § 230(c) “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material,” suggesting that the definitional rule
outlined in § 230(c)(1) may have been envisioned as supporting or working in
tandem with the civil liability shield in § 230(c)(2).
None of this is to say that § 230(c)(1) exempts interactive computer service
providers from publisher treatment only when they remove indecent content.
Statutory text cannot be ignored, and Congress grabbed a bazooka to swat the
Stratton Oakmont fly. Whatever prototypical situation its drafters may have had in
mind, § 230(c)(1) does not limit its protection to situations involving “obscene
material” provided by others, instead using the expansive word “information.”4
4 This point—that Congress chose broader language thanmay have been necessary
to accomplish its primary goal—should not be confused with the Seventh Circuit’s
rationale for § 230(c)(1)’s general application: that “a law’s scope often differs from its
genesis.” See Chi. Lawyers Cmte. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008). True as this axiommight be, it does not apply here—the language
of § 230(c)(1) remained untouched from introduction to passage. Nor is there any
evidence from the legislative record that interest groups altered the statutory language.
But cf. id. (“Once the legislative process gets rolling, interest groups seek (and often
obtain) other provisions.”). That § 230(c)(1)’s breadth flowed from Congress’s desire to
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Illuminating Congress’s original intent does, however, underscore the extent of
§ 230(c)(1)’s subsequent mission creep. Given how far both Facebook’s suggestion
algorithms and plaintiffs’ terrorism claims swim from the shore of congressional
purpose, caution is warranted before courts extend the CDA’s reach any further.
II.
With the CDA’s background in mind, I turn to the text. By its plain terms,
§ 230 does not apply whenever a claim would treat the defendant as “a publisher”
in the abstract, immunizing defendants from liability stemming from any activity
in which one thinks publishing companies commonly engage. Contra ante, at 30
31, 33 34, 49. It states, more specifically, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphases
added). “Here grammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is a function word
indicating that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite . . . .” Nielsen v.
Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
overrule Stratton Oakmont, rather than from mere interest group protectionism, matters.
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The word “publisher” in this statute is thus inextricably linked to the “information
provided by another.” The question is whether a plaintiff’s claim arises from a
third party’s information, and—crucially—whether to establish the claim the court
must necessarily view the defendant, not as a publisher in the abstract, but rather
as the publisher of that third party information. See FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC,
838 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating inquiry as “whether the cause of action
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of
content provided by another”).
For this reason, § 230(c)(1) does not necessarily immunize defendants from
claims based on promoting content or selling advertising, even if those activities
might be common among publishing companies nowadays. A publisher might
write an email promoting a third party event to its readers, for example, but the
publisher would be the author of the underlying content and therefore not
immune from suit based on that promotion. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3).
Similarly, the fact that publishers may sell advertising based on user data does not
immunize the publisher if someone brings a claim based on the publisher’s selling
of the data, because the claim would not treat the defendant as the publisher of a
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third party’s content. Cf. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 18 1041, 2019 WL
2849153, at *12 (3d Cir. July 3, 2019) (holding that the CDA does not bar claims
against Amazon.com “to the extent that” they “rely on Amazon’s role as an actor
in the sales process,” including both “selling” and “marketing”). Section 230(c)(1)
limits liability based on the function the defendant performs, not its identity.
Accordingly, our precedent does not grant publishers CDA immunity for
the full range of activities in which they might engage. Rather, it “bars lawsuits
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content” provided by another for publication. LeadClick, 838 F.3d at 174
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Oberdorf, 2019 WL 2849153,
at *10; Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016); Jones v.
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see Klayman
v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v.
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). For instance, a claim against a
newspaper based on the content of a classified ad (or the decision to publish or
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withdraw that ad)would fail under the CDAnot because newspapers traditionally
publish classified ads, but rather because such a claim would necessarily treat the
newspaper as the publisher of the ad maker’s content. Similarly, the newspaper
does not act as an “information content provider”—and thus maintains its CDA
protection—when it decides to run a classified ad because it neither “creates” nor
“develops” the information in the ad. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
This case is different. Looking beyond Facebook’s “broad statements of
immunity” and relying “rather on a careful exegesis of the statutory language,”
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100, the CDA does not protect Facebook’s friend and content
suggestion algorithms. A combination of two factors, in my view, confirms that
claims based on these algorithms do not inherently treat Facebook as the publisher
of third party content.5 First, Facebook uses the algorithms to create and
communicate its own message: that it thinks you, the reader—you, specifically—
will like this content. And second, Facebook’s suggestions contribute to the
5 Many of Facebook’s algorithms mentioned in the PSAC, such as its third party
advertising algorithm, its algorithm that places content in a user’s newsfeed, and (based
on the limited description in the PSAC) its video recommendation algorithm, remain
immune under the analysis I set out here.
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creation of real world social networks. The result of at least some suggestions is
not just that the user consumes a third party’s content. Sometimes, Facebook’s
suggestions allegedly lead the user to become part of a unique global community,
the creation and maintenance of which goes far beyond and differs in kind from
traditional editorial functions.
It is true, as the majority notes, see ante, at 47, that Facebook’s algorithms
rely on and display users’ content. However, this is not enough to trigger the
protections of § 230(c)(1). The CDA does not mandate “a ‘but for’ test that would
provide immunity . . . solely because a cause of action would not otherwise have
accrued but for the third party content.” HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa
Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2019). Rather, to fall within § 230(c)(1)’s radius,
the claim at issue must inherently fault the defendant’s activity as the publisher of
specific third party content. Plaintiffs’ claims about Facebook’s suggestion
algorithms do not do this. The complaint alleges that “Facebook collects detailed
information about its users, including, inter alia, the content they post, type of
content they view or engage with, people they communicate with, groups they
belong to and how they interact with such groups, visits to third party websites,
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apps and Facebook partners.” App’x 345 ¶ 608. Then the algorithms “utilize the
collected data to suggest friends, groups, products, services and local events, and
target ads” based on each user’s input. Id. at 346 ¶ 610.
If a third party got access to Facebook users’ data, analyzed it using a
proprietary algorithm, and sent its own messages to Facebook users suggesting
that people become friends or attend one another’s events, the third party would
not be protected as “the publisher” of the users’ information. Similarly, if Facebook
were to use the algorithms to target its own material to particular users, such that
the resulting posts consisted of “information provided by” Facebook rather than
by “another information content provider,” § 230(c)(1), Facebook clearly would
not be immune for that independent message.
Yet that is ultimately what plaintiffs allege Facebook is doing. The PSAC
alleges that Facebook “actively provides ‘friend suggestions’ between users who
have expressed similar interests,” and that it “actively suggests groups and events
to users.” App’x 346 ¶¶ 612 13. Facebook’s algorithms thus allegedly provide the
user with a message from Facebook. Facebook is telling users—perhaps implicitly,
but clearly—that they would like these people, groups, or events. In this respect,
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Facebook “does not merely provide a framework that could be utilized for proper
or improper purposes; rather, [Facebook’s] work in developing” the algorithm and
suggesting connections to users based on their prior activity on Facebook,
including their shared interest in terrorism, “is directly related to the alleged
illegality of the site.” Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The fact that Facebook also
publishes third party content should not cause us to conflate its two separate roles
with respect to its users and their information. Facebook may be immune under
the CDA from plaintiffs’ challenge to its allowance of Hamas accounts, since
Facebook acts solely as the publisher of the Hamas users’ content. That does not
mean, though, that it is also immune when it conducts statistical analyses of that
information and delivers a message based on those analyses.
Moreover, in part through its use of friend, group, and event suggestions,
Facebook is doing more than just publishing content: it is proactively creating
networks of people. Its algorithms forge real world (if digital) connections through
friend and group suggestions, and they attempt to create similar connections in
the physical world through event suggestions. The cumulative effect of
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recommending several friends, or several groups or events, has an impact greater
than the sum of each suggestion. It envelops the user, immersing her in an entire
universe filled with people, ideas, and events she may never have discovered on
her own. According to the allegations in the complaint, Facebook designed its
website for this very purpose. “Facebook has described itself as a provider of
products and services that enable users . . . to find and connect with other users
. . . .” App’x 250 ¶ 129. CEOMark Zuckerberg has similarly described Facebook as
“build[ing] tools to help people connect with the people they want,” thereby
“extending people’s capacity to build andmaintain relationships.” Id. at 251 ¶ 132.
Of course, Facebook is not the only company that tries to bring people together
this way, and perhaps other publishers try to introduce their readers to one
another. Yet the creation of social networks goes far beyond the traditional
editorial functions that the CDA immunizes.
Another way to consider the CDA immunity question is to “look . . . to what
the duty at issue actually requires: specifically, whether the duty would
necessarily require an internet company to monitor[, alter, or remove] third party
content.” HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682. Here, too, the claims regarding the
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algorithms are a poor fit for statutory immunity. The duty not to provide material
support to terrorism, as applied to Facebook’s use of the algorithms, simply
requires that Facebook not actively use that material to determine which of its
users to connect to each other. It could stop using the algorithms altogether, for
instance. Or, short of that, Facebook could modify its algorithms to stop them
introducing terrorists to one another. None of this would change any underlying
content, nor would it necessarily require courts to assess further the difficult
question of whether there is an affirmative obligation to monitor that content.
In reaching this conclusion, I note that ATA torts are atypical. Most of the
common torts that might be pleaded in relation to Facebook’s algorithms “derive
liability from behavior that is identical to publishing or speaking”—for instance,
“publishing defamatory material; publishing material that inflicts emotional
distress; or . . . attempting to de publish hurtful material but doing it badly.”
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. The fact that Facebook has figured out how to target
material to people more likely to read it does not matter to a defamation claim, for
instance, because the mere act of publishing in the first place creates liability.
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The ATA works differently. Plaintiffs’ material support and aiding and
abetting claims premise liability, not on publishing qua publishing, but rather on
Facebook’s provision of services and personnel to Hamas. It happens that the way
in which Facebook provides these benefits includes republishing content, but
Facebook’s duties under the ATA arise separately from the republication of
content. Cf. id. (determining that liability on a promissory estoppel theory for
promising to remove content “would come not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct,
but fromYahoo’smanifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which
happens to be removal of material from publication”). For instance, the operation
of the algorithms is allegedly provision of “expert advice or assistance,” and the
message implied by Facebook’s prodding is allegedly a “service” or an attempt to
provide “personnel.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
For these reasons, § 230(c)(1) does not bar plaintiffs’ claims.
III.
Even if we sent this case back to the district court, as I believe to be the right
course, these plaintiffs might have proven unable to allege that Facebook’s
matchmaking algorithms played a role in the attacks that harmed them. However,
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assuming arguendo that such might have been the situation here, I do not think we
should foreclose the possibility of relief in future cases if victims can plausibly
allege that a website knowingly brought terrorists together and that an attack
occurred as a direct result of the site’s actions. Though the majority shuts the door
on such claims, today’s decision also illustrates the extensive immunity that the
current formulation of the CDA already extends to social media companies for
activities that were undreamt of in 1996. It therefore may be time for Congress to
reconsider the scope of § 230.
As is so often the case with new technologies, the very qualities that drive
social media’s success—its ease of use, open access, and ability to connect the
world—have also spawned its demons. Plaintiffs’ complaint illustrates how
pervasive and blatant a presence Hamas and its leaders have maintained on
Facebook. Hamas is far from alone—Hezbollah, Boko Haram, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, andmany other designated terrorist organizations use
Facebook to recruit and rouse supporters. Vernon Silver & Sarah Frier, Terrorists
Are Still Recruiting on Facebook, Despite Zuckerberg’s Reassurances, Bloomberg
Businessweek (May 10, 2018), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018 05
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 155 of 167
Add. 155
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 182 of 279
24
10/terrorists creep onto facebook as fast as it can shut them down. Recent news
reports suggest that many social media sites have been slow to remove the
plethora of terrorist and extremist accounts populating their platforms,6 and that
such efforts, when they occur, are often underinclusive. Twitter, for instance,
banned the Ku Klux Klan in 2018 but allowed David Duke tomaintain his account,
see Roose & Conger, supra, while researchers found that Facebook removed fewer
than half the terrorist accounts and posts those researchers identified, seeWaters
& Postings, supra, at 8; Desmond Butler & Barbara Ortulay, Facebook Auto Generates
Videos Celebrating Extremist Images, Assoc. Press (May 9, 2019),
http://apnews.com/f97c24dab4f34bd0b48b36f2988952a4. Those whose accounts
are removed often pop up again under different names or with slightly different
6 See, e.g., Gregory Waters & Robert Postings, Spiders of the Caliphate: Mapping the
Islamic State’s Global Support Network on Facebook 8, Counter Extremism Project (May
2018), http://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Spiders%20of%20the%20
Caliphate%20%28May%202018%29.pdf; Yaacov Benmeleh & Felice Maranz, Israel Warns
Twitter of Legal Action Over Requests to Remove Content, Bloomberg (Mar. 20, 2018),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018 03 20/israel warns twitter of legal
steps over incitement to terrorism; Mike Isaac, Twitter Steps Up Efforts to Thwart
Terrorists’ Tweets, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/
technology/twitter account suspensions terrorism.html; Kevin Roose & Kate Conger,
YouTube to Remove Thousands of Videos Pushing Extreme Views, N.Y. Times (June 5, 2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/youtube remove extremist videos.html.
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language in their profiles, playing a perverse and deadly game of Whack a Mole
with Silicon Valley. See Isaac, supra; Silver & Frier, supra.
Of course, the failure to remove terrorist content, while an important policy
concern, is immunized under § 230 as currently written. Until today, the same
could not have been said for social media’s unsolicited, algorithmic spreading of
terrorism. Shielding internet companies that bring terrorists together using
algorithms could leave dangerous activity unchecked.
Take Facebook. As plaintiffs allege, its friend suggestion algorithm appears
to connect terrorist sympathizers with pinpoint precision. For instance, while two
researchers were studying Islamic State (“IS”) activity on Facebook, one “received
dozens of pro IS accounts as recommended friends after friending just one pro IS
account.” Waters & Postings, supra, at 78. More disturbingly, the other “received
an influx of Philippines based IS supporters and fighters as recommended friends
after liking several non extremist news pages about Marawi and the Philippines
during IS’s capture of the city.” Id. News reports indicate that the friend
suggestion feature has introduced thousands of IS sympathizers to one another.
SeeMartin Evans, Facebook Accused of Introducing Extremists to One Another Through
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‘Suggested Friends’ Feature, The Telegraph (May 5, 2018),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/05/facebook accused introducing
extremists one another suggested.
And this is far from the only Facebook algorithm that may steer people
toward terrorism. Another turns users’ declared interests into audience categories
to enable microtargeted advertising. In 2017, acting on a tip, ProPublica sought to
direct an ad at the algorithmically created category “Jew hater”—which turned
out to be real, as were “German Schutzstaffel,” “Nazi Party,” and “Hitler did
nothing wrong.” Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Enabled Advertises to Reach ‘Jew
Haters,’ ProPublica (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook
enabled advertisers to reach jew haters. As the “Jew hater” category was too
small for Facebook to run an ad campaign, “Facebook’s automated system
suggested ‘Second Amendment’ as an additional category . . . presumably because
its system had correlated gun enthusiasts with anti Semites.” Id.
That’s not all. Another Facebook algorithm auto generates business pages
by scraping employment information from users’ profiles; other users can then
“like” these pages, follow their posts, and see who else has liked them. Butler &
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Ortutay, supra. ProPublica reports that extremist organizations including al Qaida,
al Shabab, and IS have such auto created pages, allowing them to recruit the
pages’ followers. Id. The page for al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula included the
group’s Wikipedia entry and a propaganda photo of the damaged USS Cole,
which the group had bombed in 2000. Id.Meanwhile, a fourth algorithm integrates
users’ photos and other media to generate videos commemorating their previous
year. Id.Militants get a ready made propaganda clip, complete with a thank you
message from Facebook. Id.
This case, and our CDA analysis, has centered on the use of algorithms to
foment terrorism. Yet the consequences of a CDA driven, hands off approach to
social media extend much further. Social media can be used by foreign
governments to interfere in American elections. For example, Justice Department
prosecutors recently concluded that Russian intelligence agents created false
Facebook groups and accounts in the years leading up to the 2016 election
campaign, bootstrapping Facebook’s algorithm to spew propaganda that reached
between 29 million and 126 million Americans. See 1 Robert S. Mueller III, Special
Counsel, Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
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Election 24 26, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (March 2019), http://www.justice.gov/storage/
report.pdf. Russia also purchased over 3,500 advertisements on Facebook to
publicize their fake Facebook groups, several of which grew to have hundreds of
thousands of followers. Id. at 25 26. On Twitter, Russia developed false accounts
that impersonated American people or groups and issued content designed to
influence the election; it then created thousands of automated “bot” accounts to
amplify the sham Americans’ messages. Id. at 26 28. One fake account received
over six million retweets, the vast majority of which appear to have come from
real Twitter users. See Gillian Cleary, Twitterbots: Anatomy of a Propaganda
Campaign, Symantec (June 5, 2019), http://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat
intelligence/twitterbots propaganda disinformation. Russian intelligence also
harnessed the reach that social media gave its false identities to organize “dozens
of U.S. rallies,” some of which “drew hundreds” of real world Americans.
Mueller, Report, supra, at 29. Russia could do all this only because social media is
designed to target messages like Russia’s to the users most susceptible to them.
While Russia’s interference in the 2016 election is the best documented
example of foreign meddling through social media, it is not the only one. Federal
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intelligence agencies expressed concern in the weeks before the 2018 midterm
election “about ongoing campaigns by Russia, China and other foreign actors,
including Iran,” to “influence public sentiment” through means “including using
social media to amplify divisive issues.” Press Release, Office of Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence, Joint Statement from the ODNI, DOJ, FBI, and DHS: Combatting
Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections, (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.
php/newsroom/press releases/item/1915 joint statement from the odni doj fbi
and dhs combating foreign influence in u s elections. News reports also suggest
that China targets state sponsored propaganda to Americans on Facebook and
purchases Facebook ads to amplify its communications. See Paul Mozur, China
Spreads Propaganda to U.S. on Facebook, a Platform It Bans at Home, N.Y. Times (Nov.
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/technology/china facebook.html.
Widening the aperture further, malefactors at home and abroad can
manipulate social media to promote extremism. “Behind every Facebook ad,
Twitter feed, and YouTube recommendation is an algorithm that’s designed to
keep users using: It tracks preferences through clicks and hovers, then spits out a
steady stream of content that’s in line with your tastes.” Katherine J. Wu, Radical
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Ideas Spread Through Social Media. Are the Algorithms to Blame?, PBS (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/radical ideas social media algorithms.
All too often, however, the code itself turns those tastes sour. For example, one
study suggests that manipulation of Facebook’s news feed influences the mood of
its users: place more positive posts on the feed and users get happier; focus on
negative information instead and users get angrier. Adam D. I. Kramer et al.,
Experimental Evidence of Massive Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks,
111 PNAS 8788, 8789 (2014). This can become a problem, as Facebook’s algorithm
“tends to promote the most provocative content” on the site. Max Fisher, Inside
Facebook’s Secret Rulebook for Global Political Speech, N.Y. Times (Dec. 27, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/world/facebook moderators.html. Indeed,
“[t]he Facebook News Feed environment brings together, in one place, many of
the influences that have been shown to drive psychological aspects of
polarization.” Jaime E. Settle, Frenemies: How Social Media Polarizes America (2018).
Likewise, YouTube’s video recommendation algorithm—which leads to more
than 70 percent of time people spend on the platform—has been criticized for
shunting visitors toward ever more extreme and divisive videos. Roose & Conger,
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supra; see Jack Nicas, How YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s Darkest Corners,
Wall St. J. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how youtube drives
viewers to the internets darkest corners 1518020478. YouTube has fine tuned its
algorithm to recommend videos that recalibrate users’ existing areas of interest
and steadily steer them toward new ones—a modus operandi that has reportedly
proven a real boon for far right extremist content. See Kevin Roose, The Making of
a YouTube Radical, N.Y. Times (June 8, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/06/08/technology/youtube radical.html.
There is also growing attention to whether social media has played a
significant role in increasing nationwide political polarization. See Andrew
Soergel, Is Social Media to Blame for Political Polarization in America?, U.S. News &
World Rep. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017 03 20/is
social media to blame for political polarization in america. The concern is that
“web surfers are being nudged in the direction of political or unscientific
propaganda, abusive content, and conspiracy theories.” Wu, Radical Ideas, supra.
By surfacing ideas that were previously deemed too radical to take seriously,
social media mainstreams them, which studies show makes people “much more
Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-1, Page 163 of 167
Add. 163
Case: 18-17192, 08/03/2021, ID: 12191305, DktEntry: 71, Page 190 of 279
32
open” to those concepts. Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Everyday Social Media
Users Become Real World Extremists, N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/world/asia/facebook extremism.html. At its
worst, there is evidence that social mediamay even be used to push people toward
violence.7 The sites are not entirely to blame, of course—they would not have such
success without humans willing to generate and to view extreme content.
Providers are also tweaking the algorithms to reduce their pull toward hate speech
and other inflammatory material. See Isaac, supra; Roose & Conger, supra. Yet the
dangers of social media, in its current form, are palpable.
While the majority and I disagree about whether § 230 immunizes
interactive computer services from liability for all these activities or only some, it
7 See, e.g., Sarah Marsh, Social Media Related to Violence by Young People, Say Experts,
The Guardian (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/02/social
media violence young people gangs say experts; Kevin Roose,AMass Murder of, and for,
the Internet, N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/
technology/facebook youtube christchurch shooting.html; Craig Timberg et al., The New
Zealand Shooting Shows How TouTube and Facebook Spread Hate and Violent Images—Yet
Again, Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2019/03/15/facebook youtube twitter amplified video christchurch mosque shooting;
Julie Turkewitz & Kevin Roose, Who Is Robert Bowers, the Suspect in the Pittsburgh
Synagogue Shooting?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
10/27/us/robert bowers pittsburgh synagogue shooter.html.
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is pellucid that Congress did not have any of them in mind when it enacted the
CDA. The text and legislative history of the statute shout to the rafters Congress’s
focus on reducing children’s access to adult material. Congress could not have
anticipated the pernicious spread of hate and violence that the rise of social media
likely has since fomented. Nor could Congress have divined the role that social
media providers themselves would play in this tale. Mounting evidence suggests
that providers designed their algorithms to drive users toward content and people
the users agreed with—and that they have done it too well, nudging susceptible
souls ever further down dark paths. By contrast, when the CDA became law, the
closest extant ancestor to Facebook (and it was still several branches lower on the
evolutionary tree) was the chatroom or message forum, which acted as a digital
bulletin board and did nothing proactive to forge off site connections.8
8 See Caitlin Dewey, A Complete History of the Rise and Fall—and Reincarnation!—of
the Beloved ‘90s Chatroom, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the intersect/wp/2014/10/30/a complete history of the rise and fall and
reincarnation of the beloved 90s chatroom; see also Then and Now: A History of Social
Networking Sites, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/then and now a history
of social networking sites (last accessed July 9, 2019) (detailing the evolution of social
media sites from Classmates, launched only “as a list of school affiliations” in December
1995; to “the very first social networking site” Six Degrees, which launched in May 1997
but whose networks were limited “due to the lack of people connected to the Internet”;
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Whether, and to what extent, Congress should allow liability for tech
companies that encourage terrorism, propaganda, and extremism is a question for
legislators, not judges. Over the past two decades “the Internet has outgrown its
swaddling clothes,” Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1175 n.39, and it is fair to ask
whether the rules that governed its infancy should still oversee its adulthood. It is
undeniable that the Internet and social media have had many positive effects
worth preserving and promoting, such as facilitating open communication,
dialogue, and education. At the same time, as outlined above, social media can be
manipulated by evildoers who pose real threats to our democratic society. A
healthy debate has begun both in the legal academy9 and in the policy
to Friendster, launched in March 2002 and “credited as giving birth to the modern social
media movement”; to Facebook, which was “rolled out to the public in September 2006”).
9 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn t Just Backpage:
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 453, 454 55 (2018); Jeff Kosseff,
Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol y 123, 124
(2010); Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment
and the Fight Against Fake News, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2623, 2642 43 (2019). Much of the
enterprising legal scholarship debating the intersection of social media, terrorism, and
the CDA comes from student Notes. See, e.g., Jaime E. Freilich, Note, Section 230’s Liability
Shield in the Age of Online Terrorist Recruitment, 83 Brook. L. Rev. 675, 690 91 (2018); Anna
Elisabeth Jayne Goodman, Note and Comment, When You Give a Terrorist a Twitter:
Holding Social Media Companies Liable for their Support of Terrorism, 46 Pepp. L. Rev. 147,
182 86 (2018); Nicole Phe, Note, Social Media Terror: Reevaluating Intermediary Liability
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community10 about changing the scope of § 230. Perhaps Congress will clarify
what I believe the text of the provision already states: that the creation of social
networks reaches beyond the publishing functions that § 230 protects. Perhaps
Congress will engage in a broader rethinking of the scope of CDA immunity. Or
perhaps Congress will decide that the current regime best balances the interests
involved. In the meantime, however, I cannot join my colleagues’ decision to
immunize Facebook’s friend and content suggestion algorithms from judicial
scrutiny. I therefore must in part respectfully dissent, as I concur in part.
Under the Communications Decency Act, 51 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 99, 126 30 (2018).
10 See, e.g., Tarleton Gillespie, How Social Netowrks Set the Limits of What We Can Say
Online, Wired (June 26, 2018), http://www.wired.com/story/how social networks set the
limits of what we can say online; Christiano Lima, How a Widening Political Rift Over
Online Liability Is Splitting Washington, Politico (July 9, 2019), http://www.politico.com/
story/2019/07/09/online industry immunity section 230 1552241; Mark Sullivan, The
1996 Law That Made the Web Is in the Crosshairs, Fast Co. (Nov. 29, 2018),
http://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/maybe its time to take away the outdated
loophole that big tech exploits; cf. Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial
Intelligence Is Transforming the World, Brookings (Apr. 24, 2018),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/how artificial intelligence is transforming the
world (“The malevolent use of AI exposes individuals and organizations to unnecessary
risks and undermines the virtues of the emerging technology.”).
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THE EGLYPH WEB CRAWLER: 
ISIS CONTENT ON YOUTUBE
Introduction and Key Findings
From March 8 to June 8, 2018, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) conducted a 
study to better understand how ISIS content is being uploaded to YouTube, how long 
it is staying online, and how many views these videos receive. To accomplish this, 
CEP conducted a limited search for a small set of just 229 previously-identified ISIS 
terror-related videos from among the trove of extremist material available on the 
platform. 
CEP used two computer programs to locate these ISIS videos: a web crawler to 
search video titles and descriptions for keywords in videos uploaded to YouTube, and 
eGLYPH, a robust hashing content-identification system. CEP’s search of a limited 
set of ISIS terror-related videos found that hundreds of ISIS videos are uploaded to 
YouTube every month, which in turn garner thousands of views. 
Based on CEP’s research parameters, we found that in this three-month period:
1,348 ISIS videos were uploaded to YouTube, garnering 163,391 views
24% of those videos remained on YouTube for over two hours, receiving 148,590 views
76% of those videos remained on YouTube for less than two hours, receiving 14,801 views
278 accounts uploaded all 1,348 videos to YouTube
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YouTube, Google’s video streaming platform, has been an important site for posting 
and sharing ISIS’s propaganda since the group’s inception1. Even as ISIS’s message 
shifted from building a utopia in the Middle East to inspiring individuals to commit 
attacks in the West, YouTube has remained a central component of ISIS’s online media 
strategy2.  
ISIS, like most Americans, is drawn to YouTube because it is the dominant online 
streaming platform. A March 2018 Pew Research Center report found that 73% of 
American adults use YouTube, with 94% of individuals between the ages of 18 and 24 
using the site3.  
Moreover, there is a clear link between extremist videos and individuals who have 
sought to support or join ISIS. A joint study from the University of Chicago’s Project 
on Security and Threats and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Counter-Terror-
ism Policy Center found that 83% of Americans who committed or were charged with 




83% of Americans who 
committed or were charged 
with ISIS-related crimes 
between March 2014 and 
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YouTube’s policies restricting the types of videos prohibited on the site and 
how those videos are removed have only evolved in response to scandal or 
pressure from policymakers.
Below are several policy changes resulting from highly publicized discoveries 
of extremist content on YouTube and pressure from lawmakers and advertis-
ers to remove this material.
2016: Throughout the year, UK and European 
lawmakers expressed concern that social media 
platforms had become a “vehicle of choice” for 
extremists to recruit and radicalize. Several 
governments threatened legislative action5. 
March 2017: A Times of London investigation 
found advertisements of reputable brands appear-
ing alongside hateful and extremist videos7. 
December 2016: YouTube, Facebook, Microsoft, 
and Twitter launched a shared industry database 
of “hashes”–digital “fingerprints” of extremist 
imagery–in an effort to curb the spread of terrorist 
content online6. 
March 2017: YouTube announced that it will take 
a tougher stance on hate speech and strengthen 
advertiser controls8. 
June 2017: YouTube announced new guidelines 
about content eligible for ads9. 
B: Selected YouTube Policy Changes Over Time 
May-June 2017: In May, the Times of London 
found several bomb-making videos on Facebook 
and YouTube, days after Salman Abedi detonated a 
suicide bomb in Manchester, England. He report-
edly built the bombs after watching instruction-
al videos online. UK and European lawmakers 
also continued to increase pressure against tech 
companies, calling for new laws to punish compa-
nies that continue to host extremist material on 
their platforms.
The UK Home Affairs Committee published a re-
port saying that tech companies are “shamefully 
far” from taking action to tackle hateful content10. 
June 2017: YouTube “increases its use of tech-
nology” to identify extremist videos, increases the 
number of people in its Trusted Flagger program, 
and takes a “tougher stance” on videos that do not 
clearly violate its policies11. 
June 2017: YouTube, Facebook, Microsoft, and 
Twitter launched the Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), a partnership aimed 
at combating extremist content online12.  
July 2017: YouTube launched its Redirect Method 
program, which aims to redirect users searching 
for violent extremist content to counter-narrative 
videos13. 
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According to YouTube’s Community Guidelines, it “do[es] not permit 
terrorist organizations to use YouTube for any purpose, including recruit-
ment. YouTube also strictly prohibits content…that promotes terrorist acts, 
incites violence, or celebrates terrorist attacks14.” Since June 2017, You-
Tube has also taken measures towards hiding extremist content that does 
not explicitly violate their rules, such as putting inflammatory videos behind 
warning labels. 
YouTube claims to locate ISIS content through three mechanisms: human 
flagging, machine learning, and hashing15.  
Human flagging involves an individual user notifying YouTube that a 
video violates the Community Guidelines16. The flagger may be a regular user 
browsing videos or a ‘trusted flagger’17. Trusted flaggers are individuals, 
government agencies, or NGOs that YouTube has granted extra features for 
reporting content, such as mass flagging, YouTube staff support, and prior-
itizing those flagged reviews18. A YouTube employee, however, makes the 
final decision on whether or not to remove the flagged content. 
YouTube states that it uses automated machine learning technology to locate 
extremist videos. Still, the decision to remove these videos is made by 
a human content moderator19. According to its 2018 Community Guidelines 
Transparency Report, YouTube located 72% (7,029,971 out of 9,790,083 
videos) of removed extremist videos through automated machine learning 
systems between January and March 201820. 
YouTube also claims to locate videos through hashes, which are signifiers 
unique to each piece of content21. The extent to which YouTube utilizes this 
technology is unclear, and it is uncertain whether this technology is used 
to prevent the reupload of known extremist content. In December 2016, 
Google/YouTube, along with Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft, launched a 
shared hash database, which they claim now numbers over 88,000 hashes 
as of June 201822.  
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In order to test YouTube’s stated ability to remove ISIS content, CEP used a web crawler to 
search video titles and descriptions for pro-ISIS keywords in videos uploaded to YouTube, 
and eGLYPH, a hashing image identification system to locate known ISIS videos. 
eGLYPH, developed by CEP Senior Advisor and digital forensics expert Dr Hany Farid, is an 
image identification system that uses robust hashing (see Annex A). A hash represents a 
distinct signature (like a fingerprint) of a multimedia file, and can be used to detect duplicate 
image, video, and audio recording files.
As a robust hashing system, eGLYPH can also detect content that has been slightly 
modified, such as by changing the video’s resolution and/or speed (i.e., slow down or speed 
up), as well as video segments typically used in pro-ISIS video montages. CEP created a 
hash database composed of 229 full-length ISIS videos, introductory clips from ISIS 
videos with variations based on ISIS’s administrative regions or media outlets, and import-
ant excerpts from ISIS videos that have appeared in multiple pieces of visual propaganda. 
CEP also identified 183 keywords that are indicative of pro-ISIS sympathies and are typically 
associated with ISIS content such as slogans as well as the names of ISIS’s provinces, 
media outlets, and prominent propagandists (see Annex B). 
The web crawler, attached with eGLYPH, conducted searches using YouTube’s API every 
20 minutes for 24-hours a day for video uploads that match one or more of the 229 hashes, 
as well as one or more of the 183 keywords. Video matches were downloaded to CEP’s 
server, which recorded key data, including: date and time of upload, the number of views, 
the account that uploaded the video, and the time of removali (if at all). 
i: Due to YouTube’s API’s quota requirements, CEP checked for the
availability of an ISIS video over a three-day period. CEP did not confirm 
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Between March 8 and June 8, 2018, using a nar-
row set of research parameters, CEP located 
1,348 ISIS videos on YouTube that included con-
tent matching ISIS video content included in CEP’s 
database. Those 1,348 ISIS videos received a total 
of 163,391 views before they were removed (if at 
all) by YouTube. 
Of those 1,348 videos, 322 videos (24%) were on 
YouTube for two hours or longer, accumulating a 
total of 148,590ii views (91% of all views), with an 
average of 461 views per video. And 1,026 videos 
(76%) were on YouTube for less than two hours, 
receiving 14,801 views (9% of total views), with an 
average of 14 views per video.
91% of all uploaded videos were uploaded more 
than once, meaning that YouTube’s hashing sys-
tems are not working appropriately to prevent the 
reuploads of known terrorist videos. 
All 1,348 ISIS videos were uploaded by 278 differ-
ent YouTube accounts. 92% of accounts uploaded 
more than one video (with one account upload-
ing 50 videos). 60% of accounts remained live on 
YouTube after videos were deleted, meaning that 
the account was not deleted after an ISIS video 
was removed by YouTube staff.
CEP was surprised to see that these accounts 
remained on the platform. It is unclear why 
YouTube would not delete them immediately, 
especially when the accounts are known to have 
uploaded terrorist material.
DATA OVERVIEW
Collected Data on YouTube Percentage of total views
Percentage of accounts that have
uploaded more than one video
Percentage of accounts that remained
live after uploaded videos had been
removed for content violations
91%: videos online for
more than 2 hours
92%: accounts that






videos online for 
less than 2 hours
accounts that
uploaded one video







ii: CEP only checked for the availability of an ISIS video over a three-day 
period. As a result, the actual number of views for these videos on YouTube 
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CEP’s findings call into question YouTube’s claims of proactive content removal efforts. The 
fact that 91% of extremist videos had been reuploaded to YouTube at least once casts doubt 
on YouTube’s stated efforts to prevent the upload or removal of known terrorist material.
YouTube’s human flagging efforts are currently inadequate to consistently locate and remove 
known terrorist content. The fact that 24% of content remained on YouTube for more than 
two hours indicates that YouTube is failing to prepare, train, and educate its content moder-
ators about known ISIS videos.
Similarly, while YouTube’s machine learning technology appears to have made improve-
ments in locating ISIS content, it does not excuse the fact that these videos are still allowed 
to be uploaded and accrue in some cases hundreds or thousands of views. The overall total 
of 163,391 views within a three-month period on this limited set of 1,348 uploaded videos 
shows that YouTube is still an important site for ISIS’s propaganda efforts. 
It is unlikely that Google/YouTube is deploying hashing technology appropriately given that 
known ISIS videos continue to be reuploaded to the platform. If video hashes were checked 
against a hash database of known terrorist content at the point of upload, it should prevent 
that video from being posted to YouTube.
Instead, CEP found that 91% of the narrow set of 1,348 videos had been uploaded more than 
once during the three-month period. For example, the ISIS video, Hunt Them O, Monotheist, 
originally released by ISIS’s Somalian affiliate on December 25, 2017, encourages firearm 
and vehicular attacks in Western countries. During CEP’s research period, the video was 
uploaded to YouTube on March 10, 2018 and was available for 29 hours and received 405 
views before it was removed. The video was reuploaded on March 11 by a different account 
and was available for 39 hours and received 113 views before it was again removed. The 
video was then again reuploaded and deleted at least ten more times, receiving another 990 
views, before the conclusion of CEP’s research period on June 8. 
Clearly, it remains possible to reupload known ISIS content despite YouTube’s highly
publicized promises to be proactive in removing content and use of machine learning and 
hashing technology24. The fact that known terrorist videos continue to be uploaded and 
reuploaded to the platform calls into question YouTube’s true intentions behind its heavily 
promoted efforts to combat online extremism. YouTube still has a long way to go in the fight 
against terrorist propaganda on their platforms.
CONCLUSION
The fact that known terrorist 
videos continue to be uploaded 
and reuploaded calls into 
question YouTube’s true 
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CEP proposes several recommendations in order 
to help prevent the upload and spread of ISIS vid-
eos on YouTube.
Firstly, Google/YouTube should provide clear pol-
icy guidelines and take action to consistently and 
immediately delete accounts that have uploaded 
ISIS videos. Users should not be allowed to main-
tain their YouTube account after posting terrorist 
content. 
Secondly, Google/YouTube must be more transpar-
ent regarding its hashing efforts. Google/YouTube 
should fully explain how it is implementing hashing 
technology, specifically if YouTube is deploying at 
the point of upload. Google/YouTube should also 
provide a detailed explanation of how the compa-
ny contributes to and participates in the so-called 
“hashing coalition” announced in December 2016.
Google/YouTube should state how much content 
they have contributed to this shared database, 
and whether there is an agreement that all con-
tent in the database be removed across industry 
platforms and websites that are members of the 
hashing coalition and the Global Internet Forum 
to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). Google/YouTube 
should also state how much content has been re-
moved from their platform as a result of the data-
base, and how the company as well as their coali-
tion partners keep the database up to date.
An objective of the GIFCT is to share knowledge, 
information, and best practices. As a founding 
member of the GIFCT, Google/YouTube should aim 
to set industry standards on hashing practices. 
A mandate for all GIFCT members to hash and re-
move content produced by groups and individuals 
sanction-designated by the United States, Europe-
an Union, and United Nations, as well as material 
that glorifies or incites violence would rationalize 
RECOMMENDATIONS
content removal practices and dramatically reduce 
the amount of terrorist content online. 
Lastly, while removing content quickly from You-
Tube is clearly an important component of any 
effort to restrict the dissemination of terrorist 
propaganda, ‘time online’ should not be the only 
metric used to gauge the progress of YouTube and 
other platforms in ending their facilitation of ter-
rorist propaganda. CEP has found that in many 
cases, ISIS videos removed within two hours still 
received dozens and, in some cases, hundreds of 
views. With CEP’s narrow scope of research pa-
rameters, we found that 1,026 videos (76%) were 
on YouTube for less than two hours, receiving 
14,801 views (9% of total views).
Policymakers in the United States, United King-
dom, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe are in 
the process of developing regulations to com-
pel tech companies to remove terrorist content 
quickly. Timely removal of ISIS videos is indeed 
important, but lawmakers should not lose sight of 
the importance of views. ISIS material, similar to 
other types of propaganda, is posted in order to 
be viewed and influence opinions and actions. A 
larger audience raises the possibility that an ad-
ditional viewer may commit an act of terrorism in 
the name of ISIS. For instance, a video calling for 
terrorist attacks during holiday celebrations that 
has been on YouTube for one hour with 100 views 
has the potential to be more damaging than if that 
same video was online for two hours but only had 
a dozen views.
Setting standards for removal time periods is 
necessary, but lawmakers must also consider 
regulating and potentially fining companies based 
on highly-viewed terrorist material. 
Lawmakers must consider 
regulating and potentially 
fining companies based 
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ANNEX A
A Technical Explanation of eGLYPH by Dr Hany Farid
Data hashing has long been employed to identify or verify data. 
Specifically, a hash function is applied to data of any format, con-
verting the data into an integer (referred to as a hash value, hash 
sum, or signature).
This hash function should have several properties: (1) the function 
should be computationally efficient to evaluate; (2) the function is 
deterministic, returning exactly the same signature when present-
ed with the same input data; (3) the function should return a unique 
signature—that is, there should be no two distinct input data that 
hash to the same signature; and (4) the signature should be 
relatively compact.
There are many applications of hashing including efficiently 
accessing data in large databases, finding duplicate data entries 
in a database, verifying the integrity of a binary executable, and 
authenticating messages. For these applications, the uniqueness 
(or near uniqueness) of the hash function is critical. That is, da-
ta-searching and verification relies on the basic principle that any 
modification to the data will yield a different signature. 
Hashing has been proposed as a means to detect duplicate im-
ages in a database. This approach works well if the image being 
searched is precisely the same image as that in the database. Any 
modification to the image, however, renders this approach relative-
ly useless, as even the most minor of modifications (changing one 
pixel, adjusting contrast, resizing, re-compressing, etc.) changes 
the resulting hash signature.
Images (and audio/video) are somewhat distinct from other data 
formats in that it is often desirable to relax the definition of “dupli-
cate” to be the same image invariant to simple modifications such 
as re-sizing, compression quality, and contrast/color enhancement. 
To this end, the term robust hashing has emerged to mean that the 
extracted signature of a data file is invariant to pre-defined trans-
formations.  
We have developed a robust hashing algorithm - eGLYPH - for 
identifying images, videos, and audio recording. The image-based 
version of eGLYPH operates as follows: (1) a full-resolution color 
image is converted to grayscale and down-sized to a lower and 
fixed resolution of 400 x 400 pixels.
This step reduces the processing complexity in subsequent steps, 
makes the robust hash invariant to image resolution, and eliminates 
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artifacts; (2) perform a high-pass filter on the reduced resolution 
image to highlight the most informative parts of the image; (3) par-
tition the image into non-overlapping quadrants from which basic 
statistical measurements of the underlying content are extracted 
and packed into a feature vector; and (4) compute the similarity of 
two hashes as the Euclidean distance between two feature vectors 
- distances below a specified threshold qualify as a match.
Despite its simplicity, this robust hashing algorithm has proved to 
be highly accurate and computationally efficient to compute (and is 
similar to the PhotoDNA that I co-developed in the mid-2000s and 
which today is used to find and remove child exploitation material 
on many on-line platforms).
The largest challenge with extending the image-based hashing 
to video is the massive amount of data in an even short video; at 
24 frames per second, a three-minute video contains 4,320 still 
images. At even a modest resolution of 640 x 480 pixels per frame, 
a three-minute video contains over 1.3 billion pixels. The complexity 
of hashing a video, as compared to analyzing a single image, is at 
least three orders of magnitude larger.
There are, however, typically only small changes between succes-
sive frames of a video leading to a large amount of information 
redundancy in a video. We can, therefore, reduce the complexity of 
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We, conveniently, just described a mechanism for measuring the 
similarity between two images. In addition to finding nearly identi-
cal images, robust hashing can be used to find similar images by 
controlling the threshold on the Euclidean metric for image similar-
ity (as described in the previous section).
We start a video analysis by using robust image hashing to elimi-
nate redundant video frames. This elimination of redundant frames 
typically reduces the length of a video by approximately 75%.
The image hash is then extracted from each of the remaining 
frames and concatenated to yield a final video hash. Unlike the im-
age-based hashing that yields a fixed length hash, a video hash 
can be of arbitrary length. This presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity for comparing two hashes.
A Euclidean distance cannot, of course, be used to compare two 
hashes of arbitrary length. Instead, we utilize the longest common 
substring (LCS). By way of intuition, the longest common substring 
of the two strings “ABABACABBC” and “ABACABACBBCA” is six 
because the longest common string shared by these strings is the 
“ABACAB.” Note that these strings also have the substring “BBC” 
in common but this is shorter than the substring of length six.
The advantage of using LCS to compare two hashes is that it allows 
us to find not just matching videos but also video segments that 
are extracted or video segments that are embedded within a larger 
video (e.g., a video compilation).
Running on a standard Linux machine, a Java-based implemen-
tation of this robust video hashing requires approximately 10ms 
to process a single video frame and approximately 2.5ms to com-
pare two hashes. To improve the efficiency, we have implemented 
a multi-core version of this algorithm that allows for a video to be 
partitioned into an arbitrary number of short segments each of 
which can be analyzed on a separate computer core.
The individual results from each segment are then combined to 
create a single hash. With this approach, the rate-limiting step to 
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ANNEX B
Keywords Indicating Pro-ISIS Sympathies and Associated
with ISIS Content Used in Web Crawler
The Islamic State (Arabic)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Remaining and Expanding (Arabic)
Wikalat A’maq (Arabic)
Caravan of Martyrs (Arabic)
Flames of War (Arabic)
Deterring the Hired (Arabic)
Martyrdom Seeker (Arabic)





Abode of Disbelief (Arabic)
Abode of Islam (Arabic)
Rejectionists (Arabic)
Cubs of the Caliphate (Arabic)
The Tyrants (Arabic)





The Parties of Satan
Las Vegas Conquest 1 (Arabic)
Las Vegas Conquest 2 (Arabic)
Las Vegas Equitable Revenge               
(Just Terror Tactics) (Arabic)
Sufficient is your Lord as a Guide and 
Helper (Arabic)
United Cyber Caliphate (Arabic)
Caliphate Cyber Army (Arabic)
Mujahid (Arabic)
Democracy and Islam
Inside the Khalifah (Arabic)
Hayat Al Jihad (Arabic)
For the Sake of Allah (Arabic)
The Making of Illusion (Arabic)
Paris Has Collapsed (Arabic)
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Soon God Willing (Arabic)
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Al Rased Al Felasatiny (Arabic)
Al Hayat (Arabic)




The Polytheists (I Politeisti)
The Polytheists (Il politeismo)
The Polytheists (Les polytheists)
Abode of Disbelief (Heimat des Unglaubens)
Abode of Disbelief (Huis van ongeloof)
Abode of Disbelief (Dar Al-Kufr)
Abode of Disbelief (Demeure de mécréance)
Abode of Disbelief (darul kufur)
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Inside the Khalifah (À l’intérieur du Califat)
Inside the Khalifah (unutar kalifate)
Islamic State (Islamischer Staat)
Islamic State (Islamitische staat)
Islamic State (Stato Islamico)
Islamic State (L’État islamique)
Islamic State (Islamska Država)
Abode of Islam (Heimat des Islam)
Abode of Islam (Huis van Islam)
Abode of Islam (Dar Al-Islam)
You Must Fight Them O Muwahhid (Du musst sie Bekämpfen Muwahhid)
You Must Fight Them O Muwahhid (Je moet tegen hen vechten Muwahhid)
You Must Fight Them O Muwahhid (Vous devez les combattre Muwahhid)
You Must Fight Them O Muwahhid (borite se protiv njih o vjernici)
Abode of Islam (Demeure de l’Islam)
Abode of Islam (Darul islam)
Wikalat A’maq (Amaq Nachrichtenagentur)
Wikalat A’maq (L’Amaq)
Wikalat A’maq (Novinska agencija Amak)
Flames of War (Flammen des Krieges)
Flames of War (Vlammen van oorlog)
Flames of War (fiamme di Guerra)
Flames of War (les flammes de la guerre)















Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-2, Page 32 of 84
Add. 199
: - , 8/03/ , I : 91 05, t tr : 71, Page 226 of 279




Twitter Permanently Bans Trump, Capping Online Revolt
The presidents̓ preferred megaphone cited “the risk of further incitement of violence.” It
acted after Facebook, Snapchat, Twitch and other platforms placed limits on him.
By Kate Conger and Mike Isaac
Published Jan. 8, 2021 Updated Jan. 12, 2021
OAKLAND, Calif. — Twitter said on Friday that it had permanently banned President
Trump from its service “due to the risk of further incitement of violence,” effectively cutting
him off from his favorite megaphone for reaching the public and capping a series of actions
by mainstream sites to limit his online reach.
Twitter said in a blog post that Mr. Trump’s personal @realDonaldTrump account, which
has more than 88 million followers, would be shut down immediately. The company said two
tweets that Mr. Trump had posted on Friday — one calling his supporters “patriots” and
another saying he would not go to the presidential inauguration on Jan. 20 — violated its
rules against glorifying violence.
The tweets “were highly likely to encourage and inspire people to replicate the criminal acts
that took place at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021,” Twitter said, referring to the storming of
the Capitol by a mob of Trump loyalists.
Within minutes, Mr. Trump’s account on Twitter was no longer accessible. His posts were
replaced with a label: “Account suspended.”
Mr. Trump tried to evade the ban late Friday by using the @POTUS Twitter account, which
belongs to sitting U.S. presidents, as well as other accounts to lash out at the company. But
almost all of his messages were almost immediately removed by Twitter. The company
forbids users to try avoiding a suspension with secondary accounts.
The moves were a forceful repudiation by Twitter of Mr. Trump, who had used the platform
to build his base and spread his messages, which were often filled with falsehoods and
threats. Mr. Trump regularly tweeted dozens of times a day, sending flurries of messages in
the early morning or late evening. In his posts, he gave his live reactions to television news
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6/15/2021 Trump's Twitter Account Permanently Suspended - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twitter-trump-suspended.html 2/6
“Twitter’s permanent suspension of Trump’s Twitter account is long overdue,” said Shannon
McGregor, a senior researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. “This is
the key de-platforming for Trump. The inability to tweet cuts off his direct access to the
press — and, by extension, the public.”
In a statement late Friday, Mr. Trump said Twitter was trying to silence him. He said he was
negotiating with other sites and promised a “big announcement soon,” adding that he was
looking at building “our own platform.”
“Twitter is not about FREE SPEECH,” Mr. Trump said. “They are all about promoting a
Radical Left platform where some of the most vicious people in the world are allowed to
speak freely.”
A day earlier, Facebook had barred Mr. Trump for the rest of his term, and other digital
platforms — including Snapchat, YouTube, Twitch and Reddit — also recently limited Mr.
Trump on their services.
The actions were a stark illustration of the power of the social media companies and how
they could act almost unilaterally when they chose. For years, Twitter, Facebook and other
platforms had positioned themselves as defenders of free speech and had said the posts of
world leaders like Mr. Trump should be allowed because they were newsworthy. The
companies had rejected touching his account, even after they were assailed for allowing
misinformation and falsehoods to flow.
Twitter decided to permanently ban Mr. Trump as it faced pressure from lawmakers, its own
employees and many others, including Michelle Obama. Other politicians and world leaders
also have posted incendiary tweets, raising questions of whether Twitter had started down a
slippery slope and would have to take down other accounts.
On Friday, the company also permanently banned the accounts of several prominent Trump
supporters who used the platform to spread conspiracy theories, including the lawyer
Sidney Powell and President Trump’s former national security adviser Michael T. Flynn.
Rush Limbaugh, the conservative talk show host, also appeared to deactivate his account.
Donald Trump Jr., Mr. Trump’s son, called Twitter’s move against his father “absolute
insanity” and said the tech companies were overreaching. “We are living Orwell’s 1984,” he
tweeted.
Republican lawmakers renewed their calls to revoke legal protections for social media
companies, taking aim at Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields the
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“It is now time for Congress to repeal Section 230 and put Big Tech on the same legal footing
as every other company in America,” Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina said on
Friday.
Mr. Trump had repeatedly told allies who raised the possibility that social media firms
would bar him, “They’ll never ban me.”
In the White House, there was an extensive process for drafting official tweets. But at night
and early in the morning, Mr. Trump composed his own tweets on his iPhone, often to the
chagrin of advisers and Republican lawmakers who then spent hours or days dealing with
the fallout.
“Without the tweets, I wouldn’t be here,” Mr. Trump told The Financial Times in April 2017.
In a meeting at the White House last year, Brad Parscale, Mr. Trump’s campaign manager at
the time, suggested that the president move over to Parler, an alternative social media site
that has become popular with right-wing users. But Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-
law and senior adviser, shot down the idea later, sharing Mr. Trump’s confidence that
Twitter wouldn’t act, and it never happened, according to a person briefed on what took
place.
While the White House still has official Twitter accounts like @POTUS and @WhiteHouse
until the inauguration, Twitter has said it will facilitate the transfer of those accounts to the
incoming Biden administration. Before the mob attack on Wednesday, Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s
chief executive, was involved in discussions about transferring those accounts, a person
familiar with the discussions said.
The pushback against Mr. Trump online began on Wednesday after his loyalists, urged on
by the president, breached the Capitol building. In the aftermath, Twitter temporarily locked
Mr. Trump’s account, followed by Facebook. At the time, Twitter said the risks of keeping his
commentary live on its site had become too high.
The company said Mr. Trump could return to its platform if he deleted several tweets that
contained falsehoods about the election or calls for violence, which violated its policies. One
of the tweets was a video that Mr. Trump had posted after the police pushed the mob back
where he told his supporters: “We love you. You’re very special.”
After Mr. Trump took those posts down, he was reinstated to the site on Thursday. Late on
Thursday, he issued a conciliatory message, saying he was outraged by the violence and
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But Mr. Trump  tweeted on Friday that his supporters were “American Patriots” who would
possess a “GIANT VOICE long into the future.” He also said he would not attend the
inauguration on Jan. 20.
Twitter said those messages appeared to condone Wednesday’s violence and were likely to
stoke further violence. It added that the one about the inauguration offered the date as a
target for attack.
“Plans for future armed protests have already begun proliferating on and off Twitter,
including a proposed secondary attack on the U.S. Capitol and state capitol buildings on Jan.
17, 2021,” Twitter said.
Inside Twitter, employees and executives have debated how to treat Mr. Trump’s account.
Mr. Dorsey has been vacationing on an island in French Polynesia this week, but called in to
meetings, three people with knowledge of his location said. On Thursday, he sent an email to
employees saying it was important for Twitter to remain consistent with its policies,
including its policy of allowing a user to return after a temporary suspension, according to
one person who received the email.
Hundreds of employees soon signed a petition asking the company to immediately remove
Mr. Trump’s account, three people familiar with the petition said. The petition was reported
earlier by The Washington Post.
On Friday, Twitter held a meeting with employees, two people with knowledge of the event
said. At the meeting, workers pressed executives on why they had not permanently barred
Mr. Trump from the platform.
Mr. Dorsey and other managers, such as Vijaya Gadde, Twitter’s head of legal and safety,
said the company wanted to be consistent with its policies, which state that users can tweet
again if they have deleted the messages that violated its rules.
But Mr. Dorsey also said he had “drawn a line in the sand” that the president could not cross
for fear of losing his account privileges, the people with knowledge of the event said. Mr.
Dorsey said Twitter would follow through on a ban if Mr. Trump crossed that line.
Emerson Brooking, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab,
said taking down Mr. Trump’s Twitter account now was, in some ways, too late because the
president had already spread so many conspiracy theories on the platform over the past few
years.
“Removing Trump from Twitter does not fix our politics or bring millions of Americans back
to reality,” Mr. Brooking said. “But it does make it significantly harder for disinformation to
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Beyond muting Mr. Trump’s biggest megaphone, Twitter’s decision could create headaches
for the Trump administration when it comes to complying with the Presidential Records Act
of 1978, which requires the preservation of presidential materials and communications.
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4 THE AMERICAN FACE OF ISIS: ANALYSIS OF ISIS-RELATED TERRORISM IN THE US MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2016 
In this undated photo provided by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Samy el-Goarany poses for a photo 
with a weapon and the Islamic State group flag. Prosecutors showed this photo of Samy el-Goarany in federal court 17 January 2017, 
during the trial of Ahmed Mohammed el-Gammal who is accused of helping Samy el-Goarany reach Syria where he trained with the 
Islamic State group before he was killed. The photo was shown while Samy el-Goarany’s brother, Tarek el-Goarany, was testifying. (US 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is mobilising sympathisers in the US at rates much higher than seen for 
previous terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.
To understand this new American face of ISIS, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) study examined 
112 cases of individuals who perpetrated ISIS-related offences, were indicted by the US Justice Department for such 
offences, or both, in the US between March 2014 and August 2016. The offences fall into three categories:
1. attacking or conspiring to attack targets in the US
2. travelling or conspiring to travel to join ISIS abroad
3. facilitating others seeking to attack or travel.
Commentary to date on the type of people in the US who support ISIS is typically based on a few high-profile 
individual cases and some speculation. This is the first comprehensive analysis of ISIS-related cases to examine the 
profiles of indictees overall, as well as to identify characteristics associated with each of the three offence types.
Our key findings are as follows:
• US ISIS indictees are very similar to the overall US population.
– Their rates of marriage, college or higher education, and employment are close to the US average.
• Indictees are mostly born and raised in America.
– 83% are US citizens, and 65% were born in the US.
– None is a refugee from Syria.
• A significant proportion are converts from outside established Muslim communities.
– 30% are converts to Islam, including 43% of US-born indictees.
• Those indicted for attacking or conspiring to conduct an attack in the US are as likely to be US-born converts to 
Islam as to be from established Muslim communities.
– 51% are recent converts to Islam.
– 49% are from established Muslim communities.
• ISIS propaganda videos played a central role in the radicalisation of indictees.
– 83% watched ISIS propaganda videos, including execution videos and lectures by terrorist leaders.
• ISIS has been more successful than al-Qaeda in mobilising support in the US.
– ISIS is mobilising US indictees at a rate four times higher than al-Qaeda’s.
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6 THE AMERICAN FACE OF ISIS: ANALYSIS OF ISIS-RELATED TERRORISM IN THE US MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2016 
Policy takeaways
• Stopping immigration from Islamic countries won’t prevent support for ISIS in the US.
• Defeating ISIS in the US requires a better understanding of the group’s propaganda strategy and why it’s more 
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INTRODUCTION
Who becomes a sympathiser of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and why? What explains why some travel 
to fight for the group in Syria, others choose to attack at home, and others limit their activity to facilitating travel 
and attacks? Are today’s ISIS sympathisers different from those of al-Qaeda who threatened the US with 9/11 and 
its aftermath?
To answer these questions, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) conducted a comprehensive 
review of the 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated offences or were indicted by the US Justice Department for 
ISIS-related offences in the US between March 2014 and August 2016.1 These offences are:
1. attacking or conspiring to attack targets in the US
2. travelling or conspiring to travel to join ISIS abroad as ‘foreign fighters’
3. facilitating others seeking to attack or travel.
We found striking patterns
First, US ISIS indictees2 look more like average Americans than is commonly understood. While the image of the 
‘typical terrorist’ is that of a young, single male under the age of 25 years, the profile emerging from our research 
presents a different picture. US ISIS indictees are older—nearly half are over 25—and a notable fraction (11%) 
are women. In addition, their rates of marriage and higher education are comparable to the US national average, 
and three-quarters were either students or employed at the time of the offence. In short, they are engaged with 
society and have educational and career opportunities. They aren’t loners operating from the fringes of society. 
Nevertheless, their opportunities and social relationships didn’t prevent them being radicalised and active 
supporters of ISIS.
Second, the indictees are truly homegrown. The vast majority are US citizens (83%), and 65% were born in the 
US. None is a Syrian refugee. Indeed, only three of the 112 had refugee status at the time of their offences, and 
two of those had arrived in the US before 1999. Two of the three were from Bosnia and one from Iraq. However, a 
significant fraction of those born in the US are second-generation Americans, consistent with studies investigating 
ISIS recruitment in other Western countries, such as France.3 While data on the families of US indictees is limited, we 
know that at least 17 were born into Muslim immigrant families, and evidence points to an additional four for whom 
that is highly likely (together comprising 29% of the 73 US-born indictees).
Third, many indictees come from outside established Muslim communities. Half (51%) of those who chose to attack 
in the US are recent converts to Islam, including some who converted less than a year before their arrest (Figure 1). 
This is in sharp contrast to the smaller number of converts among those who chose to travel to fight in Syria (19%) or 
who facilitated attackers and ‘travellers’ or foreign fighters with money and logistical support (10%). Travellers were 
on average the youngest offenders, at 25 years old. Facilitators were not only the oldest, averaging 29 years, but also 
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Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Fourth, ISIS propaganda, and especially videos, played a central role in their radicalisation. Eighty-three per cent 
of indictees reported watching ISIS videos, including videos of executions, which ISIS distributes widely on the 
internet. Travellers were most likely to report watching videos (92%) and attackers the least (76%), although all 
groups demonstrate a high rate of watching video propaganda.
Finally, ISIS has been more successful than al-Qaeda in mobilising support in the US, with four times more indictees 
per year. ISIS indictees are also significantly more likely to be US citizens and recent converts than their al-Qaeda 
counterparts. ISIS’s comparative success underscores not only the effectiveness of its propaganda strategy but also 
the centrality of the internet in making the group’s propaganda available to potential supporters across the globe.
These findings challenge conventional stereotypes of terrorists and even the standard profiles of past groups.
The popular view of ISIS terrorists, commonly reinforced in some American media, is that they are Muslims from 
outside the US or from within established Muslim-American communities.4 This view has led to some policy 
proposals to exclude Muslims from migrating to the US. They are also regularly portrayed as young—with a high 
proportion of teenagers—mostly male, and as lonely outsiders with little education and low job prospects, leaving 
them especially vulnerable to the allure of terrorist groups.5
This popular view persists despite the fact that past expert studies have shown that terrorists are typically broadly 
representative of their communities in terms of socioeconomic and educational measures.6
Our study built on existing research7 on the threat of ISIS in the US by including more recent cases, expanding the 
variables to include a particular focus on propaganda consumption, and engaging in new analysis of subgroups of 
offenders by citizenship and offence type that allows us to draw new insights into the face of ISIS in America.
Our findings are based on a comprehensive and rigorous review of the documentary evidence on the 112 
indictees in our database, more than 1,600 pages of formal indictment material, criminal complaints, and media 
coverage. Based on this review, we systematically identified and collected a broad spectrum of demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics as well as factors associated with radicalisation and the consumption of 
militant propaganda.
We were able to source data on these variables for the overwhelming majority of indictees. Of note, we have data 
for all 112 cases on the categories of age, offence type, citizenship, country of birth, religion, and whether they are 
recent converts to Islam. We identified educational attainment for 72 individuals (64%), employment for 90 (80%), 
marital status for 74 (66%), and propaganda consumption for 87 (78%). Violent criminality and mental illness aren’t 
common among ISIS indictees. According to our data, 14% had confirmed mental illness, while 13% had been 
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9INTRODUCTION
Our data allows us to identify patterns and make inferences based on important observable characteristics. 
Additional research, including interviews, would be necessary for a systematic evaluation of motivations and other 
psychological factors in these cases.
ISIS has been remarkably successful in mobilising US citizens, in particular recent converts, at rates higher than 
al-Qaeda’s. Other commentators have suggested that the path to ‘conversion’ may have been part of the jihadi 
radicalisation and recruitment process. Indeed, this perspective is consistent with the relatively high number of 
recent converts among attackers.
The average ISIS indictee is a 27-year-old male with no criminal record or mental illness who attended some college, 
is employed or still in school, is in personal relationship, is a Muslim but may be recent convert, and is part of a local 
group of like-minded radicals.
Our findings have significant policy implications.
Taken together, the increase in ‘born and bred’ Americans supporting ISIS and the very limited number of refugees 
in our study suggest that limiting or halting immigration from Muslim countries will not eliminate or even markedly 
mitigate the threat posed by ISIS to the US. Significantly, in the light of current debates about security threats 
associated with Syrian refugees from the current conflict, there are no cases in our data of a refugee from Syria 
perpetrating an ISIS-related offence in the US.
Additionally, because our study doesn’t point to a narrow, easily distinguishable profile, law enforcement officers 
can’t simply expect to identify ISIS supporters by tracking large numbers of traditionally religious Muslim men. 
Instead, our security forces and intelligence forces must focus on limiting access to the tools used to carry out 
attacks and the propaganda that inspires them.
To do so, we need to deepen our understanding of the appeal of this propaganda in order to sever the link between 
individuals’ sense of disenfranchisement, perceived lack of opportunity and other factors and support for ISIS.
The increase in ‘born and bred’ Americans supporting ISIS and the
very limited number of refugees in our study suggest that limiting or 
halting immigration from Muslim countries will not eliminate or even 
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MORE NORMAL THAN 
YOU THINK
What kind of person decides to fight for or support a foreign terrorist group like ISIS? CPOST’s data on individuals 
indicted for ISIS-related offences in the US sheds new light on this question. The popular view is that individuals 
likely to be attracted to Islamist extremist groups are most often young male Muslims who are from established 
Muslim communities in the US or have come to the US from such communities abroad.8 This view assumes they are 
uneducated loners with few economic opportunities and little to lose, making them vulnerable to recruitment by 
militant groups such as ISIS promising them purpose and opportunity.
Those assumptions don’t tell the whole story.
Strikingly, our study found that a substantial proportion of indictees doesn’t fit that profile. Indeed, on many 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, the 112 indictees in our study are nearly indistinguishable from 
average Americans.
Older and a higher proportion of females than expected
Although one might expect ISIS indictees to be males in their late teens or early twenties, the data shows that the 
group is far more heterogeneous (Figure 2). The average age is 27 years, ranging from a low of 17 to a high of 52. 
Nearly half are older than 25, the age commonly thought to be the upper bound for people willing to join and fight 
for extremist groups.9 For example, a comprehensive study found the average age of suicide bombers from 1982 to 
2003 to be 23.10 Additionally, the fact that 11% of indictees on terrorism-related charges are female challenges the 
presumption that support for ISIS comes only from young males, and that if women are involved it would only be in 
a passive manner.11 The role of women in terrorist groups has long been noted, but the potential appeal of Islamist 
groups like ISIS to women may be underappreciated.12




















Based on 112 cases.
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11MORE NORMAL THAN YOU THINK
What drove female indictees to support ISIS varies. Three operated together with male significant others, including 
Jaelyn Young, who was arrested for attempting to travel to Syria with her fiancée, Muhammad Dakhlalla, using their 
honeymoon as cover.13 Others, such as Shannon Maureen Conley, had developed a romantic relationship with an 
ISIS fighter in Syria online; Conley was arrested after attempting to travel to join her man.14 Yet others, such as Noelle 
Valentzas and Asia Siddiqqi, conspired to attack targets in the US in apparent retaliation for US policy in Syria and, in 
Valentzas’s words, to ‘make history’.15
US citizens, not foreigners or refugees
A key finding is that the vast majority are US citizens, and a strong majority were born in the US (Figure 3).














*Held refugee status at time of arrest. 
Notes: Based on 112 cases. Direct evidence of citizenship was not available for 2 of the 112 indictees in our database (Jalil ibn Ameer 
Aziz and Imran Rabbani) and birth country for 4 confirmed US citizens (Ali Saleh, Robert Blake Jackson, Daniel Seth Franey and Darren 
Arness Jackson). However, contextual evidence suggests all six are American-born US citizens, and we have coded them as such.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Almost two-thirds were US citizens born in the US. In addition, about half of the non-US born individuals have 
become naturalised US citizens. This highlights that the main threat from ISIS within the US stems from our own 
citizens, not foreigners or refugees from the Middle East.
A typical example is Edward Archer, arrested for shooting and almost killing a police officer in Philadelphia after 
pledging allegiance to ISIS.16 A US-born citizen and lifelong US resident, Archer was radicalised not by travelling to 
Syria or Iraq, but by ISIS propaganda or by ISIS operatives via social media.
Only three of the 112 had refugee status at the time of their arrest. Two of the three are from Bosnia and have been 
in the US since 1999. None is a Syrian refugee. Aws Mohammad al-Jayab, a refugee from Iraq who arrived in the US 
in 2012, is the only recent refugee among the 112 cases. He travelled to Syria to fight with a group that would later 
join ISIS and was arrested upon returning to the US.17 That ISIS indictees are much more likely to be US-born citizens 
than in any other category means that radicalisation largely takes place inside the borders of the US.
Partners, not loners: nearly half were in a relationship
It’s commonly assumed that being married or otherwise in a relationship is incompatible with terrorism, which is 
why terrorists are expected to be loners.18 However, consistent with recent research, relationships are prominently 
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12 THE AMERICAN FACE OF ISIS: ANALYSIS OF ISIS-RELATED TERRORISM IN THE US MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2016 












Note: Based on 74 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
We have data on the relationship status for 74 (66%) of the 112 indictees (Figure 5). Of those, 42% were in some 
sort of relationship at the time of their arrest, and a significant number (24) were married. Only half were single 
and had never married. Even if we assume that all of the individuals for whom data on relationships was missing 
were single, the total in a relationship would still be 30%, suggesting that relationships aren’t a prominent factor 
in preventing individuals from supporting ISIS, particularly in relation to seeking to mount an attack in the US or 
facilitating support.
Figure 5:  Marriage: ISIS indictees vs. US average










* US average for ages 35–59.
Note: Based on 74 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database; US Census 2012.
In three cases, both partners in a relationship were indicted for their roles in a joint operation. For example, 
Jaelyn Young and Muhammad Dakhlalla, arrested on their way to a Mississippi airport in order to travel to Syria, 
were engaged at the time, and were seeking to travel together to live in the so-called Islamic State and aid ISIS.19 
Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, responsible for killing 14 in San Bernardino in December 2015 in an 
attack claimed by ISIS, were married and had a daughter. Overall, 65% of indictees were radicalised to support 
ISIS alongside like-minded others in some form of local group, including 13 with their spouses or extended 
family members.
In other cases, the indicted individual was married, but their partner wasn’t involved in illegal activity and may not 
even have been aware of it. Mediha Salkicevic, married with four children, was charged with transferring money 
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13MORE NORMAL THAN YOU THINK
didn’t prevent Salkicevic from actively supporting ISIS, even if having a large family may have made perpetrating an 
attack or travelling to Syria less likely.
The distribution of married indictees closely matches that of the US population as a whole. Overall, indictees are 
just as likely to be people in relationships and with other ties as average Americans. While surprising, the high 
percentage of married indictees is consistent with recent studies, especially for transnational terrorists.21
Almost two-thirds attended college, similar to national average
The educational status of indictees is quite similar to that of American society as a whole, indicating that support for 
ISIS is not explained by a lack of educational opportunities (Figure 6).














Note: Based on 72 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Of the 72 indicted individuals for whom educational status is known, 64% had completed some college or more 
(Figure 7), in line with the US average of 62% for the same age range as the indictees. In fact, the rate at which 
indictees attended college matches the national averages for specific age groups. The overwhelming majority of 
those with high school or some college attended secular institutions, which means they are not the product of 
religious educational institutions.
Figure 7:  Some higher education: indictees vs. US average, by age









** Averages some college rates for ages 35–54.
Note: Based on 72 cases.
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14 THE AMERICAN FACE OF ISIS: ANALYSIS OF ISIS-RELATED TERRORISM IN THE US MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2016 
All but one of the perpetrators of the San Bernardino attack, the attack on the convention centre in Garland, Texas, 
and the Pulse Nightclub attack had a university degree. The exception, one of the Garland attackers, had attended 
college but dropped out. An example of a more educated indictee is Mohammad Jamal Khweis, who travelled to 
Syria and joined ISIS after completing a degree in Administration of Justice from Northern Virginia Community 
College.22 Khweis illustrates the trend of people with numerous educational and career opportunities becoming 
radicalised. Overall, ISIS supporters in the US include people gaining an education and trying to further their 
prospects in a manner quite similar to the typical American their age.
Three-quarters had jobs or were students
As with education, the data suggests that unemployment wasn’t a deciding factor in motivating individuals in the US 
to perpetrate ISIS-related offences (Figure 8).








Note: Based on 90 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
ISIS indictees generally had occupations and worked regular jobs with regular hours. Seventy-seven per cent of 
individuals indicted either held a job or were students. For example, Nicholas Young, indicted for providing financial 
support to ISIS, had been steadily employed as a transit police officer for over 12 years in Washington DC at the time 
of his arrest.23 With stable employment and no reports of economic insecurity, Young doesn’t fit the stereotype of 
an unemployed and poor member of society with no opportunities beyond terrorism. Syed Farook, one of the two 
San Bernardino shooters, was employed as an environmental health specialist in the San Bernardino County Health 
Department, making US$53,000 per year.24 With a comfortable salary and no indication of financial problems, 
Farook too seems not to have been driven to terrorism by economic incentives or a lack of alternative options. In 
short, like average Americans, the indictees are mostly occupied in some way, either as wage-earning employees or 
as students.
Nearly one-third are recent converts to Islam
With one exception, all of the indictees were Muslims.25 However, 30% are recent converts to Islam, and some had 
converted a year or less prior to their arrest (Figure 9). These are individuals who don’t come from established 
Muslim communities, don’t have family or cultural ties to the Middle East, and are unlikely to have longstanding 
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Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Not surprisingly, the proportion of converts to Islam is highest among US-born citizens. Figure 10 shows the 
distribution of converts to Islam across the three citizenship groups.










Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Forty-three per cent of US-born citizens who perpetrated or were indicted for ISIS-related offences were converts 
to Islam. This further emphasises the appeal of ISIS to those outside the communities from which support for the 
group is typically most expected in the US.
This group is significant in size, and contains individuals from all offence types. James Gonzalo Medina, a New 
York-born offender of Hispanic descent, was arrested for attempting to detonate a bomb at a synagogue in Florida. 
He seemingly had no connection to Muslim communities before his conversion to Islam four years before his arrest, 
and even after that had very sparse contact.26 Christopher Lee Cornell, an Ohio-born US citizen arrested for buying 
weapons and ammunition for a planned attack, converted to Islam just six months before his arrest.27 Alexander 
Ciccolo, the Massachusetts-born son of a Boston police chief, converted to Islam in the year prior to his arrest on 
similar charges.28
The high prevalence of recent converts among indictees underscores the effectiveness of ISIS’s recruitment, and 
especially propaganda, in mobilising individuals without longstanding ties to Islam or the Middle East to either take 
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So far, our analysis has treated the 112 ISIS indictees as a group, and as a group they have more in common with 
average Americans than the standard profile of terrorists. However, we were able to go further than past reports and 
investigate whether the characteristics of indictees vary by different offence types. What makes someone choose 
to attack targets in the US in the name of ISIS, rather than travelling to fight for the group in Syria or assisting those 
wishing to attack or travel?
To answer those questions, we coded every individual in our dataset for one of three possible offence categories:
• Attackers: those conspiring to attack or having carried out an attack in the US
• Travellers: those conspiring to travel or having travelled to join ISIS in Syria
• Facilitators: those providing material aid to attackers or travellers with no evidence of intending to do either.
Offence type was assigned based on the best available evidence for a demonstrated willingness to attack, travel 
or facilitate, such as mounting or preparing to mount an attack, travelling or making preparations for travelling to 
Syria, or providing money or planning to assist others to attack or travel. Every indictee was coded with only a single 
offence type based on the strength of the evidence. 
Mohammad Badawi is an example of a facilitator. He was indicted for purchasing a one-way airline ticket for Nader 
Elhuzayel to aid Elhuzayel’s travel to Syria, but did not plan to travel or attack himself.
Attackers and travellers account for 82% of offenders and are roughly evenly split (Figure 11). Facilitators make up 
the smallest group, accounting for the remaining 18% of offenders.







Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
How does the profile of offenders vary by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics? Do they have different 
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17EXPLAINING DOMESTIC ATTACKERS, FACILITATORS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Travellers are younger; facilitators are older and include a higher proportion 
of females
At an average 25 years old, travellers are the youngest among the three types of offenders and, along with attackers, 
include the lowest proportion of females. Facilitators—those whose offence was to provide money and logistical 
support to others—are far more likely to be older (on average 31) and female than the other two categories. Indeed, 
women are twice as likely to be facilitators as either travellers or attackers (Figure 12).
















Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
This distribution makes sense: travelling to fight abroad and attacking at home are high risk and therefore more 
likely to appeal to younger males, while the decision to facilitate others in their offences poses a lower risk and is 
more likely to appeal to older and more established individuals, who are also more likely to have the resources to 
help finance the activities of others.
Attackers most likely to be in a relationship
The data shows that 53% of attackers—those indicted for attacking or conspiring to attack targets in the US—
were in a longstanding relationship (Figure 13). This is surprising because relationships, through attachments 
and responsibility, are commonly assumed to mitigate egoistic motivations for terrorism.29 The high proportion 
of relationships among attackers further underscores the divergence between the stereotypical terrorist and 
ISIS indictees.










Note: Based on 74 cases.
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18 THE AMERICAN FACE OF ISIS: ANALYSIS OF ISIS-RELATED TERRORISM IN THE US MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2016 
In contrast to the profile of attackers, the relationship patterns of travellers and facilitators are consistent with 
expectations. Travellers are the least likely to be in a relationship (about half as likely as attackers or facilitators). 
Travellers are younger and therefore less likely to be in long-term relationships, especially marriage. Moreover, 
being in a relationship could complicate travelling to Syria, which requires the individual to leave their old life and 
relationships behind. Facilitators are older and more likely (50%) to be in an established relationship.
Education and employment don’t matter
One might expect education and employment to differ based on offence type, particularly given the differences in 
average age. However, while the data shows some differences, they are typically minor, and without a strong pattern 
(Figure 14).











Note: Based on 72 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Overall, attackers, travellers and facilitators attended college or other higher education at roughly similar rates. 
Attackers are less likely than facilitators and travellers to have attended some college, but at 14% the difference is 
small. Despite being a much younger group, 67% of travellers had attended at least some college, implying that they 
were not without connections and opportunities in the US prior to their decision to leave for Syria.
Employment, like relationship status, does not differ substantially across offence types (Figure 15).









Note: Based on 90 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Overall, attackers, travellers and facilitators attended college or other 
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19EXPLAINING DOMESTIC ATTACKERS, FACILITATORS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Attackers and travellers are nearly equally likely to be unemployed, and roughly a quarter of each group were 
jobless at the time of arrest. Facilitators were half as likely to be unemployed: 13% were not students or holding a 
job. Higher rates of employment among facilitators is consistent with the fact that providing money and logistical 
support requires income. Facilitators are also more likely to be foreign-born, and immigration to the US generally 
requires one to have good prospects of getting a job. Finally, the facilitator role is the easiest role to have alongside a 
job (and a family, etc.), increasing the likelihood that people with jobs seeking to support ISIS do so as facilitators.
Most attackers are recent converts to Islam
The most striking finding in our analysis of offence types is that attackers are much more likely than facilitators or 
travellers to be recent converts to Islam (Figure 16).











Note: Based on 112 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
While recent converts to Islam make up 30% of all indictees, they make up 51% of attackers. The percentage of 
converts among attackers is between two and five times higher than that of converts among facilitators and 
travellers. The high proportion of converts among attackers is the effect of deliberate choice. Sixty-eight per cent of 
converts chose to attack in the US rather than travelling to Syria or aiding others in ISIS-related offences (Figure 17).







Note: Based on 73 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
What explains this pattern? Converts may be more likely to adopt the attacker role due to a lack of personal and 
cultural connections to the Middle East, which would make it harder to establish the networks needed to be a 
facilitator and make it less desirable to travel and live within the Islamic State.
The relatively high number of recent converts among attackers, including in a number of cases a lack of contact 
with established Muslim communities and mosques before or after conversion, suggests that conversion may have 
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VIDEOS PLAY A 
MAJOR ROLE
ISIS is well known for its use of high-quality video propaganda to entice individuals and supporters to join it in 
Iraq and Syria or attack enemies of the group abroad. While al-Qaeda and other groups have disseminated videos 
over the internet, none rivals ISIS in the quality and quantity of the videos. Because the content of these videos is 
frequently sensationalistic in its brutality (for example, showing the beheading of foreign hostages), they are widely 
viewed and shared among sympathisers and the curious alike. As a result, knowledge of ISIS videos and exposure to 
them is widespread, including in the US.
The CPOST ISIS Indictee Database has data on propaganda consumption for 87 of the 112 indictees. Eighty-four per 
cent of those indictees watched extremist propaganda videos, chiefly those produced by ISIS (Figure 18).





86% ISIS 53% Executions
Videos Watched
37% Awlaki
Note: Based on 87 cases, in which data on specific videos was available for 59.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database.
Eighty-six per cent of the 59 video watchers for whom data on specific videos was available specifically mentioned 
ISIS videos. ISIS has produced many hundreds of videos since it declared a caliphate in Iraq and Syria in July 2014, 
including recruitment videos targeting Western audiences and specific appeals to sympathisers in the West to attack 
targets where they live. Fifty-three per cent reported watching execution videos, including the video showing the 
group’s execution of a captured Jordanian fighter pilot. While many who watched executions were attracted by the 
violence that the videos depicted, others, such as Hamza Naj Ahmed, testified that although he watched execution 
videos, he was more affected by videos that showed ISIS ‘helping the innocent people’.30 
Six indictees specifically identified the ISIS video ‘Flames of War’, released in response to the start of the US-led air 
campaign against the group in September 2014 and one of the earliest videos to achieve the high production quality 
for which ISIS has become infamous. In addition to videos made by ISIS, 37% reported watching video versions of 
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21VIDEOS PLAY A MAJOR ROLE
in the militant group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Shannon Maureen Conley ‘left behind a pile of Awlaki 
DVDs’ when she attempted to travel, and Munther Omar Saleh said he watched ‘almost all of [al-Awlaki’s] lectures’. 
31Awlaki was killed by a US drone strike in 2011, but his lectures on Islam and jihad remain popular among Islamists.
Travellers are most likely to have watched some sort of propaganda video: more than nine in ten have done so 
(Figure 19). Evidence suggests that propaganda videos have played an important role in radicalisation for all offence 
types, as more than three-quarters of attackers and facilitators have viewed them as well. The vital trend is that all 
offenders, regardless of role, are highly likely to have watched propaganda videos (Figure 20). ISIS videos seem to be 
highly effective in at least speeding up radicalisation and encouraging people to act on their beliefs. ISIS’s effective 
use of the internet for propaganda purposes has increased the rate at which it’s able to attract active supporters, 
especially outside of its area of territorial control, compared to other groups, past and present.










Not video watcherVideo watcher
Note: Based on 87 cases.
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database. 
Figure 20:  The average ISIS indictee
• Male 89%
• Average 27 years
• US citizen 83% (by birth 64%)
• Some higher education 62%
• Employed or studying 77%
• Known convert 30%
• No history of mental illness 86%
• Radicalised in group 65%
• Traveller or attacker 82%
• Watched propaganda videos 86%
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A NEW BREED: 
COMPARING ISIS TO 
AL-QAEDA INDICTEES
To get a better sense of the characteristics of ISIS indictees, we compared them with individuals who committed or 
were indicted for conspiring to commit offences in the US on behalf of al-Qaeda.
Table 1 compares key demographic and socioeconomic factors between the 112 ISIS indictees in the CPOST ISIS 
Indictee Database and the 171 individuals indicted for al-Qaeda-related offences between 1997 and 2011 profiled by 
Robin Symcox and Emily Dyer of the Henry Jackson Society in 2013.32
Table 1:  Comparison of ISIS and al-Qaeda indictees
Variables ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS indictees …
Average age 27 years 30 years are younger
% Female 11% 5% are more likely to be women
% Some college 64% 65% have the same education
% Unemployed 23% 31% are less likely to be unemployed
% Converts 30% 23% are more likely to be converts
% US citizens 82% 55% are far more likely to be US citizens
Source: CPOST ISIS Indictee Database; Symcox and Dyer 2013.
The most striking finding is ISIS’s higher rate of mobilisation in the US: it recruits almost four times as many 
individuals as al-Qaeda per year (an average of 45 per year for ISIS, compared to 12 per year for al-Qaeda).
Compared to al-Qaeda indictees, ISIS indictees are much closer demographically to the average American. Most 
strikingly, 82% of ISIS indictees are US citizens, compared to just 55% of al-Qaeda indictees. In addition, ISIS 
indictees are more likely to be employed, bringing them closer to the average American than al-Qaeda indictees. 
The higher proportion of converts to Islam among ISIS indictees implies that ISIS is more effective at radicalising 
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The video giant’s recent travails underscore a basic question: How “neutral” should
social-media platforms try to be?
By Neima Jahromi
July 8, 2019
arlier this year, executives at YouTube began mulling, once again, the problem of online
speech. On grounds of freedom of expression and ideological neutrality, the platform has long
allowed users to upload videos endorsing noxious ideas, from conspiracy theories to neo-Nazism.
Now it wanted to reverse course. “There are no sacred cows,” Susan Wojcicki, the C.E.O. of
YouTube, reportedly told her team. Wojcicki had two competing goals: she wanted to avoid
accusations of ideological bias while also affirming her company’s values. In the course of the spring,
YouTube drafted a new policy that would ban videos trafficking in historical “denialism” (of the
Holocaust, 9/11, Sandy Hook) and “supremacist” views (lauding the “white race,” arguing that men
were intellectually superior to women). YouTube planned to roll out its new policy as early as June. In
May, meanwhile, it started preparing for Pride Month, turning its red logo rainbow-colored and
promoting popular L.G.B.T.Q. video producers on Instagram.
Susan Wojcicki, the C.E.O. of YouTube. The company is facing profound technical, social, and political
challenges in moderating its own system. Photograph by Peter Prato / NYT / Redux
On May 30th, Carlos Maza, a media critic at Vox, upended these efforts. In a Twitter thread that
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quickly went viral, Maza argued that the company’s publicity campaign belied its lax enforcement of
the content and harassment policies it had already put in place. Maza posted a video supercut of
bigoted insults that he’d received from Steven Crowder, a conservative comedian with nearly four
million YouTube followers; the insults focussed on Maza’s ethnicity and sexual orientation. When
Crowder mentioned Maza in a video, his fans piled on; last year, Maza’s cell phone was bombarded
with hundreds of texts from different numbers which read “debate steven crowder.” Maza said that
he’d reported the behavior to YouTube’s content moderators numerous times, and that they had done
nothing.
On Twitter and his YouTube channel, Crowder insisted that, in labelling Maza a “lispy queer” and a
“token Vox gay-athiest sprite,” he had been trying to be funny. Maza’s supporters, meanwhile, shared
screenshots of ads that had run before Crowder’s videos, suggesting that, because YouTube offers
popular video producers a cut of ad revenue, the company had implicitly condoned Crowder’s
messages. YouTube said it would investigate. A week later, it tweeted that Crowder hadn’t violated its
community guidelines in any of the videos that Maza highlighted. The next day, it announced its
new policy, which included a warning that the company would no longer share ad revenue with
YouTubers who repeatedly brushed up against its rules. Then it announced that Crowder would be
cut off from the platform’s ad dollars.
The news made no one happy. Maza said that he wanted Crowder’s channel removed completely;
conservatives, including the Republican senator Ted Cruz, complained about censorship. YouTube
employees, siding with Maza, began denouncing their bosses on Twitter and in the press. “It’s a
classic move from a comms playbook,” Micah Schaffer, a technology adviser who wrote YouTube’s
rst community guidelines, told me. “Like, ‘Hey, can we move up that launch to change the news
cycle?’ Instead, it made it worse. It combined into a Voltron of bad news.” (A YouTube spokesperson
said that the launch date was not in response to any individual event.) Former colleagues deluged
Schaffer, who had left the company in 2009, with bewildered e-mails and texts. (A typical subject
line: “WTF is Going on at YouTube?”) Sitting in a dentist’s office, he started typing a response on
his phone, trying to lay out what he thought had gone wrong at the company.
Schaffer told me that hate speech had been a problem on YouTube since its earliest days. Dealing
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P
with it used to be fairly straightforward. YouTube was founded, in 2005, by Chad Hurley, Steve
Chen, and Jawed Karim, who met while working at PayPal. At rst, the site was moderated largely
by its co-founders; in 2006, they hired a single, part-time moderator. The company removed videos
often, rarely encountering pushback. In the intervening thirteen years, a lot has changed. “YouTube
has the scale of the entire Internet,” Sundar Pichai, the C.E.O. of Google, which owns YouTube,
told Axios last month. The site now attracts a monthly audience of two billion people and employs
thousands of moderators. Every minute, its users upload ve hundred hours of new video. The
technical, social, and political challenges of moderating such a system are profound. They raise
fundamental questions not just about YouTube’s business but about what social-media platforms have
become and what they should be.
erhaps because of the vast scale at which most social platforms operate, proposed solutions to
the problem of online hate speech tend to be technical in nature. In theory, a platform might
ne-tune its algorithms to deëmphasize hate speech and conspiracy theories. But, in practice, this is
harder than it sounds. Some overtly hateful users may employ language and symbols that clearly
violate a site’s community guidelines—but so called borderline content, which dances at the edge of
provocation, is harder to detect and draws a broad audience. Machine-learning systems struggle to
tell the difference between actual hate speech and content that describes or contests it. (After
YouTube announced its new policies, the Southern Poverty Law Center complained that one of its
videos, which was meant to document hate speech, had been taken down.) Some automated systems
use metadata—information about how often a user posts, or about the number of comments that a
post gets in a short period of time—to ag toxic content without trying to interpret it. But this sort
of analysis is limited by the way that content bounces between platforms, obscuring the full range of
interactions it has provoked.
Tech companies have hired thousands of human moderators to make nuanced decisions about
speech. YouTube also relies on anonymous outside “raters” to evaluate videos and help train its
recommendations systems. But the ood of questionable posts is overwhelming, and sifting through
it can take a psychological toll. Earlier this year, YouTube described its efforts to draw more heavily
on user feedback—survey responses, likes and dislikes—to help identify “quality” videos. And yet, in
a 2016 white paper, the company’s own engineers wrote that such metrics aren’t very useful; the
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T
problem is that, for many videos, “explicit feedback is extremely sparse” compared to “implicit”
signals, such as what users click on or how long they watch a video. Teen-agers, in particular, who
use YouTube more than any other kind of social media, often respond to surveys in mischievous
ways.
Business challenges compound the technical ones. In a broad sense, any algorithmic change that
dampens user engagement could work against YouTube’s business model. Net ix, which is YouTube’s
chief rival in online video, can keep subscribers streaming by licensing or crafting addictive content;
YouTube, by contrast, relies on user-generated clips, strung together by an automated
recommendation engine. Programmers are always tweaking the system and the company is reluctant
to disclose details. Still, a 2018 white paper outlined the general principle at that time: once someone
starts watching a video, the engine is designed to “dig into a topic more deeply,” luring the viewer
down the proverbial rabbit hole. Many outside researchers argue that this system, which helped drive
YouTube’s engagement growth, also ampli ed hate speech and conspiracy theories on the platform.
As the engine dug deeper, it risked making unsavory suggestions: unearth enough videos about the
moon landing and some of them may argue that it was faked.
Francesca Tripodi, a media scholar at James Madison University, has studied how right-wing
conspiracy theorists perpetuate false ideas online. Essentially, they nd un lled rabbit holes and then
create content to ll them. “When there is limited or no metadata matching a particular topic,” she
told a Senate committee in April, “it is easy to coördinate around keywords to guarantee the kind of
information Google will return.” Political provocateurs can take advantage of data vacuums to
increase the likelihood that legitimate news clips will be followed by their videos. And, because
controversial or outlandish videos tend to be riveting, even for those who dislike them, they can
register as “engaging” to a recommendation system, which would surface them more often. The
many automated systems within a social platform can be co-opted and made to work at cross
purposes.
echnological solutions are appealing, in part, because they are relatively unobtrusive.
Programmers like the idea of solving thorny problems elegantly, behind the scenes. For users,
meanwhile, the value of social-media platforms lies partly in their appearance of democratic
openness. It’s nice to imagine that the content is made by the people, for the people, and that














Case: 18-17192, 06/22/2021, ID: 12150326, DktEntry: 64-2, Page 69 of 84
Add. 236
: - , 8/03/ , I : 91 05, t tr : 71, Page 263 of 279
6/15/2021 The Fight for the Future of YouTube | The New Yorker
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-fight-for-the-future-of-youtube 5/15
popularity ows from the grass roots.
In fact, the apparent democratic neutrality of social-media platforms has always been shaped by
algorithms and managers. In its early days, YouTube staffers often cultivated popularity by hand,
choosing trending videos to highlight on its home page; if the site gave a leg up to a promising
YouTuber, that YouTuber’s audience grew. By spotlighting its most appealing users, the platform
attracted new ones. It also shaped its identity: by featuring some kinds of content more than others,
the company showed YouTubers what kind of videos it was willing to boost. “They had to be super
family friendly, not copyright-infringing, and, at the same time, compelling,” Schaffer recalled, of the
highlighted videos.
Today, YouTube employs scores of “partner managers,” who actively court and promote celebrities,
musicians, and gamers—meeting with individual video producers to answer questions about how
they can reach bigger audiences, giving them early access to new platform features, and inviting them
to workshops where they can network with other successful YouTubers. Since 2016, meanwhile, it
has begun paying socially conscious YouTubers to create videos about politically charged subjects,
through a program called Creators for Change. “In this instance, it’s a social-impact group,” Paul
Marvucic, a YouTube marketing manager, explained. “We’re saying, ‘We really believe in what you
guys are saying, and it’s very core to our values.’ ”
The question of YouTube’s values—what they are, whether it should have them, how it should
uphold them—is fraught. In December of last year, Sundar Pichai, the C.E.O. of Google, went
before Congress and faced questions about social media’s in uence on politics. Democrats
complained that YouTube videos promoted white supremacy and right-wing extremism;
Republicans, in turn, worried that the site might be “biased” against them, and that innocent videos
might be labelled as hate speech merely for containing conservative views. “It’s really important to
me that we approach our work in an unbiased way,” Pichai said.
And yet the Creators for Change program requires YouTube to embrace certain kinds of ideological
commitments. This past fall, for an audience of high-school and college students, YouTube staged a
Creators for Change event in the Economic and Social Council chamber at the United Nations. The
occasion marked the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ve
“ambassadors” from the program joined Craig Mokhiber, the director of the New York office of the
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U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, onstage. “The U.N. is not just a conference center that
convenes to hear any perspective offered by any person on any issue,” Mokhiber said. Instead, he
argued, it represents one side in a con ict of ideas. In one corner are universal rights to housing,
health care, education, food, and safety; in the other are the ideologies espoused by Islamophobes,
homophobes, anti-Semites, sexists, ethno-nationalists, white supremacists, and neo-Nazis. In his
view, YouTube needed to pick a side. He urged the YouTubers onstage to take the ideals represented
by the U.N. and “amplify” them in their videos. “We’re in the middle of a struggle that will
determine, in our lifetime, whether human dignity will be advanced or crushed, for us and for future
generations,” he said.
Last year, YouTube paid forty-seven ambassadors to produce socially conscious videos and attend
workshops. The program’s budget, of around ve million dollars—it also helps fund school programs
designed to improve students’ critical-thinking skills when they are confronted with emotionally
charged videos—is a tiny sum compared to the hundreds of millions that the company reportedly
spends on YouTube Originals, its entertainment-production arm. Still, one YouTube representative
told me, “We saw hundreds of millions of views on ambassadors’ videos last year—hundreds of
thousands of hours of watch time.” Most people encountered the Creators for Change clips as
automated advertisements before other videos.
The Mumbai-based comedian Prajakta Koli, known on YouTube as MostlySane, sat beside
Mokhiber in the U.N. chamber. Around four million people follow her channel. Her videos usually
riff on the irritating people whom she encounters in her college cafeteria or on the pitfalls of dating
foreigners. “No Offence,” a music video that she screened at the Creators for Change event, is
different. As it begins, Koli slouches in her pajamas on the couch, watching a homophobe, a
misogynist, and an Internet troll—all played by her—rant on ctional news shows. A minute later,
she dons boxing gloves and takes on each of them in a rap battle. After the screening, Koli said that
she had already begun taking on weighty subjects, such as divorce and body shaming, on her own.
But it helped that YouTube had footed the production and marketing costs for “No Offence,” which
were substantial. The video is now her most watched, with twelve million views.
On a channel called AsapScience, Gregory Brown, a former high-school teacher, and his boyfriend,
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Mitchell Moffit, make animated clips about science that affects their viewers’ everyday lives; their
most successful videos address topics such as the science of coffee or masturbation. They used their
Creators for Change dollars to produce a video about the scienti cally measurable effects of racism,
featuring the Black Lives Matter activist DeRay Mckesson. While the average AsapScience video
takes a week to make, the video about racism had taken seven or eight months: the level of bad faith
and misinformation surrounding the topic, Brown said, demanded extra precision. “You need to
explain the study, explain the parameters, and explain the result so that people can’t argue against it,”
he said. “And that doesn’t make the video as interesting, and that’s a challenge.” (Toxic content
proliferates, in part, because it is comparatively easy and cheap to make; it can shirk the burden of
being true.)
YouTube hopes that Creators for Change will have a role-model effect. The virality of YouTube
videos has long been driven by imitation: in the site’s early days, clips such as “Crazy frog brothers”
and “David After Dentist” led fans and parodists to reënact their every move. When it comes to
political videos, imitation has cut both ways. The perceived popularity of conspiracy videos may have
led some YouTubers to make similar clips; conversely, many Creators for Change ambassadors cite
other progressive YouTubers as inspirations. (Prajakta Koli based her sketches on those of Lilly
Singh, a sketch-comedy YouTuber who has also spoken at the United Nations.) In theory, even just
broadcasting the idea that YouTube will reward social-justice content with production dollars and
free marketing might encourage a proliferation of videos that denounce hate speech.
And yet, on a platform like YouTube, there are reasons to be skeptical about the potential of what
experts call “counterspeech.” Libby Hemphill, a computer-science professor at the University of
Michigan’s Center for Social Media Responsibility, studies how different kinds of conversations,
from politics to TV criticism, unfold across social media; she also prototypes A.I. tools for rooting
out toxic content. “If we frame hate speech or toxicity as a free-speech issue, then the answer is often
counterspeech,” she explained. (A misleading video about race and science might be “countered” by
the video made by AsapScience.) But, to be effective, counterspeech must be heard.
“Recommendation engines don’t just surface content that they think we’ll want to engage with—they
also actively hide content that is not what we have actively sought,” Hemphill said. “Our incidental
exposure to stuff that we don’t know that we should see is really low.” It may not be enough, in short,
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to sponsor good content; people who don’t go looking for it must see it.
Theoretically, YouTube could ght hate speech by engineering a point-counterpoint dynamic. In
recent years, the platform has applied this technique to speech about terrorism, using the “Redirect
Method”: moderators have removed terrorist-recruitment videos while redirecting those who search
for them to antiterror and anti-extremist clips. (YouTube doesn’t pay people to create the antiterror
videos, but it does handpick them.) A YouTube representative told me that it has no plans to redirect
someone who searches for a men’s-rights rant, say, to its Creators for Change–sponsored feminist
reply. Perhaps the company worries that treating misogynists the way that it treats  would shatter
the illusion that it has cultivated an unbiased marketplace of ideas.
ne way to make counterspeech more effective is to dampen the speech that it aims to counter.
In March, after a video of a white-supremacist mass shooting at a mosque in Christchurch,
New Zealand, went viral, Hunter Walk, a former YouTube executive, tweeted that the company
should protect “freedom of speech” but not “freedom of reach.” He suggested that YouTube could
suppress toxic videos by delisting them as candidates for its recommendation engine—in essence, he
wrote, this would “shadowban” them. (Shadow-banning is so-called because a user might not know
that his reach has been curtailed, and because the ban effectively pushes undesirable users into the
“shadows” of an online space.) Ideally, people who make such shadow-banned videos could grow
frustrated by their limited audiences and change their ways; videos, Walk explained, could be
shadow-banned if they were linked to by a signi cant number of far-right Web havens, such as
8chan and Gab. (Walk’s tweets, which are set to auto-delete, have since disappeared.)
Shadow-banning is an age-old moderation tool: the owners of Internet discussion forums have long
used it to keep spammers and harassers from bothering other users. On big social-media platforms,
however, this kind of moderation doesn’t necessarily focus on individuals; instead, it affects the way
that different kinds of content surface algorithmically. YouTube has published a lengthy list of
guidelines that its army of raters can use to give some types of content—clips that contain “extreme
gore or violence, without a bene cial purpose,” for example, or that advocate hateful ideas expressed
in an “emotional,” “polite,” or even “academic-sounding” way—a low rating. YouTube’s A.I. learns
from the ratings to make objectionable videos less likely to appear in its automated
recommendations. Individual users won’t necessarily know how their videos have been affected. The
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ambiguities generated by this system have led some to argue that political shadow-banning is taking
place. President Trump and congressional Republicans, in particular, are alarmed by the idea that
some version of the practice could be widely employed against conservatives. In April, Ted Cruz held
a Senate subcommittee hearing called “Sti ing Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the
Public Discourse.” In his remarks, he threatened the platforms with regulation; he also brought in
witnesses who accused them of liberal bias. (YouTube denies that its raters evaluate recommendations
along political lines, and most experts agree that there is no evidence for such a bias.)
Among Cruz’s guests was Eugene Kontorovich, a law professor at George Mason University. In his
testimony, Kontorovich pondered whether regulation could, in fact, address the issue of bias on
search or social platforms. “Actually enforcing ideological neutrality would itself raise First
Amendment questions,” he said. Instead, he argued, the best way to address issues of potential bias
was with transparency. A technique like shadow-banning might be effective, but it would also stoke
paranoia. From this perspective, the clarity of the Creators for Change program adds to its appeal: its
videos are prominently labelled.
Engineers at YouTube and other companies are hesitant to detail their algorithmic tweaks for many
reasons; among them is the fact that obscure algorithms are harder to exploit. But Serge Abiteboul, a
computer-science professor who was tasked by the French government to advise legislators on online
hate speech, argues that veri able solutions are preferable to hidden ones. YouTube has claimed that,
since tweaking its systems in January, it has reduced the number of views for recommended videos
containing borderline content and harmful misinformation by half. Without transparency and
oversight, however, it’s impossible for independent observers to con rm that drop. “Any supervision
that’s accepted by society would be better than regulation done in an opaque manner, by the
platforms, themselves, alone,” Abiteboul said.
ooking back over the history of YouTube, Micah Schaffer thinks he can see where the
company made mistakes. Before YouTube, he had worked at a Web site that showcased
shocking videos and images—gruesome accidents, medical deformities. There he saw how such
material can attract a niche of avid users while alienating many others. “Bikinis and Nazism have a
chilling effect,” he said. YouTube sought to distinguish itself by highlighting more broadly appealing
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themselves.
The company featured videos it liked, banned others outright, and kept borderline videos off the
home page. Still, it allowed some toxic speech to lurk in the corners. “We thought, if you just
quarantine the borderline stuff, it doesn’t spill over to the decent people,” he recalled. “And, even if it
did, it seemed like there were enough people who would just immediately recognize it was wrong,
and it would be O.K.” The events of the past few years have convinced Schaffer that this was an
error. The increasing efficiency of the recommendation system drew toxic content into the light in
ways that YouTube’s early policymakers hadn’t anticipated. In the end, borderline content changed
the tenor and effect of the platform as a whole. “Our underlying premises were awed,” Schaffer
said. “We don’t need YouTube to tell us these people exist. And counterspeech is not a fair burden.
Bullshit is in nitely more difficult to combat than it is to spread. YouTube should have course-
corrected a long time ago.”
Some experts point out that algorithmic tweaks and counterspeech don’t change the basic structure of
YouTube—a structure that encourages the mass uploading of videos from unvetted sources. It’s
possible that this structure is fundamentally incompatible with a healthy civic discourse. “It’s not that
Jesus came down and said, ‘You must suck up ve hundred hours of content per minute, every day,’ ”
Sarah T. Roberts, an expert on commercial content moderation at the University of California, Los
Angeles, said. “That’s something that they came up with, that they facilitated. We’re inside the
parameters of the potentials and possibilities that have been meted out in the architecture and in the
economics of these platforms. It’s only been a decade and a half, at most, and it’s so second nature.”
YouTube has denied that rabbit holes leading toward radicalization exist on its platform; it also says
that, despite what researchers claim, “extreme” videos are not more engaging or algorithmically
favored. At the same time, the company has said that it has tuned its recommendation systems to
redirect users who search for borderline content about breaking news toward more authoritative
sources. (What counts as “authoritative” among mainstream outlets such as Fox News and CNN is
itself a sticking point.) As the Times reported, in a recent article about the apparent power of alt-
right YouTubers, the company also appears to have tweaked its recommendation system to push users
to watch videos on new and varied subjects. (In theory, helping viewers nd new interests will keep
them engaged in the long run.) Recently, it also announced that it would give greater control over
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recommendations to its users, who will now be able to more easily prevent individual YouTube
channels from popping up among their suggested videos.
There are commercial reasons, it turns out, for ghting hate speech: according to a survey by the
Anti-Defamation League, fty-three per cent of Americans reported experiencing online hate or
harassment in 2018—rates of bigoted harassment were highest among people who identi ed as
L.G.B.T.Q.—and, in response, many spent less time online or deleted their apps. A study released
last year, by Google and Stanford University, identi ed toxic speech as a “rude, disrespectful, or
unreasonable comment that is likely to make you leave a discussion.” As part of the Creators for
Change program, YouTube has drawn up lesson plans for teachers which encourage students to “use
video to nd your voice and bring people together.” Teen-agers posting videos disputing toxic ideas
are engaged users, too.
I asked YouTube’s representatives why they didn’t use the Redirect Method to serve Creators for
Change videos to people who search for hate speech. If they valued what their ambassadors had to
say, why wouldn’t they disseminate those messages as effectively as possible? A representative
explained that YouTube doesn’t want to “pick winners.” I brought that message back to Libby
Hemphill, the computer-science professor. “I wish they would recognize that they already do pick
winners,” she said. “Algorithms make decisions we teach them to make, even deep-learning
algorithms. They should pick different winners on purpose.” Schaffer suggested that YouTube’s
insistence on the appearance of neutrality is “a kind of Stockholm syndrome. I think they’re afraid of
upsetting their big creators, and it has interfered with their ability to be aggressive about
implementing their values.”
The Creators for Change program is open about its bias and, in that respect, suggests a different way
of thinking about our social platforms. Instead of aspiring, unrealistically, to make them value-neutral
meeting places—worldwide coffee shops, streaming town squares—we could see them as forums
analogous to the United Nations: arenas for discussion and negotiation that have also committed to
agreed-upon principles of human dignity and universal rights. The U.N., too, has cultivated celebrity
“ambassadors,” such as David Beckham, Jackie Chan, and Angelina Jolie. Together, they promote a
vision of the world not merely as it is—a messy place full of violence and oppression—but as we
might like it to be. Perhaps this way of conceptualizing social platforms better re ects the scale of the
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in uence they wield.
After YouTube removed ads from Steven Crowder’s channel, he gathered his co-hosts and his lawyer
and started a live stream—also on YouTube—to respond. YouTube could keep their money, he said,
so long as he could “keep the reach” of his four million followers. (That reach draws in money from
fans, who buy merchandise, and sponsors.) Crowder also claimed that YouTube’s partner managers
had courted him years ago, saying that they wanted more conservative voices on the platform. He
went on, “If they said, ‘Listen, we’ve changed our minds, you cannot say anything that offends
anybody and we don’t want conservatives here’—you know what? I’d walk off into the sunset.”
Almost certainly, this claim is a bluff. “YouTube has a complete monopoly on video hosting, and they
know it,” Lindz Amer, a queer and nonbinary YouTuber, told the Guardian, after the controversy
with Carlos Maza. When Amer tried to leave YouTube for another platform, Vimeo, their average
audience size went from a hundred thousand views per video to ve.
Recently, Gregory Brown, of AsapScience, also expressed his disappointment with the company.
“We opened ourselves up to unbelievable hate after coming out on @YouTube,” he wrote, on Twitter,
of his relationship with his co-host, Moffit. “But we ignore it, because we love educating people
about science on the platform.” When I spoke to him a few days later, he told me that he was “trying
to be as empathetic to YouTube as possible—which, at times, is in con ict with what I really feel.” It
hurt to know that it was possible to “make money, right now, on YouTube, by being homophobic.”
But Brown also said that he recognized the complexity created by YouTube’s global reach. “YouTube
is trying to moderate and keep their values while trying to make money off, literally, the entire
world,” he said. At the same time, he continued, “Being able to educate people on this huge scale is
so important to me. I still feel that YouTube is the best place to do it.”
Steve Chen, the YouTube co-founder, recalled the platform’s early days, when he often intervened to
highlight videos that could only be found on YouTube and that the algorithm might not pick up. He
might place amateur footage of the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina, or documentation of
a racist attack at a bus stop in Hong Kong, on the home page. “I remember a video that only had
twenty- ve views,” he told me. “I said, ‘There’s no way that this piece of content from some
photographer in Africa would ever be viewed from around the world without YouTube, so I’m going
to feature this.’ ” Creators for Change, he explained, sounded like a “more evolved version of what I
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was trying to do on the home page—trying to showcase, encourage, and educate users that this is the
kind of content that we want on YouTube.” But the technological developments that have made the
platform’s global reach possible have also made such efforts more difficult. “Regardless of the
proportions or numbers of great content that YouTube wants on the site, it’s the way the algorithm
works,” he said. “If you’re watching this type of content, what are the twenty other pieces of content,
among the billions, that you’re going to like most? It probably won’t be choosing out of the blue.”
Chen, who left YouTube a decade ago, told me that he doesn’t envy the people who have to decide
how the system should work. “To be honest, I kind of congratulate myself that I’m no longer with
the company, because I wouldn’t know how to deal with it,” he said.
Brown, for his part, wanted the platform to choose a point of view. But, he told me, “If they make
decisions about who they’re going to prop up in the algorithm, and make it more clear, I think they
would lose money. I think they might lose power.” He paused. “That’s a big test for these companies
right now. How are they going to go down in history?”
This article has been updated to include a comment from YouTube regarding the timing of the company's
hate-speech-policy rollout.
Neima Jahromi is a member of The New Yorker’s editorial staff.
More: YouTube Social Media Hate Speech Technology
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Why Do So Many Americans Think the Election Was Stolen?




There have been few surprises this past month in how Donald Trump has dealt with the
reality of his electoral defeat.
Anyone familiar with his career could have predicted that he would claim to have been
cheated out of victory. Anyone watching how he wielded power (or, more often, didn’t) as
president could have predicted that his efforts to challenge the election results would be
embarrassing, ridiculous and dismissed with prejudice in court. And anyone watching how
the Republican Party dealt with his ascent could have predicted that its leaders would
mostly avoid directly rebuking him, relying instead on the inertial forces of American
democracy, the conscientiousness of judges and local officialdom, and Trump’s own
incompetence to turn back his final power grab.
So far, so predictable. But speaking as a cynical observer of the Trump era, one feature of
November did crack my jaded shell a bit: not his behavior or the system’s response, but the
sheer scale of the belief among conservatives that the election was really stolen, measured
not just in polling data but in conversations and arguments, online and in person, with
people I would not have expected to embrace it.
The potency of this belief has already scrambled some of the conventional explanations for
conspiratorial beliefs, particularly the conceit that the key problem is misinformation
spreading downward from partisan news outlets and social-media fraudsters to the easily
deceived. As I watch the way certain fraud theories spread online, or watch conservatives
abandon Fox News for Newsmax in search of validating narratives, it’s clear that this is
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evidence, a lot of so-called disinformation is collected and circulated sincerely rather than
cynically, and the power of various authorities — Tucker Carlson’s show or Facebook’s
algorithm — to change beliefs is relatively limited.
But what has struck me, especially, is how the belief in a stolen election has spread among
people I wouldn’t have thought of as particularly Trumpy or super-partisan, who aren’t
cable news junkies or intensely online, who didn’t even seem that invested in the election
before it happened.
Others have taken note of the same phenomenon: At National Review, Michael Brendan
Dougherty writes that “friends who I did not know were political are sending me little
snippets of allegations of voter fraud and manipulation.” At The American Mind, the
pseudonymous Californian Peachy Keenan describes watching a passel of lukewarm
Trump-supporter moms in her Catholic parish suddenly “get MAGAfied” by election
conspiracy theories. (As a fraud believer herself, she thinks that’s a good thing.)
Drawn from my conversations in the past few weeks, here’s an attempt at a taxonomy of
these unlikely seeming fraud believers.
The conspiracy-curious normie
I say “normie” to reflect the reality that being open to the possibility of conspiracies is itself
extremely normal and commonplace. There is nothing unusual, statistically speaking, about
believing that a Cold War-era deep state assassinated John F. Kennedy or that the
government is concealing evidence of U.F.O.s. Conspiracy theories are common among
Democrats as well as Republicans: Witness the polling on Russia’s supposed tampering
with vote totals in 2016 or George W. Bush’s supposed foreknowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks;
recall the voting-machine theory spun to explain John Kerry’s narrow defeat in 2004.
This means you don’t need a complex story about Facebook or Fox News to understand why
a person who isn’t intensely political might nonetheless be open to the idea that an election
settled by tens of thousands of votes in a few key states was actually fixed for the winner.
That kind of openness is just human nature — and not the worst part of human nature,
either, given that conspiracies and cover-ups exist (the military really has been hiding weird
evidence of U.F.O.s!) and even wrongheaded theories often partake of a reasonable
skepticism about elite malfeasance, from the Gulf of Tonkin era to the Jeffrey Epstein case.
What’s happened in the past month with our open-minded normie, though, is that this
openness has been validated by the president of the United States and his retainers in a way
that other forms of conspiracy curiosity are not. There is a longstanding pattern in both
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2004 were given oxygen by prominent congressional Democrats; MSNBC’s Russiagate
coverage was not exactly cautious in the theories that it entertained.) But Trump is
obviously different — higher-profile and more radical. He’s a president, not a cable-TV host
or a congressman, and he’s shouting allegations, any allegations, with no pussyfooting,
hedging or deniability involved.
If you are biased against conspiracy theories, this shouting is ridiculous. If you’re somewhat
open toward them, though, and somewhat right-of-center, it provides encouragement. It’s
not that the curious normie listens to Trump and thinks that everything he says is true. It’s
that Trump is providing validation for the belief that something might be true, that where
there are so many claims of fraud a few might be accurate, that where there’s so much
smoke there might be a blaze or two as well.
Of course there are also lots of pure Trump loyalists who trust his claims absolutely, and a
certain number of QAnon-type fantasists who embrace any theory no matter how baroque.
But the voter-fraud narrative is pervasive on the right because you don’t have to be a
loyalist or a fantasist to take something from Trump’s rants — not belief itself, but the
permission to believe.
The outsider-intellectual
The next category of believer consists of extremely smart people whose self-identification is
bound up in constantly questioning and doubting official forms of knowledge. Conservatism
has always had plenty of this sort in its ranks, but the consolidated progressive orthodoxy in
elite institutions means that more and more people come to conservative ideas because they
seem like a secret knowledge, an account of the world that’s compelling and yet excluded
from official discourse.
This, in turn, instills a perpetual suspicion about anything that seems to have too much of a
liberal consensus defending it, especially any idea that gets mocked and laughed at more
than it gets rebutted. And it creates a strong epistemological bias toward what you can only
find out for yourself, as opposed to what Yale’s experts or Twitter’s warning labels or The
New York Times might tell you.
In many cases the outsider-intellectual’s approach generates real insight. (Anonymous
right-wing Twitter was way out ahead of the coronavirus threat, for instance, at a time when
official liberalism was still fretting more about xenophobia than the virus itself.) But it also
tends to recapitulate the closed-circle problems of the official knowledge it rejects.
Thus the outsider-intellectual type looks at the no-voter-fraud consensus and immediately
goes out in search of cracks in the pillar of official truth, anomalies that official certainty
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efforts — not from grifts or lies (though grifters and liars do pick them up) but from sincere
analyses of election data, which inevitably turn up anomalies here and there, which confirm
the searchers’ assumptions, which closes the circle and convinces them that the official
narrative is false and voter fraud is real.
The recently radicalized
This final camp includes many of the people reading and circulating the outsider-intellectual
analyses — people on the right whose perceptions of what liberal institutions and actors are
capable of doing have been altered by the coronavirus era.
Many liberals have spent the Trump years worried about a kind of Reichstag Fire moment,
a crisis that Trump might use as an excuse to consolidate authoritarianism. But a lot of
conservatives experienced May and June of the Covid era as a mirror image of those anti-
Trump fears — as a crisis that seemed to be deliberately exploited for revolutionary
purposes by politicians and activists of the left.
Their story of the spring and early summer starts with our country’s leaders and experts
calling for unprecedented sacrifice, with lockdowns and closures that disproportionately
affected small businesses, churches and families with children — all conservative-coded
groups and institutions — while liberal professionals on Zoom were in better shape and the
great powers of Silicon Valley expanded their influence and wealth. Then, based on a single
activist-amplified case of police brutality, the same experts and politicians suddenly
abandoned restrictions for the sake of left-wing protests … which the official media
pretended were peaceful even when they cut a violent swathe through American cities …
which included a wave of iconoclasm against key symbols of American history … even as a
new ideological vocabulary seemed to suddenly take over elite institutions … and
dissenting figures were purged … and in the background the world’s elites loudly
announced that they were seeking a “Great Reset,” a post-coronavirus new world order.
For the radicalized, all this felt stage-managed, prearranged — both as a further escalation
in the establishment’s battle against Trump, a successor to the Mueller investigation and
the impeachment push, and as an attempt to use the weirdness of the Covid situation to
consolidate radical power within elite institutions. Experiencing and interpreting the
summer of 2020 this way primed people to expect further escalation in the fall: After all, if
liberals exploited a pandemic to stage-manage an ideological revolution, why wouldn’t they
exploit all the weird features of pandemic voting to stage-manage the election outcome?
No doubt some of my liberal readers will find this question too ridiculous to even merit an
answer. You can’t argue someone out of a conspiracy theory, a common axiom goes, which
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quarantine — to be achieved, presumably, through better Facebook algorithms, the
comprehensive political defeat of the Republican Party and some sort of “have you no sense
of decency, sir” courage from news anchors and political leaders whenever right-wing
paranoia re-emerges.
I don’t see any way that these efforts will work. (Certainly on the evidence of 2020, the
Republican Party isn’t going anywhere, let alone about to be “burned to the ground” as
some anti-Trumpers hoped.)
Of course the alternative — actually trying to argue with people in the camps I’ve just
described — may not work either, especially given the curated virtual realities that the
internet increasingly enables us all to inhabit. But I’ve been argued in and out of a few outré
theories in my life. (Only the best outré theories, I assure you.) And if you accept that
there’s more reasoning involved in conspiracy theorizing than official wisdom suggests,
then once such theories achieve a certain prominence, there’s an obligation to actually make
the case against them rather than just laugh them away.
My own attempts at argument have run as follows: To the conspiracy-curious Republican
whose curiosity is validated by Trump’s allegations of fraud, I’ve suggested that the place to
look for fire amid the smoke is in claims that the president’s lawyers are actually willing to
advance in court, as opposed to in news conferences, semiofficial hearings and on Twitter.
Those lawyers — especially now that it’s mostly just the Rudy Giuliani show — have every
incentive to blow a fraud case wide open. If their legal claims don’t actually allege fraud or
they fall apart under scrutiny, then so should your assumption that the president’s
blustering must have some real-world correlative.
To the outsider-intellectuals fascinated by anomalies in ballot counts or ballot return
patterns, I’ve argued that anomalies indicating fraud would have to show up in the final vote
totals — meaning some pattern of results in key swing-state cities that differ starkly from
the results in cities in less-contested states, or some turnout pattern in a swing state’s
suburbs that looks weird relative to the suburbs in a deep- blue or deep-red state. But where
claims for those kinds of anomalies have been offered, they’ve turned out to be false. So
until a compelling example can be cited, anomalies in the counting process should be
presumed to be error or randomness, not fraud.
Finally to the radicalized, I’ve tried to convey, based on my own knowledge of how liberal
institutions work, that what looked stage-managed to outsiders in the May and June
disturbances actually reflected organic upheaval and division, sincere antiracism and
disorganized Trump-phobia, a crisis in the mind of liberalism, a dose of religious revival,
plus a chaotic revolt by city-dwellers against a lockdown experience that fell heavily on
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charge, except sometimes for activists in the younger generation who sensed a professional
opportunity, and any supposed “plan” or “reset” was just a hapless attempt by elder
statesmen to get woke. Put more succinctly: The liberal establishment that I watched
stagger through May and June could not plan a sweeping voter-fraud conspiracy to save its
life.
Have I persuaded anyone with these arguments? Maybe not, and as a columnist for a noted
establishment organ, I’m probably not the best person to make them anyway. That
distinction belongs to people more enmeshed in the conservative universe, scribes for
National Review and talk-radio hosts and conservative media critics, all of whom are the
more important arguers for an intra-Republican debate.
But I am certain that these issues are connected to a larger and more important question for
the future of the right. At the moment, the voter-fraud narrative is being deployed, often by
people more cynical than the groups I’ve just described, to help an outgoing president —
one who twice lost the popular vote and displayed gross incompetence in the face of his
administration’s greatest challenge — stake a permanent claim to the leadership of his
party and establish himself as the presumptive Republican nominee in 2024. And it’s being
used to push aside the more compelling narrative that the Republican Party could take
away from 2020, which is that Trump’s presidency demonstrated that populism can provide
a foundation for conservatism, but to build on it the right needs a very different leader than
the man Joe Biden just defeated.
That’s the most important argument for the next four years — and one I’ll be making firmly,
passionately, right up until the Republican Party nominates Trump again in 2024.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. Weʼd like to hear what you think about this or
any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here s̓ our email: letters@nytimes.com.
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